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INTRODUCTION 
The ideals of the Revolution had still not settled into 
the mainstream of American life by 1830. Over two million black 
Americans were slaves. Burgeoning industry was sucking low-
income farm-people into the cities and exploiting them. The 
best of the virgin lands were held by the banks and railroads. 
For a great number of the new Republic's first-born, meaningful 
freedom and equality had yet to be attained. Many among them 
were eager to transform America's institutions to fit the 
ideals of the democracy. Some of these young people, centering 
about Concord and Boston, accepted the title "Transcendentalist." 
In its hoped-for reformation for society this group felt 
a special intellectual challenge from the elder scholars who 
scoffed at the possibility of ordinary persons establishing 
moral and religious truths for themselves. According to the 
older, and even ancient, tradition the directives or God's will 
indeed God's very existence could be reliably ascertained only 
by a specially educated elite, trained to interpret Scriptures 
and to think correctly. 
Those of the Transcendentalist temper disagreed. Since 
nature was the expression of God's will, the more freely one 
could attend to one's nature the more sure his moral judgments; 
moreover since nature was accessible to all, God's will must 
l 
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be open to all. The Transcendentalists set about to articulate 
a new approach to judging reality, one in which the discovery 
of God's will--and indeed God's existence--would be accessible 
to everyone. Orestes Brownson, Theodore Parker and others tried 
to formulate this approach. And however their formulations 
varied they all agreed implicitly that it was crucial this new 
approach should be able to confirm God's existence. For just 
as their elders, the Transcendentalists (and many of their 
associates) had willingly inherited the Puritan belief that 
moral precepts derived their authority as expressions of God's 
will. To deny God's existence would destroy the binding force 
of moral law and hence completely deflate their hopes for mass 
institutional reform. 
Ralph Waldo Emerson also attempted to articulate the new 
metaphysical viewpoint, and from it to develop a broadly 
accessible approach to God's existence that might serve to 
ground a morals befitting the New Democracy. This study con-
cerns his treatment of the question of God's existence. Three 
propositions serve as major focal-points. First, Emerson's 
thought is genuinely and creatively philosaphieal. Second, his 
philosophical procedure arises within the ordinary experience 
of living and may be called an incipient pragmatism. Third, 
following this procedure Emerson concluded that the evidences 
for belief arising in ordinary experience show that God exists. 
Disappointment with the teachings of traditional Christian-
ity led him into the path of philosophy. His earliest concern 
3 
had been to find suitable norms for moral perfection within 
traditional Christianity but he concluded that since Christian-
ity supposed nature was corrupt its claims regarding moral 
behavior and reality in general, including God's existence, 
were worthless. From revelation he turned to reason. Tradi-
tional empiricism and idealism seemed serious efforts at devel-
oping a viable approach to nature but he decided both tell 
short because they too began with myopic assumptions about 
nature. To find answers at all he would have to work out his 
own approach to philosophy. Only then coul1 he argue to God's 
existence and ground his moral ·theory. Chapter I and II trace 
his critique of traditional Christianity and philosophy to this 
conclusion. 
His new approach was total reliance on the ordinary experi-
ence of natural living. It had two phasest simplicity and 
spontaneity. The first attempts to relieve man from cultural 
preconceptions which hinder total reliance on natural living. 
The second immerses man totally in the spontaneous directionali-
ties of nature. Spontaneous living provides him with true 
beliefs about the world, and--important for his argument tor 
God's existence--his norms for ascertaining whether his beliefs 
are true. The next two Chapters study simplicity and sponta-
neity, the phases of his philosophical procedure. 
We should explain in passing that he is not a philosopher 
in the usual academic sense, for his is not a technical philos-
ophy. His language is controlled but not literal. His thought 
-4 
is logically disciplined but he makes little study of logic as a 
discipline--nor does he concern himself at any length with whe-
ther his reasoning fits into the accepted canons of logic. His 
philosophy is more a.kin to that of Dante, Goethe, Kierkegaard, 
Nietzche, Camus, and perhaps Sartre. He is nearer as he himself 
claims to the ancient Greek "lovers of wisdom", Socrates and 
Plato. For Emerson, the important issues pertain to human exis-
tence; they arise as genuine problems in actual human living or 
not at all. His concepts, his procedures, his modes of expres-
sion are entirely decided by that concern. 
The last two Chapters deal specifically with his thinking 
on God's existence. He believed that his philosophical proce-
dure (loosely designated as "the moral sentiment") established 
that God, the primal boundless source of creativity, existed. 
In brief, since belief in God arose within and was confirmed by 
ordinary experience according to the moral sentiment, then God 
must be real. Chapter V discusses the meaning he gives to the 
term God; Chapter VI turns to the argument itself. 
CHAPTER I 
EMERSON'S CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONAL CHRISTIANITY 
Emerson decided that natural intelligence alone, not a 
specially historically given Christian revelation, could properl; 
ground moral and religious beliefs. He came to this conclusion 
during his efforts to discover an adequate standard for moral 
perfection within Christian revelation. This chapter deals with 
the stages of his thinking which led him to this decision. 
In the earliest stage he sought the moral standard within 
the New England sects, Calvinism and Unitaria.nism. Unsatisfied, 
he then tried to locate it within some as yet undiscovered non-
sectarian core of Christian revelation. This state had two 
phases. For a while he tried arguing that this core was a 
unique deposit given in history. but soon concluding it was far 
more pertinent to establish the existence of this unique revela-
tion in the present, he abandoned the historical quest. During 
this second stage he attempted to turn the Unitarian arguments 
for the authenticity of Christian revelation to his own purposes. 
These arguments, from miracles and the moral sense, receive 
special attention in this chapter. It was through his efforts 
to use them to argue to the authentic core of Christian revela-
tion that he came to the final stage of his critique: that if 
5 
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moral and religious truths were to be discovered at all, only 
natural intelligence would find them. 
F..arly Influence of Calvinism and Unitarianism 
Ralph Waldo Emerson entered Harvard College in 1817 per-
plexed. The scripture injunction "Be ye perfect even as your 
heavenly Father is perfect," haunted him. Taken at its written 
worth it suggested a paradox--that imperfect man become like 
God. Yet how was it possible for imperfect mortals to reach 
divine perfection? The young man earnestly sought an answer. 
He believed God specially instituted Christianity to unravel 
the puzzle precisely by providing the standard which would 
bring the commanded perfection about. Hence his search began 
within the gates of Christianity or, more particularly, within 
the two religious traditions closest within the gates for him 
at the time: Calvinism and Unitarianism. 
His life was subject to the early influences of both Cal-
vinism and Unitarianism. He grew up an avowed Unitarian--born 
into the religion of his father, a minister, who, following the 
leadership of another Unitarian minister, Buckminster, placed 
New England Unitarianism on the path toward its eventual sophis-
tication. Moreover, by the time Ralph Yaldo went to Harvard 
the school was already firmly in the direction of Unitarian 
hands. In fact he never fully set aside his Unitarian associa-
tions. 
Yet he was also steeped with lasting effect in Calvinism. 
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With bis father's death, his formation from age eight shifted 
almost entirely into the care of his mother and his Aunt Mary, 
both devout Calvinists. His aunt, Mary Moody Emerson, deserves 
special comment. Quick, intelligent, slightly renegade in her 
religious beliefs, she tried earnestly to combine a strong 
sense of dedication to her own religious beliefs with a fair 
amount of open-mindedness toward the beliefs of other denomina-
tions. The true scope of her influence on the youth--though 
quite significant--has yet to be researched. She entered his 
life at many times. She became almost a second mother in the 
widow Emerson's struggling household and gained the rare distinc-
tion of being Ralph Waldo's intellectual confident during his 
early manhood years. 
Even his Unitarianism had its Calvinist traces. Originally 
New England Unitarianism grew out of the Calvinist congregations. 
Its nascent form seemed so consistent with the Calvinist teach-
ings that its eventual burgeoning as a distinct point of view 
took many Calvinist theologians entirely by surprise. They 
accused its leaders of having planted sedition in the Calvinist 
ranks. 1 As a result of the split many Oalvinist domains became 
Unitarian. Thus, for instance, Cotton Mather once pastored 
Emerson's father's pulpit--a fact which the younger Emerson 
regarded with reverence. Harvard College too was Calvinist 
before it turned Unitarian. Its library remained a storehouse 
lcr. Clarence Faust "The Background of the Unitarian Oppo-
sition to Transcendental!sm," Modern Philology, XXXV (1938), pp. 
297, et sgq. 
.. 
of the older Puritan writings. Ralph Waldo would read them 
intently. 
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Initially the youth hoped to find an adequate moral stan-
dard within Calvinism and Unitarianism. But neither satisfied 
him. Both drew distorted pictures of nature, especially bum.an 
nature. The Calvinist conception was too pessimistic; the Uni-
tarian, too optimistic. 
Calvinist Conception ot Nature 
According to classical Calvinist theology man's nature, 
because of the primitive tall, is entirely depraved. Man can 
do nothing ot himself either to achieve or thwart his salvation; 
salvation is entirely a gift of God. Christ justifies and sanc-
tities a particular fallen man's nature, 1! God's will has so 
predestined it. Justification means to be redeemed or saved; 
sanctification means to be purified from sin in one's day to day 
activities. 2 
The sign of justification is personal sanctification. Man 
must, therefore, attempt by his own efforts to make his every 
action holy--1.e., pleasing to God's will. Yet since all nature 
has become depraved with the fall of man's nature he cannot 
expect to discover God's will by looking to the things of nature 
2cr. John Winthrop, "Journal," p. 53; John Cotton, "Chris-
tian ciiling," pp. 1?2, et .!.9.9.•• in The American Puritans: Their 
Prose and Poet~, ed. by~erry Miller;-Anchor Boois {Garden atty, 
lew Yori: Doub eday and Company, 1956). (Hereinafter referred 
to as American Puritans.) 
9 
(God's hidden will). To discover what course of action conforms 
to God's will he must turn with trust to God's revealed will, 
the Bible. 3 
Living by the Bible was not all that simple, since usually 
it was not immediately evident how a Scriptural passage should 
relate to a present course of action. Somehow, depraved though 
his nature was, the elect had to rely on his natural capacities 
to make the right interpretation of Scriptures. Puritans in the 
homeland came to recognize this amid the climate of rapid social 
change which marked Elizabethan and Restoration England.4 The 
success of the colonists in forging a new community in the wil-
derness, where there was high demand to rely on one's own abili-
ties, sparked a like realization among New England Puritans. In 
their efforts to cope with this complication Puritans polarized 
into two tendencies. 
Following one move some Puritans, on the theory that upon 
justification reason becomes somewhat regenerated, inclined to 
direct their sanctification by a sober, conservative, rather 
rationally critical commitment to Revelation; following another 
move some leaned toward the belief that the Spirit dwelling 
within steers the elect to sanctification by their personal 
feelings of religious enthusiasm. John Cotton and Anne 
3
.Q!. Increase Mather, "Han knows not his time," pp. 183, 
et .!9.9,i Urian Oakes, "The Sovereign E.f'fic~cy of Divine Provi-
Tence," pp. 192, .!! !.9.9.•, ~· 
4Alan Simpson, Puritanism in Old and New England (Chicago: 
University ot ChicaJ1:0 Press. l9~l. u.-n.-
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Hutchinson represent the polarity in the 1600's; Charles Chauncy 
and Johnathan F.dwards reflect it in the 1700's. 
Special Impact or Edwards on the Development 
of New England Calvinism 
It is important to our purpose to remark upon the place of 
Johnathan Edwards in the development of New England Calvinist 
theology. Perry Miller maintains that American Transcendenta-
lists were attempting to recapture the position of Edwardianism. 
Indeed some key .Emersonian notions can be traced to Calvinist 
origins through Edwards.5 
During the 18th century certain sectors of New England 
became rather well to do. With increased prosperity Puritan 
religiousness turned quite sedate and formalistic. 6 In the age 
before, the experience of conversion had been widely considered 
the chief sign of election, or salvation, and among Congrega-
tionalists, of church membership. This experience, usually 
attended by a feeling of high enthusiasm, indicated a new birth 
which brought with it the conviction of being saved and a dedi-
cation to doing battle with sin.? Now the earlier insistence on 
inward feelings of ecstacy and on moral seriousness had dwindled, 
so much so that frequently not even clerics considered it 
5l'1iller "Johnathan Edwards to :Emerson,"!'!!.! England .2!!!£-
terly, XIII (December, 1940), p. 608. 
6 Ibid.• p. 600. 
-
?Simpson, Puritanism !!!, fil ~ .!!?! England, pp. 2, ~ !.9.9.• 
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necessary to experience oonversion. 8 
It was Edwards who refurbished the foundations of Puritan 
philosophy and revived the waning seriousness of Puritan ferYor 
and dedication. To rekindle religious experience, to call men's 
heart~ to God, Edwards not without trepidation strongly rear-
• 
firmed the importance of sentiment--thus the vigorous tone of 
his sermons. 
Yet be was not as distrustful as Calvin of rational thinki 
as a means to foster religious insight. 
FA.wards was a gifted speculative thinker whose mind 
was nourished by the great thinkers or the past, 
and freshened by the new currents flowing trom the 9 Cambridge Platonists, from Locke and from Berkeley. 
In effect Edwards attempted to synthesize both poles in the 
Puritan tradition by bringing both reason and emotion to bear 
together upon sound religious conviction. Emerson's notion or 
experience bears FA.ward's mark. 
Edwards also mollified the Puritan concept ot nature. Like 
Calvin he placed the sovereignty of God above all other consi-
derations, yet within this framework several subordinate doc-
trines assumed a different tone. First, though depraved and 
fallen all nature was a product or God's will. Since His will 
was all-good all nature had to be good.lo Secondly regarding 
means or sanctification, though men were saved only by putting 
8Ral:ph Barton Perry, Puritauism and Democracy; (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1944), p. ?~. ---
9Perr,., Puritanism !!!9. Democrac1, p. 102. 
lOMiller "Johnat 
... 
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on Christ rather than by their own natural intelligence obedi-
ence was neither blind nor ignorant but rather, as Ralph Barton 
Perry put it, 
••• within its limits the human mind shares and confirms 
the knowledge of God, and the moral experience and in-
sight of man give meaning to the goodness of God •••• 
God's omnipotence was construed as a beneficent force 
which guaranteed the triumph of the moral will; and 
his omniscience as a revelation of the good, which 
eon.firmed and extended the worshipper's moral judge-
ment. God was obeyed for the sake of that goodness 
which his power executes, and which bis wisdom illumi-
nates.11 
By :Emerson's day the emotional tide of the Great Awakening 
in which Edwards shared had ebbed, and sober intellectual cur-
rents augmented now by the presence of Lockean philosophy within 
them reasserted themselves upon New England Calvinist beliefs. 
Once again pastors returned to their libraries and people to 
religious formalism. Hence the Calvinism young :ED.arson dis-
covered was that nourished by the intellectual side of F.d.wards, 
shorn of much of the fervid drive that made it live. But his 
own growing concern for reform soon quickened his interest in 
the fuller picture of Edwards. He was particularly drawn to 
Edwards' less auspicious view of nature and to his attempt to 
bring reason and emotions into synthesis. 
Unitarian Conception of Nature 
Even the first generation of New England Puritans though 
heavily suspicious of human nature took the material and 
11 Perry, Puritanism ~ Democracy, p. 3?0. 
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spiritual success of their project as a sign of the rightness of 
their decision to leave the Old for the New World. The New--
brutal and wild--World had demanded more than geographical sepa-
ration from the homeland. The forms for every-day living in 
.England, founded on circumstances far different than those of 
New England, did not lend themselves well to the problems of 
surviving in the wilderness. The colonists were forced to rely 
on their own strengths, skills and ingenuity to develop viable 
torms of their own. The success o! their experiment coaxed New 
Englanders into a gradual trust of human nature. The early 
Unitarians, fed by their colonial experience,12 and to some 
extent encouraged by Enlightenment ideals, seized upon and 
developed those aspects of Edwardian theology which stressed the 
goodness of nature and the capabilities or human intelligence. 
The major point of opposition between the Unitarians and 
Calvinists concerned their views on the goodness and reliability 
of nature. According to Unitarians man's nature was not fallen. 
Yet man ~ sanctify himself--perfect himself in his daily 
activities. That was the comm.and of God. Sanctification no 
longer meant, as it did for the Calvinists, the external expres-
sion of the fact that the fallen man had been internally 
restored to the order of grace (justification). It merely meant 
to become more God-like. Man was born in the image of God. 
12cr. Joseph Buckminster, "Sermon," pp. 17-18, in The 
Transcendentalists: An Antholo~, ed. by Perry Miller (aambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1960~ (Hereinafter referred to as 
The Transcendentalists.) 
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!hough never fallen. man at birth only very slightly reflected 
the divine image. Sanctification was the gradual improvement on 
the image. Man placed himself on the road of progressive sanc-
tification by his own efforts--by knowing and doing G·od's will. 
How to discover God's will remained a difficult issue though. 
While in contrast to Calvinists, Unitarians professed more confi-
dence in the ability of human intelligence, they still believed 
that unaided it could unveil only little of God's expressed will 
in nature. A special guide, provided by the Scriptural life of 
Christ, was needed. Even here, however, Unitarians interpreted 
the Scriptures according to their own--rather Lockean--notions 
of experience and understanding. 
With Locke's thought influential in their theology, Unitar-
ians were prey to the difficulties inherent in his philosophy. 
One such problem was whether Locke's theory of knowledge actu-
ally made it even possible to apply reason validly to morals and 
religion. Though at first unaware of this problem, by the time 
Emerson had reached college the Unitarians were quite sensitive 
to it, but they felt they had found rectification for Locke's 
shortcomings in the theory of the moral sense elaborated by the 
Scottish School of Common Sense. 13 Thus assured• the Unitarians' 
l3Reasonableness was the norm used by New England Unitar-
ians to decide which Scriptural statements God actually revealed. 
Their conception of reasonableness depended heavily on Locke's 
theory of knowledge. Hume had argued that given Locke's basic 
assumptions no one could rationally establish the truth of moral 
and religious statements. Were Hume correct the Unitarians, 
with their theory of Biblical interpretation, would not be able 
to authenticate almost any important Scriptural passage. 
p 
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confidence in nature led them to maintain that both nature 
itself and especially Scriptures express for man those courses 
of action which conform to God's will. Human understanding, or 
more particularly the moral sentiment14--applicable both to 
nature and to Scriptures--made God's will intelligible. 15 
Rejection of Calvinism and Unitarianism 
Neither Calvinism nor Unitarianism gave Emerson a satis-
factory account of man's relationship to God, hence neither 
could provide the proper base for deciding norms for reaching 
perfection. The young man wondered ~ his heavenly father 
expected imperfect man to be as perfect as He. The Calvinists 
maintained that the justified must indeed be perfect, though 
perfect sanctification in this world could never be achieved. 
The merit of the Calvinist position was its attempted explana-
tion of how one could remain imperfect (sanctification) and 
still be called perfect (justification). He respected the 
realism of the Calvinists for having recognized man's imperfec-
tion. But he believed that they went too far in asserting the 
total corruption and unreliability of human nature. He along 
14Unitarians who accepted the theory of the moral sentiment 
borrowed it from the Scottish School of Common Sense. For the 
New England Unitarians the moral sentiment was a unified act or 
intelligence and emotions, issuing from a special sense, wherein 
they differed strongly from both David Hume and Adam Smith. 
l5stephen E. Whicher, Freedom and Fate (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1953), pp. 6-?. 
jilP 
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with many of his generation had become convinced that the emi-
nent success of the new nation in carving out a worthwhile--
indeed superior--society in the wilderness had come about 
chiefly through man's reliance on his own intelligence and 
force. This conYiction was a major !actor in leading him and 
many of his fellow New Englanders to a more sanguine view of 
nature. To use and enjoy nature's goods, to keep all man's 
natural capacities in place of useful prominence, were cardinal 
Emersonian principles. 
On this point he was closer to the Unitarians. In his es-
timate the strength of their view resided in their positive 
stress on the need to live virtuously and especially in their 
attempt to provide a scheme for sanctification in which both 
nature and man's reason had been rescued from limbo. Yet he 
felt their depiction of nature was as much over-drawn as that of 
the Calvinists'. For the Unitarian doctrine supposed man to 
have far more ability to achieve good than Emerson thought the 
facts allowed. That was its fatal weakness. 
Neither Calvinism nor Unitarianism sufficiently satisfied 
him. As he says the rigid party (Calvinism) takes as its prin-
ciple man's deep liability to sin; the liberal, man's boundless 
capacity for virtue. Both run off to extremes. The truth he 
thought must somehow be in between. 16 Each sect had preserved 
16Arthur c. MoGiffert, Jr., ed., Youn Emerson Speaks 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1938), ~. (Hereinafter 
referred to as YES.) 
-
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part of the integral Christian message but had also distorted 
the rest; therefore neither had a clear claim to a reliable 
moral standard. Surmising that the cause of the distortion was 
sectarianism, he next set about to discover the full Christian 
revelati0n, unsullied by the dogmatizing influence of any 
sect. 17 
The Search for the Primitive Core 
of Christian Revelation 
For the next phase of his investigation, Emerson hoped to 
turn to his own purposes the standard Unitarian arguments for 
the authenticity of Christianity. These arguments--from mira-
cles and the moral sense--require special discussion. The 
difficulties he had in implementing them forced him first to 
abandon hope or finding the unsullied historical core of Chris-
tianity and then even to reject the possibility of its unique-
ness. The following section deals with the features or these 
arguments, the problems they raised, and the conclusion :Emerson 
reached because of them: that if moral and religious truths were 
discoverable, only natural intelligence--and not a special reve-
lation--would be able to find them. 
The Appeal to Miracles 
The Unitarian appeal to miracles was rather simple in 
17 ~·•PP• 84-85. 
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outline. God is all-good. He would not deceive mankind in 
important matters. Miracles accompanied the founding of Chris-
tianity in numbers unrivaled by any other religion. Since only 
God can perform miracles these must have been a sign by which 
God had indicated that Christianity is a unique revelation of 
His will for man. To conclude otherwise would mean that God 
has deceived man which because of His infinite goodness He would 
not do. 
Emerson's first difficulties with the argument came from 
Hume's objections against the reality of miracles. 18 Hume held 
that miracles were violations of the laws of nature--laws which 
"firm and unalterable experience has established." Since uni-
form experience amounts to a proof only a superior opposite 
proof can establish the reality of miracles. 19 The case for 
miracles depends on reliability of the testimony of witnesses. 
since none of us has seen a miracle. We only trust the testi-
mony of a witness because of past observation. Since past 
observation also grounds the laws of nature, we must compare the 
18
.Em.erson•s first introduction to Hume came at Harvard Col-
lege. The faculty seems to have had as much animosity as mis-
conception about Hume's thought. They generally believed Hume 
to have been effectively silenced by the developments in the 
Scottish School, and were bewildered to discover that he and not 
Locke had won the day among European scholars. The Hume Emerson 
first learned of was that of his professors. But in the years 
immediately to follow, he took Hume under increasingly serious 
re-appraisal. 
l9David Hume, An Enquirz ConeerninH Human Understanding, in 
The Philosophical Works, ed. oy Thomasi11 areen and Thomas 
Hodge ~rose, reprint of the new edition (London: 1886; Aalen: 
pr 
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past experience in both cases in order to judge which is more 
probable. Since testimony concerning religious miracles more 
commonly violates the truth than that concerning any other 
matter of fa.ct, we should form a general resolve never to trust 
the authority of the former. Hume concludes that people accept 
miracles because of "the passion of surprise and wonder, arising 
from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, given a sensible 
tendency toward belief of those events from which it is 
d n20 derive • 
Hume's conclusion is particularly biting. 
Christian Religion not only was at first attended 
by miracies, but even at this day cannot be believed 
by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is 
insufficient to convince us of its veracity, and who 
even is moved by faith to assent to it is conscious 
of a continue~ miracle in his own person, which sub-
verts all the principles of his understanding, and a 
determination to believe what is most contrary to 
custom and experienee.21 
Incredible as it may seem Emerson would transform this view into 
a summary of true belief. We shall return tothis. 
He initially tried to counter Hume with a rather tradi-
tional argument. He grants from his reading of the Common Sense 
philosopher, Thomas Brown,,that Hume correctly stated that faith 
in testimony was based on the lesser improbability of the facts 
than of the falsehood of the witness. He further asserts--with 
implications about the moral sense Hume would reject--that man 
is endowed with a principle of inevitable belief in the 
20Ibid., Pt. II. 
21Ibid. 
-
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uniformity of the laws of nature. But miracles do not violate 
laws of nature. Since God's will is one of the powers of nature 1 
what he wills in a miracle may be a new effect in nature but 
cannot be an internal contradiction of the laws of nature. 22 
Still this response did not fully satisfy him; he strongly sus-
pected that Hume had yet to be effectively answered. 
Not long afterwards he hit upon a solution in a paradox 
typically Emersonian. Hume was absolutely aorreet. The notion 
of miracles as special events repulsed the mind. But he was 
wrong to conclude that there are no miracles. There is a 
strictly divine character to ordinary phenomena. What revolts 
the mind is the idea of two kinds of miracles, the ordinary and 
the special (those to which Christianity turns). 23 
The miraculous is a divine manifestation. A divine mani-
festation is what happens by powers beyond the capacities open 
to given agents of our experience. Moral goodness among men, 
and novelty in all of nature--elevation, as we shall see later--
are occurences beyond the power of the object to explain. "All 
our life is a miracle ••• ! believe in a manifestation of power 
22
william Gilman, Alfred Ferguson, et al., eds., The Jour-
nals and Miscellaneous Notebooks Qf. Ralpn-Wi!do Emerson;-";-vo!s. 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1960), Vol. II, pp. 402-403. 
(Hereinafter referred to as~.) 
23F.d.ward Waldo Emerson, ed., The Complete Works of Ralph 
~ldo Emerson, centenary edition, ~vols. (Boston: Houghton 
ffiin and Co., 1903-1904), Vol. I, p. 129. (Hereinafter re-
ferred to as Works.) JMN, Vol. III, p. 241; Ralph Rusk, The 
Letters of Ralpn Yaldo~erson, 6 vols. (New York: Colum.bra-Uni-
versity 'Press, 1939), Vo!. I, pp. 174-175. (Hereinafter re-
ferred to as Letters.) 
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beyond my own, because I am such a manifestation. 11--e.g., rais-
ing an arm, remembering, communicating. 24 In the "Divinity 
School Address" he remarks that Christ, the finest example of 
how we should live, felt all man's life was a miracle; Christ 
knew that "this daily miracle shines as the character ascends."25 
Emerson equates 'ascension' with •creation' and 'being'. 
The moral sentiment identifies the presence of newness, or a 
creative act. Creative acts reveal divine presenae. 26 To his 
Aunt Mary he writes it is more fit to take every moment of the 
existence of the universe as a ~ Creation and everything as a 
revelation of the divinity to the observer's mind. 27 To be is 
to be ascending. The fact that any x !!. (i.e., is ascending) 
he regards as a continuous miracle. For, the ascension of x is 
its movement to a plane beyond the power of production by any 
causal source we might find at that point in our experience. 
Thus the movement is a continuing manifestation of God. If 
everything is a miracle then there are no specia~ miracles by 
which to establish a special divine revelation, viz., Christi-
anity. The Unitarian appeal to miracles is pointless. 
~e Ap~eal to the Moral Sense 
The second Unitarian argument he adopted in hopes of 
24McGiffert, !,!2, PP• 120-126. 
25Emerson, Works, Vol. I, p. 129. 
~6 ~~··pp. 338-339. 
27Rusk, Letters, Vol. I, pp. 1?4-175. 
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uncovering the core of Christian revelation was from the moral 
sense. A fairly representative ve1:-sion of' the Unitarian appeal 
to the :r;ioral sense was that of Levi Frisbie. Fris1Jie' s approach 
is of special interest because it reflects the thinking common 
among many of EmtJrson' s Harvard pro.f'essors, and because as 
Frisbie's student he was highly impreBsed by it. 28 Frisbie used 
to appeal to the moral sense to argue to God's existence but the 
basic form of the argument also served to establish many other 
propositions--among them that Christian revelation was unique 
and given at a definite point of time in history. 
As we find it in Emerson's journal, Frisbie's argument for 
God's existence begins with the observation that only for vir-
tuous acts do we have a sense or feeling of moral approbation. 
'We feel moral approbation neither in observing the utility of 
material things, nor even in contemplating the beauty of a work 
of art, though what grounds aesthetic pleasure is analogous to 
what grounds our approval of moral activities. Aesthetic plea-
sure has its roots in "the power we immediately recollect to be 
28Levi Frisbie (1783-1822) was Alford Professor of Natural 
Religion, Moral Philosophy and Civil Polity at Harvard. JMN, 
Vol. I, p. 23, n. 43. Merril Davis, "Emerson's 'Reason' and the 
Scottish Philosophers," New England $uarterly, XVII (June, 1944~ 
pp. 220-221. :Emerson's interest in he argument may be gathered 
from the following. Students were routinely expected to get the 
salient points of their lesnons verbatim. To facilitate this 
Emerson often set them dow11 in his journals. Frisbie' s argument 
is recorded at length in 1820. JMN. Vol. I. P• 23-24. Whan 
Frisbie died in 1822 Emerson noti'S!iis passing and repeats the 
argument in almoot the same words. ~. Vol. II, p. 5. Again. 
eight years later he wrote a clear resume of it. JMN, Vol. III, 
p. 207. ---
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necessary to the creation of the painting." Similarly, we find 
the grounds for moral approbation in the power we recognize as 
necessary for a moral act to have taken place. "So when in 
Morals Ye see Virtue, what is it pleases us? Not the Utility; 
but the idea of moral power and beauty which strikes us as 
necessary to give birth to the action." As a confirmation of 
this view Frisbie points out that we feel impelled to stronger 
moral approval tor displays of virtues requiring mightier effort 
than for homely everyday virtues. which in fact usually have 
most utility. 29 
Frisbie's analogy between the moral and aesthetic is not by 
chance. He supposes that aesthetic experience involves an 
integrated function of both the intellectual and emotional 
aspects of man, and he intends to make the same case for the 
functioning of the moral sense. It too is a special synthesis 
of both the intellectual and emotional. Frisbie speaks as if 
his audience were quite familiar with the workings of aesthetic 
experience. He also seems to suggest that the discovery of the 
existence of God as the moral power is based on a sort of moral 
experience at least as widely accessible as the aesthetic. The 
aesthetic stands as preamble to the moral. Indeed later on 
Emerson would maintain that because moral activity was the high-
est expression of beauty, the person most sensitive to all forms 
of beauty, the poet, would be most keenly aware of the actual 
relations between men and God. Of course Emerson believed that 
29JMN, Vol. I, pp. 23-24. 
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all men could become poets. 
As Rusk notes J'risbie's argument lacks full elaboration.30 
Jully developed Prisbie's reasoning assumes this form. First, 
tor everything that happens a cause at least equal to it in 
power exists. J'urther, by itself a thing tends to remain in its 
given state. Bence whatever we discover transformed to a state 
beyond its preVious capacities could not have elevated itself. 
some power other than and superior to the object in question 
aust by in.terence have e!!ected the elevation. It is the idea oj 
the moral power we recognize as necessary !or the moral activit7 
to happen that excites aoral approbation. 
lrisbie infers that the power which ultillately underlies 
the moral sentiment and the moral elevation which ati.JBulated the 
sentiment must be God. Since man cannot account for his own 
virtuous act (elevation) some other being possessed absolutely 
ot the power to effect virtue, namely God, must account !or the 
elevation. 
!he tollowing passage shows that this is precisely how !Ber-
son understood his professor's argwaent. 
Bo man addicted to chemistry ever discovered a salt, 
or an acid, which he thought divine, never discovered 
a law which he thought God. !lo man devoted to liter-
ary criticism ever imagined that aD7 of the thoughts 
that formed his study was God. But the man who culti-
vated the moral powers, ascended to a tho~ght and said 
... !h ..i..,s-. !! .is!!!• !he faith is the eVidence.-'.l 
30aalph L. Rusk, The Li.te o! Ra~ph Waldo Emerson (1'ew York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons-;-1'94ljJ,-p. • 
31~, Vol. III, p. 207. By "faith is the evidence" he 
25 
As Emerson's journals indicate, the general structure of 
the argument could be readily shifted to the case for a specifi-
cally and historically revealed Christianity. He relates that 
close study of religious history shows the most morally elevated 
features of an era are invariably associated with the presence 
of Christianity. But no epoch can elavate itself; each is what 
it is. Therefore, God must be the source of the elevation. 
Further, moral elevation is a special sign of God's approbation. 
Therefore, Christianity must be specially revealed.32 
Abandonment of the Search for the Historical 
and Unique Core of Christian Revelation 
In the beginning Dnerson maintained that the moral sense 
showed Christianity was both given at a definite time in the 
past and was unique in history. But over the five years follow-
ing his college graduation his perspective changed considerably. 
At the start of 1826, he still believed in an historical 
core of revelation. but he remarks that since revelation is 
intelligible only through reason, reason might be called a 
"revelation prior to Revelation."33 Soon after, he abandoned 
his intention of establishing an historical deposit, concen-
trating instead on showing that Christianity was a unique 
means this belief in God is a constitutional fact of human con-
sciousness, and hence cannot be denied without imputing absur-
dity to nature. 
32cr. JMN, Vol. I, p. 80 (1822). 
- -33 JMN, Vol. II, pp. 160-161. 
-
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revelation operative in the present age. He reasoned that the 
yardstick of moral elevation could apply just as well to events 
now as to those of the past. The highest degree of moral 
development signified the presence of the fullest expression of 
God's will. Since each age progresses morally and since the 
present age represents the current peak of the ascent. the high-
est degree of moral development discovered in the present would 
serve to identify the unique body of Christian revelation opera-
tive now. If moral truths develop in every age--as they do 
par excellence in Christianity--the present status of Christi-
anity not its history is importa.nt.34 
But as the full tensions within the framework of his posi-
tion occur to him he even rejects the notion that the moral 
sense affirms the uniqueness of Christian revelation. He 
believes that, while it is true that moral elevation reveals 
God's design and that the present elevation reveals it best. 
human intelligence alone sets up the standards by which to judge 
the presence of a moral advancement. What reason discovers. 
however, is that !!.!. moral truths evolve--not just those of 
Christianity. Nor are Christian truths always the most advanced 
Hence the moral sense does not disclose Christianity as a unique 
revelation.35 Still, he notes, Sacred Scriptures remain the 
richest mine for moral truth. 
34Rusk, Letters, Vol. I. pp. 1?4-175. 
35 JMN, Vol. III, P• 15 • 
............ 
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Thus though he had hoped the moral sense would show him 
that Christianity was historically given and unique, instead it 
convinced him that concern about an historical deposit was of 
little relevance. and that belief in the uniqueness of Christian 
revelation was unfounded. 
Critigue of Traditivnal Christianity as a Whole 
The difficulties he found in the appeal to miracles and the 
moral sense directed Emerson to a still more basic criticism of 
Unitarianism and the whole of traditional Christianity. Regard-
less of how heartily Christianity insists on the goodness of 
human nature it also claims that man needs a special store of 
revelation to uncover true moral and religious beliefs. There-
fore it does not actually trust human nature. He levels this 
criticism directly at Unitarianism, but since he regarded 
Unitarianism the best manifestation of traditional Christianity, 
it was intended for all traditional Christianity. I! as Unitar-
ians claimed, nature and man's natural capacities are good, i.~., 
if they are fit to reach their natural ends, then Unitarians 
fall into inconsistency. On the one hand they stress the good-
ness of natural capacities; but on the other hand they belittle 
nature by insisting that without the Scriptures man has no sure 
guide to a good life. 
By stressing the goodness of nature, the older Unitarians 
had merely intended to vindicate the ability or human intelli-
28 
Unitarian theologians stressed that all our ideas come through 
experience and reasoning--experience and reasoning taken primar-
ily in the Lockean sense. but also significantly colored by the 
German "higher criticism" of Herder and others.36 To interpret 
scriptures properly meant to rely only om those positions con-
sistent with the ideas gathered from experience and reason. 
They thought this approach would purge Sacred Scriptures of thos 
doctrines, for instance the Trinity, which seemed openly con-
trary to reason and experience. ,.Higher criticism" was to 
strengthen respect for Revelati·on. 37 
Though this strain ot Unitarianism deemed human nature reli 
able enough to soundly interpret Sacred Scripture, it by no 
means intended to declare that human nature was self-sufficient 
to learn God's will without Scriptures. The German rationalists 
however, had claimed just that, and the New England Calvinists 
were fond of warning the Unitarians they were plunging head-long 
in the same direction. But the Unitarians steadfastly declared 
that reason could neither alter nor increase the content of 
revelation. The corpus of revelation closed with the Bible.38 
36Faust, "The Background of the Unitarian Opposition to 
Transcendentalism," pp. 304-305; Rene Wellek, "The Minor Tran-
scendentalists and German Philosophy,"!!.! England ~arterly, 
XV (Dec., 1942), p. 654. 
3?Faust, "The Background of the Unitarian Opposition to 
Transcendentalism," P• 299. 
38Ibid. , p. 303. 
Turn toward Self-reliance and Trust 
~n the P.riiiacy of LiVins 
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»nerson took the step the elder Unitarians had vowed should 
never follow from their theology, reliance on natural living for 
personal revelations of God's will. He and many of his peers 
became quite restive with the ambivalance they sensed at the 
roots of Unitarianism. If human nature is reliable as Unitar-
ians constantly professed why should they also believe that 
revelation has come only through the Bible, as if man's intelli-
gence were not trustworthy? In fact only when one finds revela-
tions in himself can the revelations of the Bible become intel-
ligible. 
Emerson argued that even though a man may find the doctrine 
of self-reliance in Scriptures, he will only find it there if he 
has discovered it already in himself, (through the moral senti-
ment). "The Bible is a sealed book to him who has not heard its 
laws from his own soul." Thus there are at least two sorts of 
revelation (personal and scriptural), the first being the norm 
for understandin~ the second. Reason is a "revelation prior to 
Revelation."39 In a sermon delivered first in 1830 he declares 
that the study of the implications in the moral sense gives us 
the fullest revelations. 
A mind of generous nature is early taught to contem-
plate with delight and reverence its own faculties--
39McG1ffert, YES, pp. 111 l?Ot JMN Vol. II pp. 250-251. 
Emerson had not ye"e""'t!oncluded ~hat Ch1'1'.'1J~ian revelation was not 
a unique and special revelation. 
to reverence them for their use; to believe, that, as 
God gave them, they are imperfect copies of his own 
perfections; and that he is well pleased in the good 
they produce; that the purposes of God are best deduced 
from his works.40 
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Thus his investigation led him to several radical conclu-
sions. On the one hand neither moral nor religious truths could 
be derived from the teachings of traditional Christianity as he 
had formerly supposed. Indeed the doctrines of Christianity 
were distorted since they falsely presumed nature was not fully 
reliable. Moreover, special revelation and hence the need for 
special miracles was superfluous. On the other hand human intel-
ligence could well provide its own original religious and moral 
inspirations. indeed every moment could bring a new divine reve-
lation. As yet he was not sure how this could come about. But 
he believed nature was trustworthy, and that if moral and reli-
gious truths were to be discovered at all, only natural intelli-
gence would be able to find them. 
As his hopes for a moral and religious standard within 
Christianity dwindled. he increased his concern for the possibil-
ity of finding the standard within nature itself. For a time his 
critique of Christianity and of natural reason went on hand in 
hand without perhaps too much differentiation of effort. But by 
1832 he was in the midst of making explicit attempts--aided by 
philosophical writings from the empiricist and idealist tradi-
tions--at discovering how man's natural capacities could provide 
40 McGiffert, YES, pp. 84-85. 
-
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the standard. His search culminated in a critique of both the 
empiricist and idealist traditions, and in a positive statement 
of his own philosophical thought. 
CHAPTER II 
EMERSON'S CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHY 
Emerson developed a philosophical procedure of his own 
because, contrary to his expectations, traditional empiricism 
and idealism proved wanting. He had turned to them for help as 
he gradually recognized that reliance on Christianity was tutile, 
and only natural intelligence could promise any hope of discover-
ing truths about the world. Empiricism and idealism failed 
because, like Calvinism and Unitarianism on a theological plane, 
they, on a philosophical plane, were each based on a one-sided 
view of man•s nature and nature as a whole. Empiricism accentu-
ated the senses at the expense of reason; idealism, reason at 
the expense of the senses. As a result both derived myopic 
philosophical procedures and faulty descriptions of reality--
the one overstressing the material, the diverse and changing; 
the other, exaggerating the ideal, the unified and stable. 
Emerson decided that since traditional philosophy in framing 
its conceptions of the nature of man had not relied entirely 
on natural intelligence, he would have to discover a genuine 
philosophical approaoh for himself. 
This chapter deals with his critique of traditional empir-
icism and idealism. Though treated separately the same order 1' 
32 
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o! study is used for each: first, his use of the terms 'empiri-
cism' or 'idealism'; second, his understanding of their basic 
positions; third, his study of their merits and weaknesses. The 
final section of this chapter shows how his critique contributed 
to the development of his own philosophical procedure. 
Meaning of 'Empiricism' 
Emerson used the term 'empiricism' principally to designate 
the positivist type of philosophy he associated with the British 
tradition continuous through Locke, Hume especially, and in some 
respects the "Scottish School." Other terms he uses for 'empiri-
cism' are 'sensiam' and 'sceptical philosophy'. He first con-
tacted empiricist writers in his classes at Harvard College and 
the Divinity Sehool.1 But not until a little later, when he 
began to recognize the true value of Hume's thought, did he give 
empiricism a scholar's attention. Hume's forceful impression 
on him led him practically to identify empiricism with Hume. 
Most younger Unitarians seemed to have made the same iden-
tification. They too considered Hume the supreme empiricist. 
Moreover contrary t~ many or their elders they maintained that 
the basic assumptions of Locke led directly into the philosophy 
or Hume. Hence the appellation of "scepticism" which they 
stamped on empiricism. By scepticism they meant that which 
their teachers only suspected in Locke but which stood explicitlJ 
1Emerson read Francis Bacon, Locke, Montaigne, Hume and 
others as school studies. 
in Hume: doubtfulness concerning the rational foundations for 
moral and religious statements. 
The Empiricist Position 
Emerson became most seriously interested in Hume's philos-
ophy as his conviction grew that Hume's criticism of Locke was 
correct. Hume had pointed out that, contrary to Locke, given 
the sensist theory of knowledge there was no way to confirm 
religious or moral statements. Jlaerson suspected, however, that 
the sensist theory of knowledge rested on a faulty assumption, 
the mind-body bifurcation of man. He studied Hume and the posi-
tivistic frame of mind to learn whether his suspicions were 
well founded. He decided they were. 
According to Hume's theory of knowledge--and that of the 
positivistio2 tradition following him--man performs two separate 
cognitive functions, sensing and reasoning. The former alone 
directly contacts facts; the latter simply relates ideas de-
rived from facts. Ma.n's sole direct cognitive relation with 
facts comes through sensing. Moreover, only the quantitative 
in sense-experience lends itself to valid factual generaliza-
tions. Thus no non-quantitative, non-material, generalizations 
about the realm of facts are possible. Further, no evidence in 
sense-experience supports factual generalizations about necessar' 
2The positivistic view maintains that only those factual 
generalizations are possible which are derivable (directly or 
indirectly) from empirical science. 
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connections between events or about the universal presence of a 
particular factor among specific events past, present and to 
come. 
Hence some purported factual generalizations, such as those 
affirming the reality of the causal relation or the presence of 
universal order in the world, actually arise not from experience 
but from a feeling of vividness which springs up in a natural 
association with repeatedly recurring experiences. Such general-
izations are belief-statements.3 Hume calls them "natural 
beliefs." They are not factual. Though of great practical 
value, natural beliefs have no speculative import. Thus the two 
chief cosmological arguments for God's existence--from causality 
and order--are invalidated at a stroke. Neither are grounded 
in sense-experience and hence cannot tell us anything about 
reality; nor can they rest on reason since reason depends 
entirely on sense-experience tor its content. 
Hume argued that moral statements in like manner are not 
supported by sense experience or by reason. In brief, reason 
by itself only relates ideas among themselves, ideas which are 
all ultimately derived from sense-experience. He gives a series 
or arguments to show further that only feelings not reason can 
~otivate human behavior. An idea must be desirable in order !or 
a man to act on it. 
3A belie! is defined as "a lively idea related to or asso-
ciated with a present impression." David Hume, Treatise on 
Human Nature, Bk. I, pt. 2, Sec. 7. --
As long as it is allowed, that reason has no influence 
on our passions and action, it is in vain to pretend 
that morality is discovered only by a deduction of rea-
son. An active principle can never be founded on an 
inactive; and if reason be inactive in itself it must 
remain so ••• whether it exerts itself in natural or 
moral subjects.4 
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Moral statements are rooted in special feelings called 
moral sentiments. Feelings may indicate something about one's 
subjective state, but nothing factual about the world. Thus 
some moral statements may be natural beliets--of great practical 
but of no speculative significance. 
Critigue of Hume and :&npiricism 
:&nerson's critique of Hume centers about his failure to 
recognize that reason does have a direct relation to matters 
of fact, that reason makes factual judgments in a unified tunc-
tion with the rest of man's powers (his will, senses, feelings) 
and that natural belie! or sentiment5 is the form these judge-
ments take. While Hume recognized only mathematics and empiri-
cal science as legitimate approaches to generalization, and only 
the latter as !actual, Emerson regarded natural belief an 
approach to generalization midway between mathematics and empiri-
cal science, and only the middle way as genuinely dealing with 
reality. 
4 Ibid., Bk. III, pt. I, see. 1 • 
.............. 
5sentiment, for Emrson, means judgment unified with feeling. 
He borrows the term from the Scottish School. Reid, Works, Vol. 
III, p. 309; Stewart, Works, Vol. V, p. 160, in "Emerson's 
'Reason' and the Scottish ~hilosophers," by Davis, p. 222. 
--
The middle region of our being is the temperate zone. 
We may climb into the thin and cold realm of pure 
geometry and lifeless science, or sink into that of 
sensation. Between these extremes is the equator of 6 life, of thought, of spirit, of poetry--a narrow belt. 
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His thinking had been strongly influenced by the Scottish 
philosophers, Reid• Stewart, and Brown. The Scottish School of 
common Sense considered natural beliefs as empirical data of 
consciousness; they called these beliefs moral sentiments. 
Thomas Reid in arguing that two of these beliefs--the reality of 
the external world and the presence of order in it--had factual 
significance, declared they could be considered fictional only 
if there were no successful planning and carrying out of plans 
in everyday life. But since men did successfully organize their 
activities according to plans, these beliefs must have factual 
import.? Emerson was especially taken by the insistence among 
these philosophers that reason does have an empirical grounding, 
and by their attempt to base their argument on an appeal to 
everyday living. As a college senior he was convinced that, 
while the language of Reid's argument had obscured its thrust, 
it decisively rebutted Hume's theory of natural beliet.8 And 
though he would in time build his own critique he always 
6 Emerson, Works, Vol. III, p. 62. 
?Book, "Anglo-American Common Sense and German Geist, 11 
American Qy.arterlz, VIII (Summer, 1956), pp. 159-160. 
8Emerson, "The Present State of Ethical Philosophy," in 
-ewr Unpublished Essa~s· ed. Edward E. Hale ((N.p.): Lamson, f?e, and Co., 189 ). 
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considered Hume weakest at this point.9 
Emerson could find no true middle ground between Hume's 
assertion that neither the senses nor reason nor natural belief 
could establish the reality of order, and the implicit conclu-
sion that no order exists. For Hume that middle ground was 
supposed to be the practicability of natural belief. But in 
Emerson's mind either belief includes no factual assertion, and 
action on thst basis rests on illusion, or if action on the basii 
of natural belief is not illusory, then the belief includes 
factual assertion.10 A belief which appears to be factual eithel 
is or is not factual. Insofar as a belief is true it can suc-
cessfully direct activities; insofar as it is false it cannot. 
If all man's natural beliefs were false he would possess no 
reliable way to live. He would not know how he ought to act. 
The result would be a paralysis--men would do nothing. 
Emerson was threatened by such a paralysis while he strug-
gled with the sceptical implications of empirieism. 11 He rescue( 
himself with the decision that the factual claims of natural 
beliefs (e.g., order in nature) could be trusted. The test of 
true belief would be its power to direct man to uttermost 
commitment to living.12 He often called his trust in natural 
9cf. JMN. Vol. II, p. 20? (1830); Rusk. Letters, Vol. I, 
p. 450 (183'5'). 
10 
.!!!'.1!• Vol. II, p. 252; .Emerson, Works, Vol. III, p. 51. 
11Emerson, Works, Vol. I, p.282; Whicher, Jrreedom and Fate,~ 
------12 !aerson, Works, Vol. I, pp. 136-137. 
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beliefs "self-reliance," which was really a confidence in the 
ability of native intelligenc~ to work up norms for activities 
out of the activities themselves. Intellect and emotions, which 
Hume took as primarily separated, Emerson regarded as twin 
aspects of a single function, conscious human living.13 
:Emerson recognized that positivism had several important 
strengths. It affirmed the reality of matter; it recognized 
diversity, multiplicity, change. But he also believed it was 
short-sighted in ignoring or rejecting the reality of "spiritual 
tacts." 
He called the empiricist to task for restricting attention 
to generalizations based on quantitative measurements, for 
assuming that only matter exists, and that the only order in 
nature was that expressible in physical laws. He linked these 
assumptions to the mechanistic thesis that all activities inclu-
ding all those or man were entirely determined by changeless 
physical lawa. 14 Man was thereby deprived of freedom and all 
nature, of evolution. He rejected these conclusions. ''It is 
essential to a true theory or nature and man, that it should con· 
tain somewhat progressive. should ascribe freedom to the will, 
or benevolent designs to the Deity."15 
l3By this function man discovers his relations; he recon-
ciles himself to life; he knows what he is doing; he becomes 
tree; he lives. Q!• ~., Vol. I, p. 151; Vol. III, p. 12. 
14 Emerson, Works, Vol. III, P• 255. 
l5JMN, Vol. V, p. 182. 
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He thought the positivists missed the spiritual dimension 
of reality because they held to the unwarranted assumption that 
only the senses had reliable access to matters of fact, while 
reason and the feelings functioned in a subordinate role. This 
mistaken bifurcation methodologically excluded them from acknow-
ledging the reality of those features in experience which could 
not be discovered by the senses alone. Freedom, creativity, 
order, moral and religious truths, were some such. Only intel-
ligence and feelings could grasp these. Hume was forced to 
explain man's affirmation of them as natural beliefs having no 
objective import. 
Emerson held that ordinary life experiences should be the 
basis of all phil:Bophizing. From his perspective ordinary liv-
ing did not support the empiricist claims for bifurcation. 
Freedom, creativity, developmental order, stability, are just 
as present in man's day to day living as are determinacy, diver-
sity, and change. The presence ot these features indicates that 
the powers by which these features are grasped (intelligence, 
feelings, senses) are all operative in experience. 
Meaning or 'Idealism' 
Emerson did not work out his own view solely as a result of 
his critique of empiricism. His study of idealism also contrib-
uted substantially to his position. For a while the force of 
Hume's arguments on behalf of empirical scepticism threatened 
]lnerson•s beliefs almost to the point of paral sis. He took u 
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the consideration of the idealist tradition in hopes of counter-
balancing empirical scepticism and or shoring up his beliefs. 
'l'O his disappointment he eventually discovered that idealism 
also suffered from a faulty theory of knowledge, which indeed 
rendered paradoxical those aspects or reality which by and 
large empiricism did not. 
Because he explored so many idealist ph1losophies16 it is 
difficult to link his use or 'idealism' with any one person or 
in fact with any one philosophical camp. For the time under 
consideration (1828-1836) we may safely exclude Hegel from his 
primary interest as well as any of the classic Neo-Platonists 
in particular, and any ot the numerous Oriental mystics who would 
draw the center ot his attention in the l840's. From 1828-1836 
he concentrated mainly on Plato, the classic Nee-Platonic tradi-
tion .!!1 general; Cudworth; and, through the works of 'Wordsworth, 
Coleridge and Carlyle, Kant and the German Romantios.17 
Accordingly he uses *idealism• in either of two ways: to 
designate the Nee-Platonic tradition, including Plato,18 classic 
16Among them are Plato1 Plotinus, Proolus, Porpbyr'T, Iam-
blicus, among the classical Neo-Platonists; Cudworth, among the 
Cambridge Neo-Platonists; Kant and Hegelc Victor Cousin, a popu· 
larizer ot Hegel1 several German and British Romantics, among 
them, Goethe, Coleridge, and Carlyle. 
17cr. William J. Sowder, :Eaerson'! Im.pact on the British 
lrles aiiCT Canada (ObarlottesviIIe: The unlversitY l'riss o? V!r-
g n!a,~. 184-215. 
18Emerson read Plato through the bias or the Nee-Platonic 
tradition. Many reasons support this view: hie extensive read-
ing ot Cudworth betore and during the early l830's, preparing 
" 
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Neo-Platonism and Cudworth; or to designate the Romantic tradi-
tion, including the German Romantics, Coleridge, Carlyle, and 
perhaps Kant by anticipation. 19 When applied to the former 
group the term often carries with it a critical tone; when used 
in reference to the latter it usually suggests approbation. 
But in his critique or the idealist tradition he rejected both. 
The Idealist Position 
A general description or the idealist point of view comes 
to us in Nature. 20 Idealism gives primacy to ideal unities; 
physical unities (or structures) in experience are inferior to 
and probably dependent on the ideal. Ideal unities are in some 
sense the reflected thoughts of God. Insofar as they reflect 
God they are beyond time and space, i.e., they are chanE§ieas, 
necessary and most nreal." Participation in these ideals dei-
fies the participant. On the other hand material things searcel;r 
reflect God because they are in time and space, i.e., they are 
changing, contingent, and only barely "real.'' Heightened 
him for such a reading; his heightened interest in Plato ooincid· 
ing with his study of Coleridge and Carlyle, both ot whom in-
clined toward a rather Neo-Platonie view; most important, his 
enthusiastic reliance on the translation of Plato's works by 
Thomas Taylor, an avowed and almost fierce adherent to the Neo-
Platonic interpretation of Plato. Ot. Walter Harding, 12nerson' s :1 .. I·,, 
Libra!2 (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 
1~61). Thomas Taylor's Work includes the chief Neo-Platonic 
commentaries on Plato. ----
l9Em.erson read Kant mainly through the eyes or Coleridge 
and Carlyle. 
20works, Vol. I, PP• 47-60. 
participation in matter is not deifying. Man should concern 
himself with the ideal realm rather than with materialities 
since only by identification with the divine ideals can man 
become like God. Religion and ethics, Em.arson remarks, intro-
duce theory into life. \.Jhen they adopt an idealist theory 
they preach the subordination of physical nature to the ideal. 
They make the material depend on the ideal, and next teach men 
to suspect physical nature. For since the physical is not 
divine it cannot deity or lead man to true reality. 21 
gritigue ot Idealism 
Just as with empiricism he weights the comparative strengthE 
and limits of the idealist tradition. He admits that idealism 
has its legitimate appeal particularly because it stresses the 
reality of enduring unities. It creates a view of the world 
"desirable to the mind," with regard to both speculative phil-
osophy and to practical morality. ..For seen in the light of 
thought, the world is phenomenal; and Virtue subordinates it to 
the mind." !merson leaves his audience to inter why this view 
should attract the mind. The implication is that upon discover-
ing that the world is really only a dependent appearance ot 
mind, it finds security in what up until then seemed an alien 
and threatening env1.ronment. Virtue somehow effects the 
obedience or phenomena to ntind. 22 
21 ~·· p. 5a. 
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But idealism has further advantages. It places the world 
in God. The mind of God unifies all actions and events in an 
eternal present in which the turmoil of change loses signiti-
cance. Thus an idealist need be little concerned for the tri-
vial--for the facts of imperfection, evil, multiplicity, change--
as if as empiricists contend, these tacts were absolute limits 
to one's ability to discover truth. Again Emerson leaves the 
reader to find out why--and the answer waits near the surface. 
For an idealist these !actors become inconsequential since he 
believes everything reaches synthesis in the mind of an absolute 
and all-good God. 
But Emerson's praise already betrays impatience. Idealism 
••• respects the end too much to immerse itself in the 
means. It sees something more important in Christian-
ity than the scandals of ecclesiastical history ••• 
and, very incurious concerning persons, or miracles 
and not at all disturbed by chasms or historical evidence; 
it accepts from God the phenomenon as it finds it,_ as 
the pure and awful form or religion in the world.~3 
He himself did not flinch at scandal in religion. But only 
after a long struggle could he feign indifference to persons, 
or miracles or gaps in historical evidence. Christianity did 
not stand or fall on such evidence for him, but the idealist's 
repose in the Supreme Good has a fatalistic inclination. The 
idealist is so taken up by the end that he--mistakenly as it 
turns out--construes the means worthy of only grudging attention. 
Opposition and evil do not rouse him. He is primarily a 
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pectator and a doer only to become a better spectator. 24 Emer-
showed some sympathy !or this mood, since to begin by taking 
world as it is man must be an observer. Yet if observing 
e man's primary occupation he will do very little of it, since 
bserving depends in every case upon acting. 
Idealism had several serious shortcomings. Because it 
ver-stressed unity it denied reality to matter and hence could 
ot explain limitation, multiplicity and change. Further, it 
God from man by the absoluteness of God's perfection 
d the degree of lowliness it attributed to man. Moreover, 
it falsely construed real structural unities as absolute 
d static rather than concrete, active, and progressive, it 
ompletely ignored the processive aspect of reality, and the need 
o continually rely on action as man's basic source of truth 
world. 25 
Just as he decided in his critique of empiricism, he regar-
the ideali.st theory of knowledge as the crucial problem. 
ke the empiricists, idealists came upon most of their diffi-
ulties because their theory of knowledge was one-sided. Sen-
ism had separated the mind from the body, making the latter 
hrough sense experience the sole mode of direct contact with 
matters of fact; idealism with a similar bifurcation took 
24Ibid. 
25"It is essential to a true theory or nature and of man, 
hat it should contain something progressive •••• All the uses of 
ature admit of being sum.med in one, which yields the activity 
f man an infinite scope." Ibid., p. 61. 
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onlY the clearly rational as real, while relegating the sensible 
to the level of mere appearance. The idealist bifurcation was 
just as unwarranted as that of the aensist. From Emerson's 
perspective matter, process, diversity, were just as present in 
ordinary experience as were unities and stabilities. The recog-
nition of both the material and the ideal in one's ordinary 
experience meant to hirri that both the senses and reason were 
operative in experience: both had direct access to matters of 
tact. 
Idealism he concludes may fulfill the desire of the mind 
oecause it places matter under law. But it does not satisfy the 
iemands of spirit since in so placing matter under law it also 
blurs the reality of matter. Spirit requires that a true theory 
ot reality render due account of both aspects of ordinary exper-
-
ience. 26 At most, idealism would make "a use!ul introductory 
n;rpothesis." But its descriptions are too narrow, its initial 
assumptions leave too much out. ''I have no hostility to nature, 
but a child's love to it. I expand and live in the warm day like 
~orn and melons. Let us speak her fair." Unfortunately, ideal-
Lsm "makes nature foreign to me, and does not account tor that 
~onsanguinity which we acknowledge to it. 027 
26JMN, V, pp. 182-183. 
27Emerson, Works, Vol. I, pp. 59, 63. 
Inclusion of the Romantics in the 
Critique of Idealism 
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Emerson intended his rather diffuse arguments to apply to 
whole idealist tradition. It is clear he meant to call the 
eo-Platonists under fire since he specifically mentions Plato, 
lotinus, the Manicheans. It is less obvious. from the text o! 
ature, that the Romantic idealists (Yordsworth, Coleridge. Oar-
yle, especially) were to be included too. Yet the circumstances 
surrounding the writing of Nature show that such was his intent. 
'While in Eu.rope in 1832 he visited the British Romantics, 
Wordsworth, Coleridge, Carlyle. It had been a period of great 
risis for him. His wife had died, his dissatisfaction with 
traditional Christianity at last forced him to resign his pasto 
ate, and as he pursued his readings in philosophy his hope to 
resolve the puzzles of human existence philosophically faltered 
in a maze of divergent opinions. As a result his outlook on lit 
was seriously threatened with fragmentation. !hough he held 
firmly to his belief in self-reliance and that living would 
ield intelligibility, he was at a loss how to concretize his 
eliets. 
!he Britis~ Romantics appealed to him because, with their 
doctrines of individualism and the primacy of Reason, they came 
very close to restoring unity and balance to the philosophical 
description o! lite. It is not su;rprising, therefore, that when 
he acceded to the suggestion or a recuperative trip to Europe he 
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Be telt they could be instrumental in leading him toreaoh a 
genuinely balanced view. Once again he would be disappointed--
~ut never with more positive effect. 
Just after having completed his visits with Wordsworth, 
Coleridge and Carlyle, Emerson observes in his journal that in 
~rue philosophical fundamentals all three lacked sufficient 
insight. He praises God for having shown him the men he wished 
to see, Landor, Coleridge, Carlyle, Wordsworth, and for having 
"comforted and confirmed him in his convictions." Though they 
showed him much, he admits, never again would he so naively live 
by idealized portraits of men whom "the world calls wise." They 
~ere well-read, earnest, sensible men, but no more than that. 
"Especially are they all deficient all these four--in different 
aegrees but all deticient--in insight into religious truth. 
1'hey have no idea of that species of moral truth which I call the 
first philosophy. 1128 
Emerson's Conception of First Ph.ilosol?hz 
This criticism becomes quite significant, once his idea of 
First Philosophy is grasped. To begin with it indicates that he 
~ad worked out at least a nugget form of his own philosophical 
stance by the time he reached England. Indeed he was already 
~aking notes for Nature. 29 More importantly this criticism or the 
2~, Vol. IV, p. ?9. 
-29Ibid. 
-
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Romantics is basically the same he would level at idealists in 
!his completed version of Nature four years later. 
'First Philosophy' is Philosophy of Mind, the study which 
catalogues the functions of the mind and specifies the limits 
of their legitimate uses. It is called 'first' because no fur-
~her philosophical investigation can be undertaken until the 
limits of hum.an understanding are clearly demarked. Emerson 
nad as examples before him the efforts of Locket Hume and Francis 
Bacon, from whom he borrowed the term.30 
In his First Philosophy the young American followed the 
Romantics in making R~ason and Understanding the fundamental 
aistinction among the cognitive powers.31 Reason is an integra-
ted function grasping an actual situation as a whole. Under-
standing is a specialized and exclusive exercise of the mind. 
Its function is to use one or another cognitive power in isola-
tion in order, for short-range needs, to deal with some segmented 
aspect or reality. Reason is intuitive whereas Understanding 
operates through multiple sense observations or explicit logical 
sequences. Only reason contacts reality--laws in the actual, 
on-going, concrete. Understanding handles appearances--rather 
disparate concrete facts, for instance, or abstract laws. The 
one, since it respects dynamism promotes creativity; the other, 
since it operates on isolated, static segments tends to 
30 i!!!• V, p. 50, n. 154. 
31Rusk, Letters, I, p. 412. 
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re-enforce the traditional and customary. Moreover, Understand-
ing is supposed to serve Reason, but in an unbalanced life-scheme 
it instead assumes an independent status--substituting appear-
ances for reality.32 Traditional sensism and idealism both 
resulted from such misuses of Understanding. 
One further thing must be stressed. Only Reason contacts 
~eality, but Reason only functions when man is in the state of 
µnprejudieed spontaneous behavior. Natural living alone stirs 
Reason to yield its truths. Neither repeated sense observations 
~or rational deductions suffice. Thus Emerson conceived First 
Philosophy as the science which relies entirely upon simple 
~pontaneous acts of natural living for its knowledge of reality. 
Laok of First Philosoph;r among Romantics 
When, therefore, he criticized the British Romantics for 
lacking First Philosophy he meant they had not derived their 
knowledge about reality solely from the actual experience of 
living. They asserted the doctrine of Reason abstractly. But 
$inoe they did not develop their doctrine through spontaneous 
living they never actually relied on Reason and hence never 
possessed true First Philosophy. Instead they attempted to base 
it on Understanding (i.e., through logical argumentation). 
This particular criticism strongly supports the view that 
ne intended to include the Romantics in Nature's arguments 
32JMN, V, PP• 269-2?6. 
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against idealism. He was already at work on Nature when he 
isited them. Moreover, he rejected Romantic idealism for funda-
entally the same reason he later rejected idealism in general 
in Nature. It tried to erect philosophy on the basis of Under-
standing, mistakenly assuming that one of the specialized fune-
ions of Understanding (abstract reason) dealt with reality as a 
bole. Consequently both classical idealists and Romantics--
ut the Romantics less than the others--shared the same root 
ailures in their philosophies, loss of real content and dynamis 
Positive Directionalities Resultinf from the 
Critique of 'f#ad\t!onal F§!1osoiffii 
When he published Nature :Emerson was still somewhat of an 
dealist though not in a traditional sense. For him all empiri-
ist and idealist theories based on Understanding were tradi-
ional, By that standard Romantic philosophy was thereby tradi-
ional, while his was not. He criticized the Romantics not for 
eing idealists as such but for resting their idealism on Under-
tanding. Indeed at first his thoughts closely resembled those 
of the Romantics. Living was the condition for discovering the 
a priori ideas of Reason. 
Yet he was far more drawn to modify theory in face of lived 
experience than to modi.ty experience according to the demands of 
Though at times he called his philosophy idealism, at 
times he called it the philosophy of spirit to suggest the 
tal quality of Reason. In fact, he once referred to himself 
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a.s a "practical idealist."33 The more he threw himself into 
natural living the more his idealism softened. Increasingly it 
came to mean the recognition that developmental laws were genu-
inely operative throughout experience. What before were regarded 
as a priori ideas faded into natural directionalities within 
beings, directionalities discoverable (for instrumental purposes) 
only by spontaneous living. Living became not only the condi-
tion but the source for truths about the world. His mature 
philosophy suggests an incipient pragmatism. 
During the period in which he scrutinized the views of 
traditional philosophers, he used the Romantic distinction betwee~ 
Reason and Understanding not only as a foil from which to launch 
his own philosophy but also as a tool by which to bring his cri-
tique into coherent synthesis. 
Sensism recognized only brute matter, multiplicity, change; 
idealism, only ideas, unity, st:ability. Neither could incorporat~ 
the positive features of the other. Actual living, however, 
showed all features were real. Both theories had grasped just 
part o! the truth. Both rendered some aspects 0£ reality into 
paradoxsa, irresolvable because eaoh had founded their theory 
exclusively on one or another function of Understanding-··idealism 
on abstract reasoning, sensism on sense observation. The result 
~as a severence o! mind from body and the ideal from the mater-
ial. 
33 JMN, V, 135. 
-
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Among the sensists the Scottish school of Common Sense 
the strongest bid to mend the split. They rightly asserted 
reason had an empirical base for its generalizations. They 
orrectly attempted to support their view on the fact that the 
opposite stance contradicts the universal experience of men, 
their daily lives, do suppose a world accessible to 
Their theory was insufficient nonetheless because while 
hey appealed to the primacy of living, they did so in a spec-
ator-like way, as a generalization culled from sense observa-
Further, they gathered their facts into logically dis-
arguments. Logically discoursive arguments and general-
from sense observations are proper to Understanding, 
reason. 
Among the idealists the Romantics came closest to success-
closing the rift. They proclaimed that Reason had an 
ntuitional grasp of the universal in the concrete. But they 
oo were unable to support their claim properly. For while they 
tated that only actual living could give evidence of their posi-
ion, they in fact remained entrenched in the spectator appeal 
o living, rooting their beliefs in appeals to sense evidence 
nd arguments of explicit logic rather than in actual spontan-
living. They too rested upon Understanding. 
Emerson concluded that no philosopher had as yet presented 
balanced view of reality because no one had tried to live an 
ntirely natural life. Hence, no one had significantly tapped 
ower of Reason. 
l 
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intention to make the attempt for himself--in hopes of at last 
striking upon a truly balanced viable description of the world. 
Summary 
.Emerson's development from a traditional believer in 
supernatural revelation to a self-reliant believer in natural 
living reveals the gradual evolution of two key concepts in his 
approach to philosophy. The first is the setting aside of pre-
conceived opinions about reality; the second, the whole-hearted 
effort to derive all beliefs entirely from natural living. 
Chapter I concludes with his decision that only natural intelli-
gence could reveal truths about the world, that somehow self-
eliance and trust o! natural living were preferable to the half-
truths of authoritarian religions suspicious of nature. Chapter 
II follows his attempts to support and concretize his beliefs 
y natural intelligence with the help of traditional philosophe 
e found their approaches wanting because they did not draw 
their doctrines or overt justification from living. They too 
distrusted nature. It became clear to him he would have to work 
out his philosophy for himself. As he progressed in his own 
approach he translated his belief in self-reliance into the doc-
trine of simplicity (the suspension of prejudices), and his 
belie! in the primacy of living into the doctrine o! spontaneity 
(full dependence upon the experience of living). These two doc-
trines are the subject-matter !or the next two chapters, which 
comprise the positive exposition o! his philosophical procedure. 
CHAPTER III 
SIMPLICITY: THE RETURN TO THE EXPERIENCE OF LIVING 
Emerson's philosophical procedure aimed at confirming 
beliefs which claimed inclusion of true factual descriptions of 
the world. He had special interest in moral and religious be-
liefs, among them belief in God. But just as his critique of 
traditional religion convinced him that only philosophy could 
confirm the claimsof moral and religious beliefs, his critique 
of traditional philosophy persuaded him that only a new philo-
sophical procedure could make possible the confirmation of any 
belief--moral, religious or otherwise. His new procedure con-
sisted of two interrelated phases, both found in the lived situa-
tion and derived directly from it. The first, simplicity, 
aimed at reaching or regaining an unprejudiced, natural life-
style; the second, spontaneity, tried to make the natural life-
style the ground for all theoretical beliefs about the world. 
Simplicity is the subject of this chapter; spontaneity, the 
focus of the next. 
For clarity I have separated the study of the two aspects 
of the procedure, though Emerson himself did not explicitly dis-
tinguish them. He was disinclined to devote a thorough-going 
speculative explanation of the two-sidedness of his theory, 
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since he disliked malting what he thought bookish and merely tech-
nical analysis. But the phases do show up in his working out of 
concrete problems. 
Two major sections comprise our study of simplicity. The 
first deals with the achieving of simplicity. We begin with an 
examination of the "youth metaphor," specially chosen by him to 
convey his doctrine of simplicity. According to the metaphor 
man must regain the innocence of childhood in order to philoso-
phize accurately. As we shall see, the effort to recover inno-
cence involves on the one hand the negating of reliance on 
Understanding, thus removing man from blinding cultural precon-
ceptions; and on the other hand the affirming of reliance on 
Reason, thus leading him into total commitment to natural living. 
The doctrine of simplicity rests on the assumption that nature 
is reliable. The second major section considers the basis for 
that belief. 
The "Youth Metaphor" 
Most often when Emerson intends to discuss the first phase 
of the procedure, simplicity, he employs one metaphor among 
several developed for that purpose, viz., the "youth metaphor." 
It deserves close consideration. 
One preliminary observation about Emerson's use of metaphor. 
He was not a technical philosopher nor an academician ·and he 
steadfastly refused that role. Instead he saw himself in the 
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radition of Plato, a poet-philosopher. 1 "Plato is philosophy, 
nd philosophy, Plato." To be a genuine philosopher, one "must 
e more than a philosopher." He must also be a poet in the full-
of the term--i.e., the man without impediment, who 
aintains a balance between his speculative and active powers, 
etween his tendency to reduce everything to unity and his ten-
ency to stress diversity, between his inclination toward the 
abstract and the removed and his inclination toward the concrete 
and ordinary. Plato closely approximated the ideal. "Plato is 
lothed in the powers of a poet, stands upon the highest place 
He regarded Plato as the ancient proto-type to 
he ideal American democrat. "He is a great average man," who 
of thinking with down-to-earth-living. "A great 
ommon-sense is his warrant and qualification to be the world's 
nterpreter." But Plato's short-coming was that he did not 
uite achieve the balance. He used his poetic gift. Instead of 
-
etting his poetic power take its rightful command over him he 
it by his intellect. In his quest for intellectual 
tried "to dispose of nature." He tipped the scale 
oward the speculative and to that extent distorted his deserip-
ions of the universe. Hence, like most philosophers he remained 
1John Dewey, ttRalph Waldo Emerson," in Emerson: A Collection 
Critical Essa s, by Milton Konvitz and Stephan Whieher, eds. 
g ewoo s, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1962), pp. 27, et (Hereinafter referred to as Critical Essays.) --
2Emerson, Works, Vol. III, p. 6; Vol. IV, pp. 40, 43, 47-56, 
1-62, ?5-79. 
-a mere philosopher. »nerson believed that to become the poet-
philosopher of the new Republic he must succeed where Plato did 
not. Thus his philosophical position dictated that his style 
should be literary rather than literal. Hence, his use of meta-
phorical language--which nonetheless was controlled and calcu-
lated for serious philosophical purposes. 
The "youth metaphor" was designed to convey his notion of 
simplicity. The outset of Nature makes clear that only it a man 
remains youthful in outlook can he hope to relate to his situa-
tion as it is. Emerson notes how differently grown-ups and 
children regard scenes of nature. For example, few adults ever 
really notice the sun except superfioially--they know just that 
in daylight they can see. By contrast the sun 'rshines into the 
eye and the heart of the child." He then makes this point: 
"The lover of nature is he whose inward and outward senses are 
still truly adjusted to each other; who has retained the spirit 
of infancy into the era of 1'Ianhood. ~3 To be childlike evokes 
the image of innocence, a frame of mind that lets reality unfold 
itself as it is. The cultural warp which blurs true vision has 
been set aside for candor. 
In Emerson's eyes a child would take things as he finds 
them; he would act on what he finds merely on the basis of what 
these things show him. The child does not engage in much reflec-
tion on what he sees. Nor would he find it intelligible to 
3 ~., Vol. I, P• 9; Vol. III, p. 26. 
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color the world with the epistemological and ontological assump-
tions of his elders. Such assumptions never confuse and hinder 
hiS ability to act in everyday life. Lastly a child will act 
without guile and duplicity, unperturbed by formalized doctrine 
or the social structures oi personal loss and gain. He does so 
calmly and single-mindedly according to the demands of the 
present. Thus the ideal was to recapture the simplicity of 
childhood, to observe things as they show themselves--without 
interposing any sort of preconceptions upon the observation--
and to act on the basis of the lived-experience rather than 
tor any imposed motive of personal gain. 
The "youth metaphortt discloses two sides to simplicity: 
removal from trust in Understanding--the suspension of cultural 
preconceptions; at the same time, a turn to commitment to Reason 
--total surrender to natural living. 
Removal of Preconceptions 
Reenstatement of a youthful innocence demanded the purge of 
customary presumptions about reality. We have already witnessed 
Emerson's odyssey through various previously established ways of 
looking at man's situation in the world. Each step of the ven-
ture, though it held out what seemed great and perhaps lasting 
promise of human fulfilment, left his desires unfulfilled. He 
came to distrust any ele~ent of received culture especially 
insofar as it would sug'sest itself as a ready-made and timelesacy 
,I 
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sure foundation upon which to build one's moral edifice. 
suggestion which comes from society and even from one's friends 
insofar as they reflect pre-established procedures are not to be 
relied on. They can mislead so many ways, sometimes purposely. 
The ideal was to judge for one's self, recognizing, of course, 
that even that has its pitfalls. 
To procure the innocence of youth, it was not enough to 
desert the city and retire to one's study to procure this inno-
cence of youth. "To go into solitude a man needs to retire as 
much from his chambers as from society. I am not solitary whils1 
I read and write, though nobody is with me.u4 The city, a man's 
friends, his private lodgings all reflect a certain cultural 
perspective. A person who desires to discover truth must not 
let them prejudice his own view. If they follow him into his 
solitary search he will continue to apprehend things according 
to the preconceptions of the established culture. Putting aside 
the settings of city-life represents a removal of the pervasive 
source of pre-conceptions, one's received cultural beliefs. But 
to put them aside man must turn to nature • 
.E}nerson believed man would be most apt to initiate the unob-
structed state of mind among natural scenes rather than in the 
city. Being in the wilderness is "more dear and connate than in 
the streets or villages.'' But he was not advocating a move back 
to agrarian society, for that of itself would accomplish nothing. 
4Ibid., Vol. I, p. ?. 
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The power which produces the natural outlook does not reside in 
nature alone any more than in man alone--but in both together 
when related in a special way. Nor was he intimating that inno-
cence could not be achieved in the city but only that it would 
be easier to discover in natural surroundings, the outmoded laws 
and traditions cluttering the city confine man and positively 
discourage creative responsiveness to new demands of living. By 
contrast the most impressive dimension of nature is its unbound-
edness and spontaneous capacity for continued growth. This as-
pect of nature strikes a responsive chord in man. "In the tran-
quil landscape, and especially in the distant line o.f the hori-
zon, man beholds somewhat as beautiful as his own nature." Man 
too is part of nature; for him too should living be spontaneous 
and unbounded--just as it once was for him as a child. "In the 
woods--a man casts off his years--and is always a child. In the 
woods is perpetual youth. 11 5 
:Emerson suggests that once man regains this youthful atti-
tude its supreme value makes itself evident, .for he recognizes 
it as a new and better state of mind. "It takes him by surprise, 
and yet it is not unknown. Its effect is like that of a higher 
thought or a better emotion coming over me, when I deemed I was 
thinking justly or doing rightly. 116 
The choice of the "youth metaphor" was quite strategic. As 
5works, Vol. I, pp. 8-31. 
6Ibid., Vol. I, p. 11; Vol. II, pp. 279-280. 
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Michael Cowan relates in Citl gt_~~' Emerson's lectures 
were addressed to "wild men re and farmers no more than were ·w-ords-
worth' s poems directed toward •'idiot boys or solitary reapers. 11 
His intended audience was primarily the young itmericans leaving 
the f arma in rapidly growing numbers to spearhead westward expan-
sion and urbanization.? He was appealing to sentiments and 
experiences still fresh in their minds, hoping to articulate 
together with them an approach to social development consistent 
with the ideal of freedom and equality among men. The approach 
was to live naturally, to construct within one's lived situation 
social institutions which would promote further natural living, 
to abolish those whiah would hinder it. As Cowan puts it, Emer-
son intended to challenge the urban audience "not to destroy but 
to remake the city ••• aecording to the organic nature of the city 
dwellers themselves. 118 
Surrender to Natural Living 
One side of simplicity was the dispelling ot preconceptions; 
surrender to natural living was the other side. :Emerson proposes 
?Michael Cowan, §Sty of the West (New Haven: Yale UniversitJ 
Press, 196?), pp. 18- ; p-;-2~ -U-the time Emerson wrote 
Nature (1836J he was 33. OVer ten million Americans were then 
as young or younger than Emerson; only about tour million were 
older. The median age was about l?.6. U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus, ed., Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945 
(Washington, D.c.: u.s. Government l'Trnt!rii orrlce, 1949), p. 28. 
8cowan, City g!_ !h,! ~' p. 220. 
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that the proper frame of mind should rely wholly on natural liv-
ing and not belittle at the outset any human capacity--reason, 
feelings, senses, or will. To do otherwise would prejudice the 
venture, as had traditional religion and philosophy. The simple 
man should let all his capacities .!:!,; he should allow his total 
person, his body, affections, will, reason, senses, have free 
rein. "If we will not interfere with our thought, but will act 
entirely, we know the particular thing, and every thing and 
every man."9 Simplicity is specified by total involvement or 
better perhaps, total commitment to nature. 
Interference and partial activity--the counterparts to total 
commitment--shed considerable light on the demand for total 
involvement. Emerson intends his initial procedure to foster a 
return to spontaneous activity, whether cognitive, volitional 
etc. According to him, if one could set aside the interferences 
with or obstructions to spontaneity the intuitions would come 
almost all by themselves. He complains that insight is smothered 
as much by "too violent direction given by our will• as by too 
great negligence." He says: "We do not determine what we think. 
We only open our senses, clear away as we can all obstruction 
trom the tact and suffer the intellect to see.--But the moment we 
cease to report and attempt to correct and contrive, it is not 
9 Works, Vol. II, p. 280; cf. pp. 2?5-280. 
true knowledge about reality for Emerson might 
"concrete universal," the general known in and 
specific instance in on-going experience. 
The ideal for 
be called the 
through the 
th nlO tru • He expressed the same idea in "Spiritual Laws.tr 
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If a 
man says and does what strictly belongs to him nature will never 
ieave him to intellectual obstructions and doubts. Our young 
people are diseased with problems which never were of practical 
difficulty to anyone who didn't go out of his way to find them--
such proulems as original sin, the origin of evil, predestination 
and the like. "A simple mind will not know these enemies," but 
will live by firm integrity. (Emerson casts the same aspersions 
on much of academic and professional education.) We must simply 
avoid vitiating nature by the interference of our will. Instead, 
we must obey--i.e., rest secure in our spontaneous acts. "Only 
in our easy, simple, spontaneous actions are we strong, and by 
contenting ourselves with obedience we become divine." The basis 
for this surrender to nature is nature itself. "The whole course 
of things goes to teach us faith. There is guidance for each of 
us, and by lowly listening we shall hear the right word. 1111 
The interference of the will thwarts spontaneity; self-
surrender promotes it. Yet this obedient surrender must not be 
misread as a cancelling ~ of the use of will. 
I say, do not choose; but that is a figure of speech 
by whicn-r-WOuld distinguish what is commonly called 
choice among men, and which is a partial act, the 
choice of the hands, of the eyes, of Mie appetites, 
and not a·whole act of the man. But that which I cat~ 
right or goodness, is the choice of my constitution. 
lOibid. t Vol. II, p. 328. 
-11Ibid.' Vol. II, pp. 133-139. 
-12Ibid. t p. 140. Italics ·ander "partial act" are mine. 
-
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!}le will act obstructs spontaneity i! and only if the good which 
elicits the choice is a partiality of man--exclusive preference 
tor intellectual pursuits, bodily pleasures, or whatever; only 
that will act which Emerson calls the whole act of man--which 
chooses the good according to the promptings of man's constitu-
tion--invites a free !low of spontaneous action. The meaning 
and importance of "partial" and ,.total act" now becomes plain. 
Total action involves all the functions of the hum.an constitu-
tion properly integrated (in spontaneous action); partial actions 
involve erroneous choice favoring one or another function as if 
that selected were supreme. Total action is action of the man 
prompted by the features of his constitution as an integral 
whole, and responding by his own directionality to the rest of 
nature. Partial actions obstruct the natural directionality. 
As Emerson remarks, what we usually call man, :i.e., the eating, 
drinking, planting man is a misrepresentation. Spirit, or soul--
the fully related integrated constitution of man directing him-
self--that is the man. It is the soul we truly respect, "would 
he ma!! let it appear through his [total] action." 
Partial acts invariably have paralyzing effects. 
The blindness of the intellect begins when it would be 
something of itself. The weakness of the will begins 
when the individual would be something of himself. 
All reform aims in some one particular to let the soul 
have its ~ay through us--in other words to engage us 
to obey.l' 
13Ibid., Vol. II, p. 271. "Something o! himsel!"--i.e., 
~hen the-w!'ll decides to make its own destiny impervious to the 
natural directionality in the man's nature. 
~· 
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BY contrast total action, i.e., the natural, full function of 
soult "when it breathes through his intellect it is genius, when 
it breathes through his will, it is virtue, when it flows through 
bis affection it is love."14 Genius, virtue, and love are the 
three foremost expressions of the natural life-style once 
achieved, expressions incidentally which frequently tie into the 
"youth metaphor." 
In summary, the "youth metaphor" unveils several important 
features of simplicity. First, cultivation of simplicity aims 
at putting into action and language no more and no less than 
experience yields. As Nature relates,15 simplicity is a love of 
truth and a desire to communicate it without loss. Loss occurs 
when a person is possessed by any desire axcept for truth--for 
instance, for riches, fame or generally what Emerson refers to 
as the cowardice of being ignorant. Ignorance includes any form 
of self deception in which some value is placed above truth. 
Ignorance is cowardice simply because continually to seek and 
to face facts requires heroic self-discipline, whereas to make 
any other value supreme does not. 16 In short, simplicity re-
quires man to try as far as possible to regain the uninhibited, 
unself-conseious, innocent vision of youth. 1? 
14Ibid. 
-
l5Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 26-31. 
16Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 293-294; 103-104; Vol. I, p. 104. 
l?Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 8-9; Vol. II, pp. 2?3-274; Vol. III, 
pp. 275~. 
,.... __________________________ ---, 
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Furthermore simplicity, purity or innocence is not primarily 
an intellectual attitude--it is more than that, it is a life-
-
style. The simple, the pure, the innocent let the facts carry 
them to their course of action. 
What is the doctrine of infallible guidance if one will 
abdicate choice, but the striving to act uneonscious!y, 
to resume the simplicity of childhood? It is so to act 
on the last impression from a knowledge of all the facts 
and not wilfully to secure a particular advantage. The 
single-mi~ded actor insists on the tranquility of his 
own mind.18 
Thus, simplicity is the attitude by which one places himself in 
the right Qrder of action. The end of the procedure is not a 
system of truths but a better man--and hopefully a morally 
improved society. 
Lastly simplicity is reached through a dual effort. On the 
one hand, an individual must begin by setting aside the judgments 
about man and the world made by sooiety--i.e., those which 
reflect the social mores, formal education, the arts, philosophy, 
religion--then he will be able to judge for himself what is true 
about man and his world. On the other hand, man must wholly 
surrender to living. Hence :Emerson's insistent return to expres-
sions such as "human activity•" "total or partial action,tt to 
pinpoint the locus of truth for man. Simplicity demands total 
involvement. A person may not surrender only one or another 
Side of himself to spontaneous behavior ~ everl ~; he may 
not dictate that, to procure his individual and personal desires, 
18~, Vol. IV, p. 318; Works, Vol. II, PP• 328-329. 
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one or another side should dominate his life-style. The proper 
relations should spring up out of the natural directionalities 
in concrete actual situations. 
Of course, simplicity is an ideal. An individual's hold on 
it admits of degrees. On the factual level simplicity is reli-
able but always open to further development. Integrity and 
selfishness do continual battle. The simple person thus strives 
daily to further purify his intentions. As we have already 
seen, the best environment in which to recover simplicity is in 
nature itself, where, away from the distractions and inhibiting 
forces of society, one might feel the relaxing goodness of an 
immediate relation to nature. The proud, the selfish, the 
cowardly--but not the lowly--will miss the primary value of this 
relation in man's life. The value is life-supporting truth. 
Simplicitl as an Assumption 
Simplicity aims at the suspension of unwarranted assumption 
and at a turn to total reliance on nature. But Emerson's high 
trust of nature is itself a rather fundamental assumption. On 
what did he base this assumption? The following section concern 
this question. First we will consider in general the grounding 
of fundamental beliefs• and next specifically Emerson's way of 
grounding his belief in the reliability of nature. Support for 
a basic belief about the world does not come as much from argu-
ments within a system of thought as from the fruitfulness of 
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regarding Emerson's fundamental belief in nature. For him the 
appropriateness of trust in nature rested on the fruitfulness of 
this belief in living. Inattention to the way he grounded his 
trust in nature has given rise to the mistaken notion that his 
optimism resulted instead from an inability to admit seriously 
the presence of evil in the world. The final section of the 
chapter will comment on his supposed dewy-eyed optimism. 
Basic Belief in General 
--------
The creation of any procedure for describing the world must 
inimally lean on some assumptions about the reliability of the 
world in general and about man's faculties in particular, since 
to construct a valid method already supposes the mind capable of 
judging the validity of a method. Furthermore, if one supposes 
the reliability of human intelligence to make such judgments 
and if, moreover, one asserts that a given method actually suits 
existing states of affairs, then one must lean also on the as-
sumption that these states of affairs are trustworthy enough, 
stable enough, to permit the assertion. Without some stability 
it becomes pointless to claim any method applies. 
As a matter of fact we hold all sorts of notions as true 
ithout challenge, notions received from our culture and which 
our experience over a period of time supports. Only when they 
come in conflict wi ti: other and more basic truths do we begin 
to doubt them. As Bertrand Russell remarks, "Wherever we feel 
initial certaint ent to make us doubt not 
~ 
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an argument to make us believe."19 In other words the proper 
frame of mind in which to begin philosophizing is to accept con-
victions and principles to the extent they do not give occasion 
to doubt them. 
Granting that we begin by accepting many principles at hand, 
the larger issue is whether the principles, especially fundamen-
tal ones can be justified. In one sense justification for first 
principles about a man's world-view cannot be given, if justifi-
cation means to give speculative reasons which validate or verif) 
the principles. First principles are belief-statements and hence 
do not call for speculative verification. They express more the 
speaker's acceptance of a point of view as basic than that these 
statements are true or false. But in another way they can be 
supported. 
William James' study of belief is helpful. According to 
him most of the time sound intellectual reasons direct our 
choices. Still when it comes to genuine options20 regarding 
fundamental beliefs we seem to have no good reasons for our 
l9Bertrand Russell, An Outline of Philosophy, Meridian Booke 
(New York: The World Publiihlng Compiiiy, I96o), p. 1?4. 
20James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays (New York: Do-
ver Publicatio'ii'S;' Inc.,-r956), pp.~4. (Hereinafter referred tc 
as The Will to Believe.) An option is genuine when a) living, 
b) force<rana-c) momentous. An option is living according to thE 
degree of willingness to act on it; forced when "there is no 
standing place outside the alternatives," e.g., "Either accept 
this truth or go without it.1t1 momentous when it offers a unique 
opportunity, the stake significant, the decision unalterable--
1.e., ideas are in an unalterable relation to the situation 
either for or against it. Example: a trip into outer space. 
~ 
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cb.oice. Rather the reasons are defensible only within the on-
going lived-situation. We ~ our choice. A case in point. 
11our belief' in truth itself, for instance, that there is a truth, 
and that our minds and it are made for each other." The will to 
believe, James holds, is a normal element in making up one's 
mind. When an option cannot be decided on intellectual grounds, 
a man must decide by his "passional nature." For 111 Do not de-
cide, but leave the question open,' is itself a passional deci-
sion--just like deciding •yes' or 'no' and is attended by the 
same risk of losing truth." In either case we act, we choose. 21 
What then of the options between a trust of nature and 
scepticism? Nodding to Emerson, James states that logic can 
. I 
neither prove nor refute either intellectual or moral scepticism. '[, 
"When we stick to it that there is truth (be it of either kind), 
-
we do so with our whole nature, and resolve to stand or fall by 
the results." No argument can prove whether he or the sceptic 
will have at last taken the wiser stand. 
But his choice is still defensible. He maintains that from 
his perspective experience itself seems to suggest goodness and 
trustworthiness. If this life is not a real fight in which we 
gain some lasting success for the universe, then life is no 
better than a private little play from which one may withdraw at 
Will. "But it feels like a .fight--as if there were something 
Wild in the universe which we, with all our idealities and 
21 ~ •• pp. 9, 11, 19. 31. 
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faithfulness, are needed to redeem. 022 
The sense in which basic belief a are defensible is clari-
fied by Carnap's discussion about the "external question." Car-
nap suggests that to ask whether x is ~ or not is to ask whe-
ther x is an element within a given system, (internal question). 
Means at hand exist by which to answer this question within a 
system--by some means of verification or by some logical princi-
ple. It is inappropriate however, to ask such a speculative 
question about a system !! ~ whole, (external question). In this 
case the word 'real' cannot meaningfully be used because 'real' 
arises as a term employed in response to questions where there 
are on hand the means within ~ system for answering such ques-
tions. But there is no similar means by which to raise specula-
tively either the question or its answer outside the system. 
Instead, Carnap proposes, when an individual asks whether '*x is 
real" as an external question, what he means to ask is whether 
"xis suitable to his own basic point of view about the world." 
Or more precisely it is to ask a practical question regarding 
the fruitfulness of adopting x as his own framework or as a fea-
ture of his framework, as the case may be. Thus when a person 
states that "x is the case," he may be answering the internal 
question affirmatively, viz., "xis an element within my system, 
as has been established by the proper means of verification or 
logical principle;" or he may be responding to the external 
22Ibid., P• 61. 
-
~ 
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question affirmatively, viz., "acceptance of x as a totality has 
truit!ul consequences for me, as practical testing has estab-
lished." The latter is a belief statement. It reflects some 
justification but not speculative. 
Applied to first principles, there is no way within the 
system to verify or establish first principles since the system 
itself including acceptable norms for verification and justifi-
cation depends on them. To ask whether these principles are rea~ 
therefore, cannot be an internal question. I wish to maintain 
that the appropriate means to establish them is pragmatic--i.e., 
one must test them in terms of their range of fruitfulness tor 
his life-style. 23 
My purpose in interjecting these summary remarks about 
basic assumptions has been not to make my own act of personal 
belief regarding them but to clear an opening in which we might 
more readily sit down to a discussion of .Emerson's way of 
supporting his choice of first principles. 
Emerson's Grounding .Q! Trust!!! Nature 
Emerson maintains that we begin by believing and require 
definite arguments to reject a belief, especially as regards our 
fundamental assumption about the reliability of nature and of 
~an within it. The "youth metaphor" serves us again. For we 
23Rudolt Carnap, ".Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," pp. 
178-193, in ContemEorar~ Readin~s in Lo~ieal Theoml' ed. by Irv-
ing M. Copi and James A. ~ould NeW-Yor : Tlie Haem llan Company, 
1967). 
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have seen that the child, the innocent youth, accepts the day as 
it comes to him. He simply trusts nature. The youth's assump-
tions are derived from his on-going experience which have gener-
s.llY sustained him; he has little store of past experience or 
social conditioning which would close definitively many future 
possibilities. By Emerson's standard a position loses credibil-
ity if it does not aid man to live more satisfactorily, for it 
does not fit into the range of human importance. 
He insisted that man ought to begin by trusting nature. We 
need call up only a few examples. Nature opens with the forth-
right complaint that the present age spends too much of its 
energies mulling over the bones of past generations. Each prior 
generation beheld nature face to face. Why then should we mas-
querade in their faded wardrobe? 
Undoubtedly we have no questions to ask which are unan-
swerable. We must trust the perfection of the creation 
so far as to believe that whatever curiosity the order 
of things has awakened in our minds, the order of things 
can satisfy. Every man's condition is a solution in 
hierglyphic to those inquiries he would put. He acts 
it as life, before he apprehends it as truth.24 
Each man must find truth for himself or go without it. Truth 
comes by genuine living, by self-reliance, self-surrender. 
Three years after Nature he wrote that the true fall of 
man came when he held himself in disesteem. Self-trust, however, 
is man's redemption. 25 In an 1844 lecture we read, "We shall 
24 Emerson, Works, Vol. I, pp. 3-4. 
25 Rusk, Letters, Vol. II, p. 213. 
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rely on the Law alive and beautiful which works over our heads 
and under our feet. Pitiless it avails itself of our success 
when we obey it and of our ruin when we contravene it." All 
men secretly believe in it. "They believe that the best is the 
true; that right is done at last; or chaos would come."26 Else-
where, he throws this challenge at himself--"Believe that the 
world exists for you. For you is the phenomenon perfect and 
what we are. that only we see."2? 
Enerson believed that one had to trust totally because any 
other approach would make living impossible. He held with the 
Transcendentalists28 that the most unassailable feature of exper-
ience is that man is alive, and that living itself urges the 
striving for continuance of life on levels far above the merely 
biologicai. 29 Any principle which blurs or opposes this fact, 
that is, which if followed through would reduce life or make it 
absurd, is not true. ''This is a true account of our instinctive 
faith--simply that it is better in the view of the mind than any 
other way, therefore must be the true way. Whatever is better 
must be the truer way." What is better in the view of the mind? 
26
.Enerson, Yorks, Vol. III, p. 283. 
2? JMN, Vol. Vt p. 182. 
-28c:r. Brownson, "fhe Convert," p. 46; also Reed. "Observa-
tions o'll9the Growth of the Mind," p. 54; also the remark in the 
second number of the Dial, that youth was not so much protesting 
the past as beginning~live in the present; p. 22, in ~ 
!Fanscendentalists, ed. by Miller. 
29 Enerson, Works, Vol. III, P• 64; p. 113. 
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"That is always best which gives me to myself'."30 11 What gives 
me to myself" is another way of saying. "what enables me to live.t1 
According to his criticism of established descriptions of 
man in his world, both sensism and idealism severed one or 
another aspect of' man from his daily world• thus paradoxically 
rendering life on speculative grounds impossible. The best is 
what joins man together whole with this world so that he may be 
alive, healthy again. (One of Emerson's common themes was Piety 
restores man to Health.) We should recall an earlier passage. 
that all men secretly believe the best is true "or else chaos 
would come." In another place he warns that as soon as I sus-
pect the reliability of nature "already the long shadows of 
untimely oblivion creeps over me, and I shall decrease for-
ever.1131 
Emerson was not merely stating that man could no longer 
give speculative reasons f'or his conduct; he would simply not be 
able to !£]_. He could not live. For the denial would involve 
man in a 1·1orld where all states of affair3 would move chaotic-
ally, including man himself. In a world of complete disorder--
a dire dominion of cha.nee, he calls it--life and specifically 
human life could not sustain itself. It made no sense to stand 
by theories of the world which if followed through would make 
living "an impossible curse."32 
30 ) JMN, Vol. III, P• 31? (Jan., 1832 ; Works, Vol. It pp. 
13l-132:--
3lworks, Vol. III, P• 283; Vol. I, pp. 131-132. 
~-··------------------------~ ,......... ?? 
He recoiled from phJ.losophies which held. positions that made 
the ordinary world of daily experience paradoxical. Speculation 
could not run counter to the natural li.fe-style. As the "youth 
metaphor'' underscores, our living is the primary experience. 
Human living, its content and relations, are the unassailable 
facts. Statemen:~s which would make living impossible are .false; 
only those which arise in the lived situation and which promote 
living are true. He was .fond of stressing that the most abstract 
truth is the most practical.33 Living rather than speoulat!ve 
arguments persuades man of his moat basic beliefs. Emerson 
opted for trust in natural living, because only that belie.f 
seemed to promote human living. 
Emerson's Optimism 
The quality of his optimism requires special comment. Com-
mon aphorism has it that he looked upon the world with the in-
cautious, rosy-glassed eyes of youthful idealism, that his world 
was a bower of fairy-tale dreams, that he could not grow up 
enough to taste and admit the bitterness of a harsh but real 
world.34 
Llilliam James comments that Emerson• s 
32 ~' Vol. II, P• 6; P• 252. 
33 Emerson, Works, Vol. I, P• 4. 
34E.g., James T. Adams, "Emerson Re-read," pp. 31-39; for az: 
opposite view, cf., Ralph H. Gabriel, "Emerson and Thoreau," pp. 
55-64, in The Transcendentalist Revolt Against Materialism, ed. 
George WhiClier (~ostont fi.C. Yeatli ana Oompany, 1949). 
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••• optimism had nothing in common with that indiscrimi-
nate hurrahing for the Universe with which Walt Whitman 
has made us familiar. For Emerson, the individual fact 
and moment were indeed suffused with absolute radiance. 
but it was upon a condition that saved the situation--
they must be worthy specimens--sincere, authentic, arehe-
t;}'-pal; they must have5made connection with what he calls the moral Sentiment./ 
fhiS assessment is particularly noteworthy because James usually 
contrasts t•optimism" with his own belief in "meliorism." By 
"meliorism" he meant the view that the world improves only by 
generous involvement and trust on man's part. 11 0ptimism" was 
untenable because it suggested a world at its very best now, 
needless of the additions of hum.an effort. But evidently James 
found Emerson's breed of optimism closer to his own thinking. 
Rightly so. The p~cture of Emerson as incurably, overly optim.is 
tic was originated largely by the fancy of the New England Vic-
torian mood coming after his death, which seemed to be in search 
!or a clean sexless American gentleman hero who would not embar-
rass the public mores of the day.36 
The fact is, Dnerson's years saw many dismal clouds. His 
childhood was hard because of the early passing of the man of 
the household. Calvinist rearing, according to his biographer, 
Rusk, was severe.37 Yet when h~ want off to college, he was 
almost heady with the prospects he dreamed o! ahead of him. But 
22. 
35uames, "Address at the :&rlers<>n Centenary in Concord.," p. 
in Critical Essays. ed. by Konvitz and Whicher. 
36.Q!. ill!!!' Vol. I, pp. xiii, ~ .!!.9..9.• 
3?Rusk, ~ 2f Ralph Yaldo :.Frierson, p. 55. ',I !. 
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as hiS journals show, the more he studied the less sure of his 
destiny he became. The Humean crisis almost overcame him.38 
AS he began to rebuild his hopes during the earliest most promis-
illS years as a minister, his frail wife of deepest romantic 
attachment passed away. The very next year he found he had to 
set aside regular Christian ministry. His trip to Europe did 
rekindle his confidence again. We have seen that there he re-
801 ved upon his own philosophical posture. But it cost him his 
hero worship for his European mentors. Home again, soon after 
in 1834 his brother Edward with whom he was very close died--
leaving Ralph Waldo stunned. But remarriage seemed to straighten 
him (1935). Again however, death struck, this time his brother 
Charles. The birth of Ralph's first child, Waldo, sparked his 
enthusiasm once more.39 In January, 1842, the child died at 
tive years of age. 
Nor did he turn his eyes away from the deep social diffi-
culties which were plaguing the nation. He was associated with 
the Transcendentalists and could scarcely have avoided contact 
with these troubles. Most members of the intellectual community 
in which he held active voice were dedicated to some type of 
social reform. Nam.es such as Horace Greeley, Sumner, Garrison, 
Dorthea Dix, Horace Mann, even John Brown, come to mind. Closer 
to home Theodore Parker, also a social reformer and conscience 
38 JMN, Vol. II, pp. xi-xiv • 
............ 
39Rusk, Life Sl!.. Ralph Waldo Emerson, pp. 2;0-232. 
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o! the Congress, was Emerson's friend. Brownson, enthusiastic-
allY received into the service of the Transcendentalists (for a 
relatively short while) was writing remarkably strong and inci-
sive attacks against the exploitation of the laboring classes by 
their employers. Some of :Emerson's writings express like criti-
cisms. We have yet to mention the most excruciating social cri-
sis of all--slavery and the Civil War. Emerson shared the haunt-
ing concern of the Transcendentalists over Negro slavery and the 
restless premonition of an impending Civil War. He can scarcely 
be accused of imperviousness to the bitter facts of human exis-
tence. 
Yet he insisted on an optimistic stand. The American exper-
ience appeared to support it. Progress in materialities and in 
oral uprightness seemed to come to those who took their norms 
tor conduct from natural living rather than from received tradi-
tions. Despite its problems America was in a unique position to 
offer that approach and those rewards to everyone. The possi-
bility for American democracy to bring about the fullest develop-
ent of man's capacities was largely taken to have already prove 
itself in the eyes of Emerson's American contemporaries. His 
friends made it a frequent subject of their journalism. 
The same optimism burned in Emerson too. In the beginning 
paragraph of Nature, Emerson demands. why should we not have a 
Poetry and philosophy of insight and a religion revealed to .!!§.; 
why should we settle for a philosophy, a poetry. a religion, 
I 
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that bas come to us second-hand through history and traditions? 
ttEmbosomed for a season in nature, whose floods of life stream 
around and through us, and invite us, by the powers they supply, 
to action proportioned to nature,'' why grope diffidently in the 
past? "The sun shines today also. There is more wool and flax 
in the fields. There are new lands, new men• new thoughts. ,,4o 
The American Scholar proclaims: "Our day of dependence, our long 
apprenticeship, to the learning of other lands--draws to a close 
••• , Events, actions, arise, that must be sung, that will sing 
themselves. Who ean doubt that poetry will revive and lead in 
a new age?" Confidence in the unsearehed might of man belongs 
to the "American Scholar" because freedom teaches the true impor-
tance and .force of the individual. When the American scholar 
recognizes his importance then "a nation of men will for the 
first time exist, because he believes himself inspired by the 
Divine Soul which also inspires all men."41 The major force 
motivating him to hold to a reliance on man and trust of nature 
in general was that the American experience supported it. Where 
men could follow the promptings of their intrinsic makeup, and 
unfettered by social institutions distrustful of nature men 
could deal directly with their environment, there they would 
prosper most. 
40 Emerson, Works, Vol. I, p. 3. 
41~ •• pp. 81-82; pp. 114-115. 
~ 
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Conclusion and Resume' 
In one sense no reasons--i. e., no speculatbre support--can 
ground a fundamental belief, we have also shown that in another 
sense practical reasons--reasons within lived-experience itself--
can be mounted to endorse a genuine option. Two facts should 
now be clear regarding Emerson's understanding about his basic 
convictions. First of all, he regards these assumptions as a 
belief. He calls his optimism a belief, or instinctive faith, 
a primary faith. 42 Furthermore, the weight that secures his 
belief is pragmatic, though he does not strip the pragmatic of 
important speculative implications. His optimism suggests what 
James called a "genuine option." If trust in nature actually 
makes living a more valuable enterprise, then to that extent this 
belief has speculative importance. It indicates something posi-
tive about the actual states of affairs--"the best is true.rr 
Emerson's position is in the order of belief, but a belief which 
as its evidence within a particular life-style. He musters on 
its behalf that any other view would make living impossible.43 
In r~sume", this chapter first described the attitude of 
simplicity, the attempt to recover a life-style free from unwar-
ranted assumptions. The effort required both removal of 
42 E.g., JMN, Vol. V, P• 182; Works, Vol. III, p. 283; ~' 
Vol. III, p. ;I'?; Works, Vol. I, P• 127. 
4
.3"The soul refuses limits, and always affirms an Optimism, 
never a Pessimism." Only with that attitude can one live. 
Works, Vol. II, p. 122. -
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preconceptions. and total trust of natural living. Next came an 
examination of the support he brought to his own assumption that 
nature was trustworthy. In one way, within a system of thought, 
no convincing argument could be given for a fundamental belief 
such as this. In another way. his belief could be confirmed 
pragmatically, by the experience of living according to the 
belief. His optimism was tempered by his experience. 
The aim of simplicity was to have man yield to spontaneous 
living, since only spontaneity would reveal a balanced, life-
promoting approach to reality. In the next chapter we take up 
spontaneity, concentrating on its procedural dimension--on the 
means for Yerifieation which spontaneity yields. 
~ 
,. -----------------------------------...., 
CHAPTER IV 
SPONTANEITY: THE .EXPERIENCE OF LIVING 
Simplicity ushers in phase two of the procedure--spontane-
ity, full reliance on the promptings of natural living. The 
childlike man commits himself totally to the experience of liv-
ing which then becomes the source for his beliefs about the 
world. It also offers him a reliable procedure by which to test 
the conformity of these beliefs to fact. This procedure is the 
topic of the present chapter. We find that the verification pro-
cedure not only arises out of but is the experience of living. 
Emerson harbors no a priori reasons for holding that 
beliefs require a testing procedure of some sort. Yet that he 
finds one necessary marks the strength of his philosophy. He 
had deep misgivings about the assumption common among Transcen-
dentalists that whatever passes as a spontaneous intuition may 
be trusted to reflect without further ado the actual state of 
affairs. It seems that he refused to join actively the Brook 
Farm1 episode not because he was socially awkward, nor because 
1In 1841 a group gathered at Brook Farm to form a self-sus-
taining transcendentalist community, founded on the belief that 
if each individual performed those tasks he felt were most natur-
al to him the association would flourish both intellectually and 
financially. Though invited, Emerson refused to join. A few 
years after its inception the association in its original form 
tailed • .Q!. George Hochfield, ed., Selected Writings 2£. ~ 
84 
~-------------------------, 
-
I 
l 
85 
he regarded corporate high-mindedness with suspicion but because 
he recognized that the participants had not girded their good 
will for the fatal eventuality that their "intuitions" might at 
iast conflict with those of the other participants. For they 
all believed that truth was one and that they were one in the 
truth. He hedged his enthusiasm with a procedure to insure 
a~ainst self-deception. In his eyes, a doctrine of intuition 
which overlooked this procedure would not have let nature speak 
for herself, or perhaps better, have allowed her full say. 
Three principal tasks confront us. The first is to explore 
Dnerson's meaning for 'the real'--his procedure for tests whether 
beliefs conform to reality having been tailored to fit the sup-
posed stance of reality. The second is a twin task: to show he 
actually made natural living the test of truth and that the test 
involved a procedure. The third is to outline the norms and 
structure of that procedure, which as we shall see indicates an 
incipient pragmatism. 
Emerson's Notion of Being 
The procedure for verifying beliefs about the world is to 
determine whether they actually relate to something real. It is 
important to specify Emerson's meaning for 'the real' or 'being' 
in order to determine the scope of the procedure. It must be 
broad enough to cover all general aspects of reality. He 
rnerican Transcendentalists (New York: The New American Library, 
nc., 1966), pp. 313, et." sqq. 
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'being,' 'living,' 'evolving.' equates The procedure for verifi-
cation will be to discover whether a given belief relates to 
'fital qualities in experience, to a kind of evolution. 
To be real, to exist, does not suggest the relation to time 
and space as modern philosophy commonly used the term, nor the 
•aetus ~" of scholastic philosophy. Being subsumes the sensi-
-
ble and the ideal, as well as essence and existence. Emerson's 
theory of being runs a remarkable parallel to Hegel's. 2 To be 
real is to be whole, possessed of self-subsv.·ning degrees. But 
it also differs from Hegel's in important ways. Hegel admits 
the aesthetic dimension of experience but makes the aesthetic 
subservient to Reason; Emerson insists that a philosopher who 
2Emerson was in touch with Hegelian thinking all through his 
career• Several of his assooiates--George Bancroft, F. H. Hedge, 
and later Theodore Parker--were conversant with Hegel's writings 
in German. Bancroft, for a while, even attended Hegel's Berlin 
lectures. Emerson also knew the St. Louis Hegelian, w. T. Harri 
even contributing articles to Harris' Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy. Through this acquaintance he poss'IDly had access to 
Harris' translations of Hegel, and his "Outlinestt of Hegel's 
works. Emerson's philosophy was well formed when around 1850 he 
began serious study of Hegel. He gave closest attention to The 
Philoso~hy of Art, and The Lectures on the Philosoph~ of Histo'ft· Or. lis !ng-rn-itarding'~eraon's LI'6riri. Biit h8 ound Hege 
too abstract, preferring instead to glean Hegel's notions from 
works by his followers--those by Victor Cousin, for instance. 
The book which, perhaps opened Hegel's thoughts most to Emerson . i 
was The General Principles of Nature (1848), by the American 
Hege!iin, John Stal!o. toy(i9D. Easton, H~el's First American 
Followers (Athens, Ohio: Ohio Universityess, 1966), pp. 4=9; 
pp. 43-49. 
Cousin, 1792-1867, a French populizer of Hegel, was a rathe 
ecclectic philosopher who tried synthesizing Kantianism and Ger-
llla.n Romanticism with Scottish Common Sensism, to provide a ra-
tional basis to the contingent propositions of science and the 
absolute of morals and religion. Cf. Joseph L. Blau, Men and 
Movements in American Philoso h (~glewood Cliffs, N.J:! l5rin-
~--------------------------------------------~8?~....., 
subordinates the aesthetic to the rational in his over-all des-
oription of being will end up with an unbalanced, intellectual-
istic philosophy. He holds that even Plato succumbed to the 
temptation to overemphasize the rational. The result was a 
closed and completed description of being. The philosopher's 
quest for unity leads him to ignore the equally present and im-
portant features of multiplicity and evolution in his over-all 
description of being. Hegel is susceptible to that charge too, 
as Dewey would later specifically point out.3 For Emerson, how-
ever, being is in principle open-ended, having no final complete 
phase. 
'Being,' 'Living,' 'Evolving' Eguated 
'The real' or 'being' first of all signifies life. On the 
one hand being is identified with the good and positive, while 
on the other, non-being is identified with evil and negation. 
Just as being means good, so good means life. 
Good is positive. Evil is merely privative, not 
absolute ••• All evil is so much death or nonentity. 
Benevolence is absolute and real. So much benevo-
lence as a man hath, so much life hath he.4 
Since being is the good, and the good i& what has life, being is 
what has life. In the "Poet" he relates: "!t'hat will recvncile 
me to life and renovate nature, to see trifles animated by a 
3newey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, enlarged edition (Bos 
ton: The Beacon Press, !948)-;-p. 106; Art as :Experience, Capri-
corn Books (New York: P. Putnam's Sons-;-I'9°5S'), p. 289. 
4 Emerson, Works, Vol. I, p. 124. 
,,' 
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r endeney, and to know what I am doing." He calls this "the sci-
the real,"5 meaning that by contact with the real a per-
the power of life • 
.Bein' also means the developmental, the evolving. :Enerson 
ictures the cosmos as an organism endowed with being, life, dir-
ctionality by its soul. He distinguishes two views of the world 
nderstanding sees all changes as ever-recurring movements be-
een opposites. For every action there is an equal and oppo-
reaotion. For every evil, an equal and opposite good and 
ce versa. Circumstances eventually balance themselves accord-
ng to an ine>capable leveling justice. Change is repetitious, 
othing new happens in the long run. But Understanding deals 
th appearances, the surfaces of life. Reason on the contrary, 
ecognizing a deeper fact than repetition, .!!!•t unreversed erea-
development. has the true grasp of reality, life itself. 
fundamentally is 
••• the aboriginal abyss of real Being. Essence or God, 
is not a relation or a part, but the whole. Being is 
the vast affiruative, excluding negation ••• Nature, 
truth, virtue, are the influx from th~nce. Vice is 
the absence or departure of the same.6 
ice, since it is non-bing, "Nothing, Falsehood," can beget no 
"can it work for it is not." Only being can do any-
The activities of being are necessarily creative, involving 
5 IE.!£., Vol. III, P• 12. 
l
. 
6~., Vol. II, pp. 120-121. 
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the achievement of new phases of life.? For creativity is just 
another term for living or being. He comments that at times man 
is conscious in himself of a "life above life in infinite de-
isrees. tt Tb.is 'uhbounded substance' has had such inadequate 
titles as "Fate, Minerva, Muse, Holy Ghost," which were meant to 
~onvey the notion of creative directionality. But "in our more 
[Correct writing we give to this generalization the name of Being, 
~nd thereby confess that we have arrived as far as we can go."8 
In their fullest sense being, goodness, life and creativity 
apply to God. Man insofar as he is good, i.e., truly lives, 
shares in the being of God. To the extent man betters himself--
lives according to his nature--he is. 
-
As Emerson says, the deep-
est fact in the soul is its own nature. It is a life; it is. 
-
The law of the soul is growth, the enlargement of life proper to 
man. It is present in man in degrees.9 The more an individual 
shares in the power of the soul the more real he is. Thus one 
~ay according to strict usage say that man is in the process of 
~ealizing10 himself; man gradually opens himself to an ever 
fuller reception of being. 
Self-existence is the attribute of the Supreme Cause, 
and it constitutes the measure of good by the degree 
?Ibid., pp. 122-124. The "novelty" aspect of life or being 
lwill be-ei'plained later. 
8Ibid., Vol. III, P• ?3. 
-9 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 122. 
-
1011 Genius realizes and adds." ~., Vol. III, p. 11. 
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which it enters into all lower forms. All things real 
are so by so much virtue as they contain.11 
90 
Emerson could state that wisdom and virtue are proper addi-
~ions of being. "In a virtuous act I properly am •••• 1'b.ere is no 
-
ta.x on the good of virtue, for that is the incoming of God him-
self or absolute existence." I am my "soul"--! .2 to the degree 
the divine Soul (Being) can extend itself in me. 12 
His was not a spectator-view of reality. The soul manifests 
itself to man not so much by giving man answers in words but by 
becoming him whom it enlightens, i.e •• by giving man's actions 
their direction. Emerson considered this manifestation the 
highest event in nature. It was this sort of manifestation he 
called "Revelation," a surge of divine goodness and intelligence 
in man's actions. 13 
Placed in its social context Em.arson's thinking on the soul 
takes on added meaning. Early New England theologians could not 
understand how in a society individual men could be both free 
and yet morally upright. Human nature was depraved. Left to its 
own devices it would tend to evil. In the covenant of the Redemp~ 
tion God agreed to direct soe:iety toward the good, but only 
through its leaders. But in Emerson's day, many younger Ameri-
cans, including Emerson, argued that since God created all 
ll~., Vol. II, p. ?O. 
12Tb.is explains what he means by, "!fb.at is best which gives 
me to myself." Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 185, 124, 122. 
-
13Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 280-281. Note how once more he re-
lates living, virtue, being. 
',' 
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natures (i.e •• intrinsic constitutions of things) and directs all 
things according to their natures. the directionalities of one•s 
nature must be good. Therefore, the freer men could be to follow 
this natural directionality in their own lives--the more they let 
God direct them--the more morally upright they would become. 
Democracy was to bring about a New Eden and a nation of New 
14 [Adams. 
All beings share in divine Being. To do so is to share in 
the divine life of the Soul which is ceaselessly creative. 
Hence all beings have some degree of creativity. manifesting 
itself as an evolutionary process. 'To be,• therefore, means not 
only 'to live' but in some sense 'to evolve.• Clarification of 
nis notion of evolution sheds light on his notion of being. As 
study of his sources and writings reveals, evolution is the pro-
gression to ever higher degrees of self-fulfilling relations 
~ith the rest of nature--each stage with an aspect continuous 
~ith the past and yet with another aspect better and entirely 
new in nature. 
Sources Influencing His View of Evolution 
A great variety of sources influenced Emerson's evolutionary 
~heory of nature. Actually he was quite slow in adopting it. 
14cf. R.L..B. Lewis, The American Adam (Chicago: The Univer-
~ity ot-miicago Press, 19~, pp. 1-10-:---r"The face of character 
is cumulative ••• That is it which throws thunder into Chatham's 
~oice, and dignity into Wkshington's port, and America into 
1dam•s eye.'' .Emerson, Works, Vol. II, pp. 59-60. 
I! ,, 
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In college the idea of growth and progress was widely discussed, 
both inside and outside of class. 15 From the early 1820's to 
l835 especially, while he engaged in a rather informal but 
serious dialectic about it he read several philosophers for help, 
among them Plato and Plotinus. Though he rejected both--Plato 
because he took the relations between forms to be static rather 
than dynamic or organic; 16 Plotinus because his doctrine of ema-
nation seemed to render the material side of experience insigni-
ficant, not to say, unreal--he still found evolution difficult 
to accept. 17 
His remedial trip to Europe in 1833 settled him into a more 
sympathetic reception of evolution. In Paris, he toured the 
"Botanical Garden," where specimens had been arranged according 
to structural similarities. He was fully aware at the time that 
Buf fon and Lamark had already made im~ortant discoveries there 
supporting evolution,18 and he too was deeply struck by the order 
l5:&nerson moved from one side of the debate to the other and 
back again, in an effort to examine its worth. Mildred Silver, 
"Emerson and the Idea of Progress," American Literature, XII 
(March, 1940), pp. 3-4. 
16Johnathan BishoF• Emerson on the Soul (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1964), p. 236, n. nr; Cf.Richard P. Adams, 
"Emerson and the Organic Metaphor," PLMA-;-LXIX (March, 1954), pp. 
117-130. Emerson more than any of t'fi'e'i.franscendentalists exploi-
ted the idea of the organic metaphor--that nature is to be con-
ceived of as a vital growing organism. Hochfield, Selected ~rit~ 
~ .2! ~ American Transcendentalists, p. xvii. -
l7Henry D. Gray, Emerson (New York: Frederick Ungar Publish-
ing Co., 191?), pp. 44-45, 51. 
18Lamark greatly influenced him during the 1830's at the 
height of his search for a viable unifying theory of reality. He 
~· 
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suggested by the arrangement as his comments soon after reveal. 
EVerY form "is an expression of something in man the observer •••• 
an occult relation between the very worm, the crawling scorpions 
and man."19 In a lectu2e "Use of Natural History, 0 given upon 
returning home, he declares: 
••• the system of La Marek aims to find a monad of 
organic life which shall be common to every animal, 
and which beeomes ••• a mastiff or a man, according 
to circumstances. It says to the caterpillar 'How 
dost thou, Brother! Please God, you shall yet be 
a philosopher.•20 
In 1835, he confesses "I cannot but think that mere enumeration 
of the objects would be found to be more than a catalogue;--
would be a s:ymmetrical picture not designed by us but by our 
Mak 0 21 er, ••• He had become sympathetic to the theme of develop-
ment but the clear recognition of the primary role of process in 
the scheme of evolution would be lacking until about 1840. 
Nothing extensive has been done to answer why Emerson at 
last moved so certainly in favor of an evolutionary perspective. 
drew much of Lam.ark from Lyell's Principles o.f Geology. Though 
in Emerson's eyes a ttmere catalogue of .facts-;ir It had the merit 
of depending for its theory on Lamark. 'Whicher suggests Lyell 
also had the special significance o.f showing him nature's move• 
~ents in a time-perspective so vast that his initial optimism 
~bout its submission to human power required much modification. 
'Whicher, Freedom and Fate, p. 146; Vivian C. Hopkins, S~ires of 
Form (Cambridge: Rarvarcr-university Press, 1951), p. l~ • --
l9Rusk, Life of Ralph Waldo :Elnerson, pp. 188-189; £!• ~. 
Vol. IV, p. 1~m;;vor. v. t p. 4:;. 
20Rusk, ~·• i[l;!!, V, p. 220. 
21Rusk, ibid. 
-
re:- good s•1gg~stion is simply that he saw the implications o:4 a 
22 
scientifically rev~aled universe and fa.cad them squarely. In 
rief, the scientific attitude declares that norms for dealing 
with experience should ::i.rise from experience its elf. In Emer-
son's case the experience was the procesn of human living. 
Indeed "Circles" does read like a manifesto on behalf of the 
23 experimental :rmthod. It is quite plausible his close atten-
ion ·to scientific t 11inking did most to convince him of the 
evelopmental quality of nature. He sustained life-long interest 
n the work of a number of scientists. With some--notably Rich-
d Owen and Agassez--he had. first-hand acquaintance. 24 
Darwin's works were certainly among those he read. 25 But 
pparently Emerson had already settled on his own theory before 
rwin's was published. In .fact he seems to have been little 
n!luenced by Darwin's work. Darwin merely supported his philo-
ophical conclusions with additional scientific facts. 
Emerson's notion of evolution differs significantly from 
22Silver, "Em.arson and the Idea of Progress," p. 1, n. l; 
uard Lindeman, "Emerson's Pragmatic Mood," American Scholar. 
(Winter, 1946-194?), pp. 59-60. 
2-
" "Emerson's ideal of the American scholar whose proper 
ondition is 'man thinking' seems to have no more adequate embod-
ent than the scientist at work." Marx w. Warto.fsky. Conceptual 
oundations of Scientific Thought (New York: The Macmillan Com-
any, 1 ,--p. 410. 
24 Silver, 11 .Emerson and the Idea of Progress," p. 13; Linde-
' ".Emerson' s Pragmatic Mood , " pp. 59-60. 
25cr. Stanley T. Williams, ed., "Unpublished Letters of 
ersou"';'"' Journal of English and Germanic Philology, XXVI, pp. ?7-4?8. - - - -
I: 
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that of Darwin. For Emerson evolution is organized growth--not 
a process directed by chance natural selection and survival of 
the fitt0st. Moreover, Darwin was concerned only with biological 
species; Emerson, with human experience and nature as a whole. 
Evolution was more than the reconfiguration of basic particles--
it was spiral, nature repeating the same process on different 
planes, each adaptation a step higher. Genuine growth took 
place at each ascent. Something qualitatively ~ happened at 
each ascent, something which no forms of nature previously could 
. 26 
achieve. 
Emerson's Notion of E.volution 
Emerson's concept of evolution only insinuated itself in 
his earlier essays, as when for instance he asks regarding the 
American scholar: 
What is nature to him? There is never a beginning, 
there is never an end, to the inexplicability o.f this 
web of God but always circular power returning into 
itself. Therein it resembles his own spirit, whose 
beginninf~ whos~ ending, he can never find--so entire, 
so boundless.2"/ 
fhe passage suggests a working tbroup;h of the Nee-Platonic theory 
of divine power retu:-ninr; to itself. But the groundwork for the 
!breakthrough and his later thin:king is present. Nature is an 
endless change; it also returns to itself. In what sense? 
~6 
- Hopkins, Spires of Form, p. 123; Whicher, Freedom and 
Ii 
!i 
,I 
~' p. 141; Henry H. CIT"ark, "Emerson and Science," l?liilosophi-
~ ,Quarterly, X (July, 1931), P• 241. i·' 
27Ernerson, Works, Vol. I, P• 85. 
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pirst of all, the change which is a foremost mark of nature does 
not suggest constant overturn, upheaval, and reversal. "Nature 
is a certain self-regulated motion or change." Further, nature 
iS "the rapid efflux of goodness executing and organizing it-
self." In the "return", the termini of change are laws and con-
cretions--general laws and particular facts in the process of 
ever-further development. "Every ultimate fact is only the 
tirst in a new series. Every general law only a particular fact 
o! some more general law presently to disclose itself."28 
The way Emerson uses the word 'return' undergoes very subtle 
changes from essay to essay as he inches toward his evolutionary 
position. At first the ttreturn" connotes some gradually develop-
ing identity between concrete instances and their changeless 
governing ideal type. In most of his later works each return 
ot particulars is to a law which is itself developing, growing. 
~o changeless laws underlie the growth of nature. In these es-
says, the "return" often evokes the image of a coming back to the 
divine creative source to imbibe once more new energies for fur-
ther evolution. By about 1850 &aerson had abandoned what Beach 
~alls "scale-of-being" theory of development in which "return" 
~as a key function, and adopted a strictly evolutionary view in 
~hich"growth" took over the central role. 29 
28 Ibid., Vol. III, p. 22; Vol. II, P• 310, P• 304. 
-29Joseph Beach, The Concert of Nature in Nineteenth-Centnrz 
Erurlish Poetry (New York: Haem lliii, 1936),-p. 339. 
I[, 
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The following passage from "Circles" exemplifies his full-
bloom view. 
There are no fixtures in nature. The universe is fluid 
and volatile. Permanence is but a word of degrees. 
Our globe seen by God is a transparent law, not a mass 
of facts. The law dissolves the fact and holds it 
fluid.30 
0nce again the contrast between Reason and Understanding comes 
into play. Understanding grasps "facts," which it considers 
absolute; Reason recognizes that no fact is ultimate and abso-
lute. He confesses that if reason would not force itself on us 
trom time to time, we would so easily and once for all adjust 
ourselves to live within those beautiful limits, "the perfect 
calculation of the kingdom of known cause and ettect ••• [whereJ 
Manly ••• ad.herence to the multiplication table ••• will insure suc-
cess."3l But Reason does force itself on us at times. It is 
then we realize that "in nature every moment is new, the past 
always swallowed and forgotten; the coming only is sacred. 
Nothing is secure but life, transition, the energizing spirit." 
lo fact, no law is absolute and fixed. Every tact and indeed 
every law evolves. "Every ultimate faet is only the first of a 
series. Every general law is only a particular fact of some more 
general law presently to disclose itself."32 The world is not a 
ass of disparate facts but a mass organized according to cease-
30 2 Ibid., Vol. II, P• 30 • 
.............. 
3lFlnerson, Yorks, Vol. III, P• 6?. 
32Ibid., Vol. II, PP• 320-321; P• 304 • 
.............. 
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iesslY evolving laws. Evolution, or ascension aims at lifting 
the soul to higher forms, to fuller degrees of self-realization 
with the rest of nature.33 together 
Bearing of 'To Evolve' on 'To Be' 
His notion of being now becomes more definite. He equates 
being, living, evolving. Since 'to evolve• means to move throug 
•tages to ever higher degrees of self-fulfilment, 'to be' means 
to ascend through these stages. Applying this notion of being 
to his verification procedure, by simple identity the test of 
the relation of belief to reality will be a test for the rela-
tion of belief to what creatively advances into newer and higher 
torms. 
Important to note, he identified being with evolving be-
cause in lived experience theev-olutionary process seemed the 
alance point for the tensions between all the other factors in 
experience--unity and multiplicity, permanence and change, mat-
ter and spirit, etc. No description o! a being could be real if 
one polar factor loomed larger than the rest, or if another 
dropped out of the picture entirely. For instance, to make 
unity the pivotal factor would eliminate multiplicity; to over-
atress permanence might remove change. But it evolution became 
oentral, then all the other factors would be present and properl 
inter-related. Unified, all the polarities constitute what is, 
33~., Vol. I, p. 133; Vol. III, p. 24. 
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1fbat evolves. 
A second observation. According to the ordinary use of 
•real,' 'living,' and we might add 'virtuous,• his language is 
odd, seeming to suggest that insofar as anything--man, beast or 
roct--is real it is living and virtuous. But animals are not 
generally thought or as virtuous nor rocks as living. The puzzle 
avels with a closer look at the term 'life.' He intended to 
)roaden its meaning even at the risk of blurring the classical 
4istinction between life and non-life. 
To be is to live. Just as to be is to share in divine 
Jeing, so to live is to share in divine Life. ~o be is to par-
take in the divine life of the Over-Soul. Moreover to be is to 
evolve. Since all beings share in divine Life they also share 
41v1ne creativity, as divine life is creative. Creativity mani-
fests itself in beings as growth, evolution. Emerson conceived 
the whole universe as a gigantic organism moving creatively 
through stages to ever higher forms. In its broadest meaning 
living and hence being suggests any organic evolution. The 
riddle--at least on the level or imagery--is thus solved. To be 
is to live, i.e., to come to ever fuller self-realizing power 
according to the divine prompting of the Over-Soul; to be is to 
e virtuous, i.e., to come to ever fuller self-realizing power, 
obedient to the Divine Yill. 
The Yerification Procedure 
The verification procedure tests the relation between 
l"':.------------------------------------------------~l~O~O~ 
belie! and the real, the evolving. What constitutes the proce-
aure? What are its norms and order? Row does it arise? These 
are our next considerations. Natural living is the source for 
all knowledge of reality. It also provides the procedure for 
yerification of beliefs. Put succinctly the process of verifi-
cation is natural living. Beliefs are tested in actual lite. 
Pu.rther, human living has norms and an order regularly operative 
which constitute the procedure for verification--one which sug-
gests an incipient pragmatism. The following sections, after 
tirst touching on his pragmatism, aim at establishing that his 
process of verification was natural living and finally at uncov-
ering the features of his procedure. 
The Pragmatism of His Approach 
In his procedure tor verification Emerson was in a broadly 
philosophical sense something of a pragmatist. Concrete actual 
living grounded all statements about reality; ideals served as 
instruments for an improved vitality. The degree of serviceabil 
ity of beliefs marked the degree of their truth. Truth was 
reached experimentally.34 
34Many writers, some if only on the way to another thought, 
have noted the experimental and experiential tone in Emerson. 
!:.g., Dewey, "Ralph Waldo Emerson," pp. 24-30; Gray, Emerson, p. 
33; Rusk, Life of Ralph Waldo Emerson, p. 23?; Whicher, freedom 
and ~ p:-cj6-;-(thou.gh lie thought It was a passing phase In 
erson.3 Mildred Silver recognizes that Emerson had a marked 
tendency to test theory by practiee--whieh, she observes, kept 
.Emerson from joining in the socialist movements of Owen and Four 
ier, and specifically from actively entering into the Brook Farm 
Venture. Silver, "Emerson and the Idea of Progress," pp. 16-1?. 
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His stance on evolution already hinted at pragmatism. Re-
call the remark quoted before that every ultimate fact is only 
the first of a new series; that every general law is only a par-
ticular fact in relation to some more general law about to dis-
close itself. Evolution specified the sort of relation ideas 
have to experience--they relate to reality inasmuch as they 
contribute to the qualitative betterment of actual living. They 
are tested by the extent they may foster evolution. Moreover, 
since things in experience evolve, ideas about things in order to 
remain accurate descriptions of them require repeated returns to 
lived experience for adjustment. "i'b.e truest state, rested in, 
becomes false. Thought is manna which cannot be stored. It will 
become sour if kept, and tomorrow must be gathered anew." The 
manna image suggests that thought is to serve the present neeas 
tor living, nothing more. Playing on "East," "Orient" and "ori-
entation" he continues: "Per~etuallz we must Ea.at ourselves or 
we get into irrecoverable error, starting from the plainest 
truth and keeping as we think the straightest road of logic."35 
It might at first seem stqrtling to hear Ellerson called. an inci-
pient pragmatist. Usually the so-called idealist strain in 
Lindeman notes that Emerson was caught up in two approaches to 
truth--the Transcendentalist, which he used at first to stimulate 
his critique of culture, and the pragmatic, his later procedure 
tor testing ideas. Lindeman, "Emerson's Pragmatic Hood," pp. 5?-
64. Emerson did not have a pragmatic theory of meaning, however. 
35JMN, Vol. V, P• 38 (1835); ct. Works, Vol. III, P• 23?. 
lor ftirtner study on Emerson and evol ut!on, et. Beach, The Con-
~ept ..2f. Nature .!!'! Nineteenth-Century English-,>oetry, pp-:-3°3G-343. 
rr-------------------10~2 
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.aaerson commands the reader's first attention. Unless prepared 
0 give »nerson a closer look a second time around, one may under 
tandably find it difficult to believe Emerson is pragmatic. 
tter all, pragmatism and idealism are not thought to mix. 
But we must not con1'use Bew :England idealism ot the nine-
eenth century with European idealism, regardless of how much the 
irst borrowed from the second. For New England '!Tanseendental-
sts distinguished themselves emphatically from the Europeans on 
he grounds that the latter were not concerned seriously enough 
1th the living out of ideals. Two centuries of North American 
uritanism, which maintained that superior beliefs had to usher 
n superior actions, was making itself telt.36 
Admittedly the emphasis on. practical follow-through need 
ot entail an experimental or pragmatic outlook. On the other 
and, in some sense, an idealist position need not preclude a 
ragmatic method. A basic tenet of idealism is that ideas are 
rior to our experience. In this sense the pragmatic and ideal-
st approach might be mutually exclusive. But in another way 
hey need not be. An idealist--a Romantic, for instance--might 
36aome measure of the way American transcendentalists looked 
t their idealism may be gleaned from Sampson Reed's "Observa-
ions on the Growth of the Mind"--which incidentally had great 
ntluence on young Emerson. "The best affections we possess will 
ind their home in the objects around us •••• If the eye were 
urned inward to a direct contemplation of these affections, it 
ould find them bereft of all their loveliness; tor when they are 
ctive, it is not of them we are thinking, but ot the objects on 
hich they rest •••• !he mind will see itself in what it loves and 
sable to accomplish. Its own works will be its mirror." Cited 
n !h! Transcendentalists, ed. Miller, P• 55. 
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iJ1Sist that since the material world reflects the ideals hidden 
ill man, man must engage in living to recover these a priori idea 
in some sense of recover. a lift into consciousness, or remini-
icence. 'l'b.e unique feature or a pragmatic test would be that 
onl1 the actual range of fruitfulness and not logical inelucta-
ility could guarantee that x or y were truly ideal. I do not 
ish to stand behind the merits of this approach but simply to 
oint out its possibility. Josiah Royce took a position much 
ike this. 37 
What I have said of the .American Transcendentalists, I may 
still greater assurance ot ]gaerson. lor him it was a 
feature of his approach to test the truth of ideas 
bout reality by pressing them into concrete use. Bot that he 
s a full-blown pragmatist. That would be more properly re-
erved tor those who claimed that designation, who made an expl1-
it discipline ot the pragmatic method, and who made a technical 
tudy of its philosophical dimensions. :&nerson struggled to 
some form of experimentalism. But as he was a pio-
no guide-posts to assure his path, he managed only to 
eeognize the tool but not to focus fully on its wide-spread 
plications. His was an incipient pragmatism. 
Natural Living, Source of the Procedure 
:&aerson maintained natural living was supposed to be the 
3?cr. Max B. ~1seh, ed., Classic Aaerican Philosophers (New 
ork: Appleton-Century-Crotts, Inc., 1951), p. ~7. 
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10uree ot all true beliefs about the world and the test of their 
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~erifieation. His "American Scholar" expresses this view most 
clearly. The theor:y of books is noble, he says. Yell used, 
ooks are the best of things; abused they are among the worst. 
"The scholar of the first age" received the world around him as 
lite, as lived actions; upon what the primitive scholar received, 
e brooded. And what he grasped he expressed in ideas which, to 
the extent they captured the world satisfactorily, were important 
and long-lived. Ideas have creative torce--insotar as they 
1rror life, they carry man to a higher plane of life.38 
But the danger is this: "The sacredness which attaches to 
he act of creation, the act of thought, is transferred to the 
ecord."39 Instead of prizing the creative force of ideas tor 
to promote the quality of present vital activities 
en too often tall down before the ideas of the past and before 
ooks, the shrine of past ideas, as it there were about ideas 
everedtt'om lite something sacred and unimpeachable. No book, 
o body of ideas, however, perfectly and lastingly mirrors the 
orld. Ot course, with the scholar the lite of action is subo~ 
but it is nonetheless essential. 
Without it he is not yet man. Without it thought can 
never ripen into truth ••• !he preample ot thought, the 
transition through which it passes from the unconscious 
38
•Good thoughts 
e executed." Yorks, 
39 ~ •• p. 88. 
are no better than good dreams unless they 
Vol. I, P• 3?; ct. PP• 8?-88 • 
........ 
-to the eonscious 1 is action. 
as I have lived.~0 
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Only so much do I know, 
Living serves the scholar in two ways. First, "If it were 
only for a vocabulary, the scholar would be covetous of action. 
Life is our dictionary."41 Language should reflect reality or 
life. Only those who face life tor themselves can reflect it in 
ianguage.42 But more important, lite also serves as the resource 
ror further insights into living. "The mind now thinks, now acts 
and each fit reproduces the other." 'When the artist, for in-
stance, exhausts his materials, when the scholar finds ideas no 
longer of service and the books tedious, "he has always the re-
sources l2, !!!.!• Character is higher than intellect.tt43 With 
the image of substance and accident before him he explains that 
living is the functionary, thinking only the tunetion. 
The stream retreats to its source. A great soul will 
be strong to live, as well as strong to think. Does 
he lack the organ or medium to impart his truths? He 
can still tall back on this elemental force ot living 44 them. This is a total act. Thinking is a partial act. 
40Ibid., PP• 94-95• 
41Ibid., p. 9a. "\lords are signs ot natural tacts." Ibid., 
p. 25. -
420As I am, so I see; use what language we will we can never 
say anything ~ut what we are." ~·• Vol. III, p. ?9. Italics 
mi.ne--the notion of ·beingWI'll be explained later. 
43ttCharacter--a reserved torce, which acts directly by pre-
sence and without means. It is conceived ot as a certain unde-
111onstrable force ••• by whose impulses the man is guided, but whose 1' 1 
counsels he cannot impart." ~·, Vol. III, pp. 89-90; Vol. I, ·1 1 
P• 99e ,I 
44 !l?!!!•t Vol. I, p. 99. Italics mine. 
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remarks elsewhere ot man's grasp of nature, •Ifie acts it as 
ife, before he apprehends it as truth."45 
The Process of Living 
Broadly stated, the procedure tor verification is the exper-
living. But how does Emerson conceive the process ot 
What a.re its elements and its relations? The answers 
eveal more about the procedure itself. At the same time 1 we 
k these questions with the full realization that to atomize a 
onorete process runs the risk of reducing the actual process 
0 the elements as they are considered in the analysis--abstract 
d unreal. Obviously we cannot make an abstract study of the 
lements of a process without analysis. There is nothing dis-
about an abstract study as long as we bear in mind that 
actual relations in tha concrete process are these ele-
ents real, that they are not each by themselves to be regarded 
subsistent. Pa.erson himself regarded the unieity ot the 
•initial relation" inviolable. "Lite will be imaged, but cannot 
or doubled. Any invasion ot its unity would be 
The elements in the initial relation or living are three: 
environment, the relation of vital process. Man is an 
Peet of reality. He is living and aware ot liitng. J'urther he 
45 Ibid., p. 4. The passage resembles Dewey: "Things are 
before they are known." 
46rbid., Vol. III, P• ?8. 
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possesses given qualities whose relations and functions gradually 
4J.sclose themselves through the process of living. Moreover, 
one feature ot living for man is that he possesses a desire to 
preserve and promote those qualities which promise to yield bis 
]1ighest fulfilment. Emerson frequently emphasizes that "man's 
life is a progress, not a station."4? 
What we may call man•s environment is the second aspect of 
the living process. "So much of nature as he is ignorant of, 
80 much of his own mind does be not possess." Bnerson remarks, 
drawing undoubtedly on his college theme on Socrates, that the 
conflict between the ancient and modern precepts is at an end. 
••:mow ~h.ysel!' and ••• •study nature,• become at last one 
•axim."48 Only when actively engaged in his environment does 
aan live and come to know truth. 
Let us call "environment" whatever atfects life. In Emer-
1on' s scheme it includes a plurality of things and persons which 
possess both structure and process. Anything can be environ-
••ntal. Structural unities, causal nexus, principles of con-
•tancy and organization are operative in environment. On the 
level of Understanding, tacts may appear to lack unity, direction 
JD.d organization. But successful living following on oelief in 
these factors belies that impression. Nature he commented once 
ls the same and yet not the same, but it only reigns to contra-
4?Ibid., Vol. II, P• 122. 
48Ibid. t Vol. I, P• a7. 
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49 ict itself. 
The reality of the unified and stable in nature does not 
iJtplYt however, the unreality or the material, diverse and chang-
1J1S in nature. He chides the schools of philosophy tor sliding 
into the clutches ot their occupational hazard, idealism. Ye 
tend to merge particulars under a single law, where the singular, 
the material, is lost. But life restores us to health since it 
1Dsists on the reality ot matter. Emerson coaxed those whose 
reverence for ideas made them queasy about his proposed alliance 
with material processes not to tear the new generalization. Por 
i! they think it degrades their ideas it also elevates their 
The third feature of living is the concrete relation between 
and his concrete situation--living itself. The process of 
living is the given "initial relation11 between man and his en-
TI.ronment. fhe organic living process of evolution, as we shall 
substantiate shortly, specifies exactly the type of primitive 
relation which exists between man and his world. It is a devel-
opmental process--one of "ascension" which takes place between 
aan and his situation and in which both are constantly bettered. 
181, 
Living, the Initial--lg>eriential-Relation 
!he process or living is man's "initial relation." His 
49Ib1d •• 
23-g-;-
50Ibid. t 
-
Vol. I, P• 85; Vol. II, P• 302; Vol. III, pp. 22, 
Vol. III, p. 171; Vol. II, P• 306. 
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primary function is to live. The process is initial both chrono-
1ogiaally and in order of ontological importance. An individuar 
earliest concern is for living; moreover onl7 in acts of natural 
living is he directly involved in reality. Man responds to the 
many dimensions of his environment and escapes from the myopia 
of sensism and idealism only when his various powers--will, 
affections, senses, intellect--operate together as an integral 
it. But his powers operate as an integral unit onl7 in acts 
of natural spontaneous living. To borrow a term from Dewey, the 
process of living is man's primary experience--direet, active 
and conscious responsiveness within the concrete on-going envir-
onment.51 
As a matter of terminology, :&aerson rarely called the pro-
ess of living 'experient1a1.•52 More frequently he referred to 
51Primary as contrasted with reflective, secondary experi-
ence, which is abstract thinking about primary experience. Dewe7 
intimates Emerson•s resemblance to him on this point. Dewey, 
"Ralph Waldo Emerson," in Critical ;Ess!l's, PP• 25-26; s.!• also 
t !! EJcperience, p. 28. 
52Emerson does at times use •experience' to convey the same 
eaning as 'intuition.• "So much only ot life as I know by ex-. 
erience, so much ot the wilderness have I vanguished and plante 
or so tar have I extended my being, D17 dominion. I do not see 
ow any man can atford ••• to spare a~ action in which he can par-
ake." Works, Vol. I, P• 95. In another place he relates that 
1th a true friend we can for long hours "continue a series ot 
incere, graceful, rich communications, drawn trom the oldest, 
secretest experience, so that they who sit by ••• shall teel a 
ively surprise at our unusual powers." Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 192-
93. 1'he poet he describes as • ••• the person in whom these 
owers are in balance, the man without impediaent, who sees and 
andles that which others dream ot, traTerses the whole scale ot 
experience." Ibid., Vol. III, p. 6' But this usage is excep-
ional; usually he preters the term 'intuition.• 
....... 
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it as 'intuitional.' But his preference was not to suggest a 
removal from the concrete order or the here and now. To explain, 
recall that in his view of first philosophy natural living was 
the exercise of Reason--a single unified act involving in duly 
proportionate order all the functions of man in concrete practi-
cal situations. Reason's direct perception ot reality, termed 
'intuition•' covered a very rich extension not intended to ex-
clude the concrete and singular. Intuition included not only 
what man does, endures, strives for, but also how he acts, en-
dures, believes, etc. Further it recognized no division between 
act and material, subject and object. It grasped nature, or 
which ruan and the rest of his world are aspects. Finally intui-
tion was primarily esthetic and action-oriented--ineluding the 
enjoying and enduring of objects--and was secondarily cognitively 
significant. It meant the human living o! every-day life.53 
He had a special design in preferring 'intuition' to 'exper-
ience.' He had rejected the sensism of Locke and Hume, both of 
~hom believed the sensible manifold to be atomic. The meaning 
~ttached to •experience' gained currency through them. So to 
~dopt this term would have been to invite contusing his thought 
with sensiam. 
On the other hand the meaning of 'intuition' popularized by 
the Romantics came much closer to his own view. It suggested a 
53John Dewey, ~erience and Nature (New York: Dover Publi-
~ations. Inc., 1958~p. ~9; •liipK Va!!o Emerson" in Critical 
Essays, PP• 26-28. 
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ified relation between man as a whole and his concrete environ-
It also occurred only in spontaneous actions. »Aerson 
term but consistent with bis critique or Romanti-
1sm he also modified the term to stress the prilnacy of actual 
to the concrete direetionalities of natural living. 
notion or intuition was in no way supra-empirical. 
His conception of the process of living gives basic shape 
verification procedure. First, spontaneous living is a 
conscious relation between man and his environment. 
ther. spontaneous living arouses beliefs about the various 
imensions ot reality--the material, spiritual, stable, changing, 
Moreover these beliefs are tor 11Ving, i.e., for promoting 
positive qualities or lite. As a consequence these beliefs 
e tested and modified by actually living according to them. 
!he Process of Living and the Verification Procedure 
The testing o! beliefs is not a random process; it involves 
procedure, some order and standards. As to be expected :Bmerson 
evotes little of his writings to the technical analysis of the 
as such. Typically his direct concern tor concrete 
ot belief mantles the presence of the factors and 
tructure ot the procedure. Yet they do function clearly enough 
n the resolving or his concerns to make explicit treatment ot 
possible. 
Our study of his conception of living has brought some of 
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,pecial attention. Contribution to 'organic evolution' or 'ascen 
ion' 1s the test for true beliet. Though these terms have been 
onsidered earlier they demand further discussion in the context 
t the procedure. Second, the special sentiment by which a per-
on detects the actual oecurence of ascension, and next, the role 
t community in the verification p~ocedure require investigation. 
1nally, a note of explanation about the self-reformatory quality 
beliet. 
Basic Outline of the Verification Procedure 
Much of the procedure may be gleaned from previous discus-
In outline, once man surrenders to nature he discovers 
hat human intelligence is the means by which to adjust to chang-
g situations and by which to improve the quality of life. 
e products or the mind--ideas, statements--have as their tune-
ion and hence as their claim to be the instruments by which to 
vital activity. ~e extent ot their 
itfulness in actual living is the measure of their truth. 
There is a eorrespondenee between the human soul and 
••• everything that is known to man. Instead of study-
ing things without the principles of them all may be 
penetrated unto within him. Every act puts the agent 
in a new condition. The purpose ot lite seems to be 
to acquaint a man with himself. He is not to live a 
future as described to him but to live .. to the real 
future by living in the real present.::>'I' 
again: 0 The great impression which a doctrine makes on us, 
~ 
.!l!!!t Vol. IV, p. 84. 
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r think is the test ot its truth. It it trees and enlarges--it 
it helps me, then it is trm.l; and not o·cherwise. ,.55 
Moreover, human intelligence provides this lite-promoting 
tunction only when engaged in concrete lite activities. Only 
than is intelligence unified with the totd.l man and his surround-
ingo. The intellect is anterior to an:;f division of function--
"it melts will into perception, knowledge into act."56 Only on 
the level or concrete activities does the intellect experien-
tially grasp things as they are, as organic, evolving continui-
ties or structure. 
Lastly living not only requires that living itself be the 
test ot ideas but also that all ideas be returned time and again 
to 11 ving for further reformations. Oth~rw113e, their claim to 
truth ceases. (One need only reoall »neraon's likening of ideas 
to manna which each day must be gathered anew.) We have hero, 
1n nugget torm Dnerson•s philosophical procedure as living itself. 
our primary GA1Jerience, reveals it. 
The test or actual improvement consists in noting that a 
statement serves in the way it, as an instrument, claims to--Viz., 
aa a means for issuance into concrete Vital activity w·hich, 
according to a standard or satisfaction, one regards aa trul7 a 
qualitative betterment. But a number of specific questions about 
the procedure present themselves. What does 'qualitative better-
55ausk, Letters, Vol. III, P• ?7 (1842). 
56.aaerson, Works, Vol. II, P• 325. 
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ent' mean; how do we know that qualitative betterment has taken 
p1aee in any given concrete instance; what makes the means tor 
discovering its presence reliable--and just how reliable are the 
eans? First. the meaning ot qualitative betterment. 
Notion or 'Ascension' 
Qualitative betterment is another term tor 'ascension,• 
•elevation' or 'novelty.• Novelty is the general and pervasive 
nature. "In nature every moment is new; the past 
s always swallowed and forgotten: the coming only is sacred."5? 
ther, we may remember that the novel is beyond prediction.58 
ovelty should not be taken to signify upheaval or chaos but 
rogressive development. "Nothing is secure but lite, transi-
ion, the energizing spirit." Lite. which he envisions as the 
nergizing spirit in nature, is developmental. The movements of 
ture from one elevation to the next take place "without shock 
or leap. n59 
A basic Eaersonian thesis is that what is so tor nature in 
eneral is so as well tor man as part of it. Since nature grows, 
evelops, ascends, so does man. "Nature has a higher end, in the 
roduction of new individuals, than security, namely ascension, 
r the passage of the soul into higher forms." As he proclaims, 
57~., Vol. II, PP• 319-320. 
58or. t .!.!.!•' ~·' Vol. III t P• a. 
59Ibid., Vol. II, PP• 319-320; Vol. III, P• 1?9. 
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"Life only avails, not having lived. Power ceases in the in-
stant of repose; it resides in the moment of transition from the 
past to the new state."60 Living, hence beipg, involves continu-
ous movement to a higher state. 
!he poet, incidentally, holds high office in this scheme 
because the poet recognizes and expresses the primacy of ascen-
sion, discerns the possibilities of ascension, and alerts the 
eyes of his generation to its presence. He "perceives that with-
in the form of every creature is a force impelling it to ascend 
into a higher form."61 !he poet attempts to display in words 
the beauty of people and things. Dllerson says the poet perceives 
the force ot ascension. Ascension is the mark of the natural 
act. Its upward movement is graceful, beautiful. Thus »aerson•s 
equation ot the natural, the beautiful and the real. Kan 1 s 
natural, graceful actions are called virtues. B7 growth in vir-
tue, man lives or is. 1fatural man, the virtuous man, alone is 
-
graceful and beautiful. 
Each ascension, which takes place in all nature, and in a 
special way in and through man, effects a new condition in which 
~an finds himself lifted to an entirely new relation to all as-
pects ot nature which affect him. Hence, Emerson's "law of laws~ 
The simple rise as by specific levity not into a parti-
cular virtue, but into the region ot all virtues. They 
60 Ibid., Vol. III, P• 24; Vol. II, p. 69; g.v. as a capsule 
of Dnerson's doctrine ot alt-reliance. 
61Ibid., Vol. III, P• 20; Vol. II, P• 312. 
-
are in the spirit which contains them all. The soul 
requires purity, but purity is not it; requires jus-
tice and is not that; requires beneficence, but is 
something better.62 
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s this passage indicates, the sort of betterment man finds most 
fulfilling is virtuous living. Ellerson here wishes to explain 
that moral life does not lead an individual on a sort ot scaven-
ger hunt tor virtues to be collected, here and there, helter-
skelter--nor even to be steadily collected one atter another. 
Instead moral lite directs him into a steadily increased posses-
sion of an overall power to elevate corners of his lite toge-
her. 63 
.A1'ter its own law and not by arithmetic is the rate 
ot the (soul'sJ progress to be computed. !he soul's 
advances are not made by gradation, such as can be 
represented by motion in a straight line, but rather 
b7 ascension of state, such as ean be represented b7 
metamorphoses.64 
But full Virtue is not reached as it by a single metamorpho-
sis. Plnerson explains that "the search atter truth is always by 
pproximation." At first we have but an "instinctive perdeption 
f the value ot certain ideas." By testing them in action we 
iscover the extent or their value, the extent ot their truth. 
ut while each act places us in a new condition, each also has 
"some falsehood ot exaggeration in it."65 B7 Reason or intuition 
Vol. II, P• 2?5. 
Vol. I, P• 121; Vol. II, P• 280, ,.!! ,!.g,Sl• 
Vol. II, p. 2?4. 
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a person must continually reassess the instrumentality ot ideas, 
discovering a new perspective that will lift him to a still more 
satisfactory plane of existence. It is in this sense he means 
"to make habitually a new estimate--that is elevation." 'Within 
lived experience some qualities are of positive, some of negative 
value. The soul draws upon those of positive value in order to 
conserve and promote the positive qualities ot experience. And 
it is in this developed sense that Emerson uses elevation, novel-
ty and ascension, tor evolution. 
Means tor Discovering Ascension 
!ut the most crucial issue is how to detect genuine ascen-
sion. What standard decides whether and to what extent an 
ascension truly has been effected by a belief having been imple-
mented in lived experience? !Prom what we have seen ot the pro-
~edure so tar. the simple man finds various ideas or principles 
arising in him spontaneously in his daily lite. To consider 
~hem properly he must regard these principles not abstractly but 
concretely--as actually directing a particular activity here and 
~ow. On this level ideas are judged to be true insotar as man 
tinds them (in the activity they effect) to be self-tultilling, 
~r satisfying. According to Dnerson man knows the extent to 
~hich a principle satisfies by means of a sentiment ot approba-
tion that arises in the presence of the ideas as related to the 
concrete.66 Basically this sentiment indicates eelt-fultilment, 
b6ot. ibid., Vol. I, pp. 121-122; 126. 
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satisfaction. By this sentiment man feels that a particular pur-
suit fulfills him--not just tor instance as a farm.er or as a 
scholar but as a !!!!!!• In the presence ot this sentiment he 
reels that total dedication to a certain line ot action will 
assure him his fullest and highest happiness, the fullest free-
dom to live, to be. 
The "Divinity School Address" and "The 0Ver-Sou1• give the 
most extended treatment of the sentiment ot approbation. Since 
the subject matter of those essays is God and our mode of behav-
ior toward him, the slant on the topic of the sentiment will be 
specifically moral and religious. Still we can manage to pick 
out the general features involved. 
Reminiscent or Johnathan Ed.wards, Em.arson tells us the sen-
timent is one of delight, reverence, and awe, in the presence ot 
certain divine laws. 67 These laws are those principles which in 
tact efteot ascension. Initially an individual may regard these 
laws solely on a physical plane; at a later stage or development 
~e discovers them to have moral and religious dimensions as well. 
The sentiment governs all elevations of reality, at first only 
physical but at advanced stages, spiritual--moral and religious--
also. 68 
Delight, reverence and awe imply an enthusiasm for the prin-
~iple or law under consideration--where enthusiasm means a 
G7Ibid., Vol. I, P• 121; Vol. II, P• 281. 
68Ibid., Vol. I, PP• 121-122; 126; Vol. II, P• 275. 
~-------------, r r 119 
feeling of whole-hearted trust and commitment to the effective-
ess of the principle. The delight indicates to the individual 
is fullest happiness or beatitude. Reverence and awe suggest 
total self-surrender to the object of beatitude. Here enthusiasm 
is the synonym. But the basis !or the awe, the delight, the 
enthusiasm, is the feeling that now man has reached the height 
of the exercise of his abilities. "This sentiment ••• is the bea-
titude of man. It makes him illimitable."69 What men seek in 
eatitude is the energy of full self-realization. 
Tb.is energy does not descend into individual life on 
any other condition than entire possession. It 
comes to the lowly and simple; it comes to whomever 
[sicJ puts off what is foreign and proud; it eQmes 
as insight; it comes as serenity and gra.ndeur.70 
other words, the sentiment tells man in concrete eases that 
he best is true. Regardleno of the stuge of development the 
entiment tells man what concretely given him fullest power to 
once refined to a moral plane (as the moral sentiment) it 
man what he ousht to do.71 Eventually man discovers what 
him truly creative is belief in God. 
Basis tor 1'rust in the Standard ot Satistaction 
But what gpounds the reliability of the standard ot satis-
action? This standard, the moral sentiment, gets its support 
69 Cf. ibid., Vol. II, PP• 281; 293; Vol. I, P• 125. 
--
70ibid., Vol. II, pp. 289-290. 
7libid., PP• 293-294. 
~-----------------------------------------------1-2-0-, 
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on the same basis as all other features of reality that arise 
ipontaneously while a person lives the lite ot self-surrender, 
or simplicity. Recall Emerson's fundamental assumption that we 
st trust nature enough to believe that whatever question nature 
raises it will answer. 'l'his beliet he implements in the atti-
tude or simplicity, a surrender to living as the source tor all 
~sting nature means trusting that vital 
provide answers to all the questions that living 
tselt brings up. Whatever spontaneously springs up as a re-
tor the pure of heart--tor one who has com-
tted himself totally to trusting nature--must be true, though 
in a limited and retoraable sense. The alterna-
ive implies tor Emerson that nature is chaotic and unreliable. 
t then we would live in a world where living is impossible, 
hich is not the case. 
Perhaps he first alerted himself to look tor some mark by 
hich to know in any given case whether nature has answered a 
question tor us, because he believed that one ot the most cen-
tral questions that living could raise was "How shall I know that 
I do promotes ~ite (is true) or not?• As it turned out the 
oral sentiment was the only standard which nature ottered him 
in response to the question. Once sentiment appears on the scene 
it can be doubted as a standard. it and only i! it is doubtful 
hat nature is reliable. 
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Role of Communitz 
It does not appear that Emerson rests content to make his 
........... 
moral sentiment stand as the solitary judge or truth. Curiously, 
bis individuality and aloofness dominate the typical portrait of 
him not only as a man but as a scholar. Self-reliance gets 
thrown against other-reliance as if he could not reconcile the 
two. Why this should be so stems from several facts on which we 
cannot tarry--among them his personal ambivalencies regarding 
social attachments, and the exaggerated picture of his ambiva-
lence which resulted from the unfortunate oversolicitous editing 
or the Emerson-~orbes journala.72 
!he tact is that he exercised his self-reliance within a 
definite social framework. Re regarded as a further check on 
the worth of his ideas their acceptance among honest simple-
nearted men. It they found his observations agreeing with their 
own lived experiences he had a further assurance tor the truth of 
those observations. This side ot him may not be obvious in his 
essays. He did not theorize much on this point, but there are 
strong supporting reasons for this position. First of all he 
shared with the Transcendentalists a belief in nature and in the 
reliability of the simple person. What the simple man claimed 
to be true would have to be true. Th.is was the reformulation ot 
the theoretical basis tor democracy which he and the New England 
72 l!!!• Vol. I, PP• xiii-xxxiv. 
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fl'anscendentalists were seeking. For him• the simple men would 
be most apt to be among the young Americans. He went to great 
iengths to come into contact with this audience as often as pos-
sible. To test and develop his beliefs he placed them before 
these simple natural souls whom he hoped to tind in this special 
audienoe--tew though these simple men may be. He adjusted his 
thoughts according to their responae.73 
Self-Retorma~orz Qual\'tf: ot True Belief 
Ye have seen that ideas are true insofar as they effect 
ascension, and that ascension is discovered by practical tests, 
in which the sentiment of approbation-individual and collective 
--determines the extent of ascension. Ascension, however, never 
reaches an absolute or ultimate level. All reality constantly 
evolves. Therefore, the proper theory about the general state-
ents and beliefs relating to the world must be developmental 
too. Of the power of a general principle Emerson explains that 
the moment confers "a sort or omnipresence and omnipotence which 
asks nothing of duration but sees that the energy of the mind is 
commensurate with the work to be done," and only of enough energy 
to work .!2!•74 Yor application to a future case, the generaliza-
tion requires adjustment, refinement. "Every- aet"--and hence 
?3or. Oowan. Cift ot the west, pp. 10-12, 18-19; Carl Bode, 
The .AmerI'can !!Zeeum eWI'orit: Oitord University Press, 1956), 
p. 2~5. 
?4Em.erson, Works, Vol. II, p. 31?; Vol. III, pp. 243-244. 
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14eal--"has some falsehood of exaggeration in it." Man inclines 
~o aake his ideas or his achievements absolute. Tb.at tendency 
i• the exaggeration. We live in a world where there is no final 
iuecess; each achievement is a promise to further achievement. 
-step by step we scale this mysterious ladder: the steps are 
actions, the new prospect is power."75 In other words, we dis-
cover that insight is limited. A new situation uncovers a dis-
iatisfaction with the previous level of insight and achievement. 
A new search begins tor that general principle which will insure 
a further degree of selt-tulfillment. "Every action admits ot 
being outdone. Our life is an apprenticeship to the truth that 
around every circle another can be drawn; that there is no end 
to nature, but every end is a beginning."76 !he need tor turther 
eri!ication never ceases. 
The sbitt in the obJect of self-tultillment does not entail 
alsity of the previous object. Nor is doubt cast on the relia-
ot nature, on which the procedure rests. We are not com-
to a topsy-turvy world. The structuresof the world remain 
ontinuous--but growing. Bence statements verified in a past 
ntui ti on remain true when subsumed into the present 11 ved exper- I, 
~ ' 
ence; they become false only when regarded as final. "Truth is 
element of lite, yet if a man fasten his attention on a sin-
e aspect of truth it becomes distorted and not itself but 
75Ibid., Vol. II, P• 305; Vol. III, PP• 185, 190. 
76Ibid., Vol. II, P• 301. 
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falsehood."?? !rue generalizations subsume prior generaliza-
tions. The artist, for instance, creates something new, but he 
still begins with the first elements, though on the most advanced 
stage. !he reason .&nerson gives tor this is poignant. ''Other-
1se all goes to ruin." What he says ot the artist applies to 
true insight. The artist, after all, and the poet are they 
have developed the ability to see the truth by intuition. 
!he real or true is beautiful, because it is natural and grace-
tul. Ye may recall the earlier quote from "Ciroles•--that each 
tact is but a generalization on the way to another fuller gener-
alization. The test of a proposition is the extent to which it 
laces man satisfactorily in specitic--though not total--power 
over his environment. Bo generalization is tinal; each promises 
a fuller satisfaction. Satisfaction is discovered only by liv-
ng according to the latest generalization. 
Re'sum.e' and Conclusion 
Simplicity opens man to spontaneity"• which in turn ,-ields 
procedure for verifying beliefs about reality. Since to be 
eal means to evolve, the procedure guages the relation between 
and what evolves or ascends. Belieta are tested by 
living. Insofar as they promote ascension, tuller de-
ees of self-realization or creativity they are true. The mark ';I 
77Ibid., Vol. II, p. 339. Nature "puniahes abstractionists 
••• It is not the intention ot Nature that we should live by 
general views." Ibid., Vol. III, P• 237. 
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of a genuine ascent is the arousal of the sentiment of approba-
tion for the sort of actions resulting from commitment to a given 
belief. A community of like-minded men provide a cross-check on 
the credibility of an individual•s assessment of his beliefs. 
Since the achievement of any level of power opens man to still 
higher possibilities, no final test of belief is possible. The 
procedure must espouse an evolutionary theory of truth. 
Of all beliefs confirmed by his procedure the supreme ease 
is his belief in God's existence. For if fullness ot power is 
the key to satisfaction, can there be any highest or lasting 
principle which will direct the widest satisfaction of man's 
~otential? !he following two ehapters establish that Emerson 
~aintained in accordance with his procedure that a supreme bound-
less souree of creativity whom he calls God exists. God opens 
~an to his fullest development, to his .tullest ascension. 
,.... ___________ __, 
~ ~ 
CHAPTER V 
THE TERM 'GOD' 
Faerson contends that to be real is to be creative, and that 
~he test or belie! is its fruitfulness in promoting creativity. 
He turther asserts that there exists a primal boundless source 
tor all creativity called God. !his chapter concentrates on the 
w8" he arrived at 'the primal boundless source of creativity" as 
the designation for the term 'God 1 ; 1 the next chapter takes up 
bis argument tor God's existence. 
:rlnerson declares that God cannot be "intellectually dis-
~erned" but God can be "felt." In other words God is not known 
by Understanding but by Reason. Natural situations give rise to 
these feelings which indicate what 'God' means. !fhe first part 
~t this chapter focuses on these situations. What arises in them 
is a feeling or religiousness toward something regarded as both 
present yet somehow inaccessible. ~e second topic is the mean-
ing of this •presence and inaccessib1li't7·' It yields the desig-
aation 'boundless source of creativity' tor 'God.' 
1
•Tb.e primal boundless source of creativity' will serve 
~•reinatter as a shorthand for a fuller description to be given 
•hortly. .Q!. n. 28, below. !his shorthand was selected for 
convenience and because it indicates the predicates Emerson 
aeems to eaphasize most. 
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In that :&lerson held God could not be discerned intellectu-
allY his position falls within the mainstream of much Christian 
thinking. 2 Christian theologians and philosophers have tradi-
1onally insisted that God is beyond human comprehension. Still,. 
the qualities of certain activities within primary ex-
rience or intuition, he does give a description of the term 
•God' derived from the tact God's presence can be felt. "I say 
I make 1lf1' circUJ1stance; but it you ask me, Whence I am? I feel 
ike other men _.,. relation to that ~act, which cannot be spoken, 
or defined or even thought, but which exists, and will exist."3 
e must remind ourselves that 'feeling' as he uses it means the 
primary intuition,4 which occurs onl~ when the 
senses and feelings, operate in a single organic 
ty in concrete acts or spontaneous living. !'he feeling of the 
of God--sense or being, Eaerson also calls it--arises 
conditiona.5 Since it is present in consciousness it 
s open to some description. 
2Jl1li, Vol. III, p. 2?4. God is the "Unknown, the Inevitable 
he Diiiiie." !Berson, Works, Vol. II, p. 352. God is that "deep 
orce, that last fact behind which analysis cannot go. 11 Ibid., 
• 64. 
3P.merson, Works, Vol. I, P• 335. 
4 Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 8? • 
.............. 
5"fhe sense ot being which in calm hours rises, we know not 
ow, in the soul, is not diverse from things ••• but one with them 
d proceeds obviousl7 trom the same source whence their lite 
d being also proceed." ~., Vol. II, p. 64. 
I ,, 
,1i1 
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Situations Revealing What 'God' Heans 
The discovery of his meaning for 'God' requires investiga-
tion of the situations in which the simple man spontaneously 
becomes acquainted with what 'God' means. The most obvious and 
typical situation occurs when a person "communes with nature," 
when for instance he looks up at the stars, gazes at a panoramic 
1torizon or basks in the solitude of a woods in summer-time. But 
these are not the only events which reveal divine presence. Acts 
of gracefulness, genius, character, virtue, all manifestations of 
beauty, are natural events which have this power too. Indeed any-
thing grasped in intuition, in ordinary experience--without arti-
ficiality, duplicity, !ormalism--is natural and hence may open us 
to recognizing the presence of God. 6 
I embrace the common, explore and sit at the feet ot 
the familiar and low. Give me insight into today ••• 
What would we reall7 know the meaning ot? !he meal 
in the tirkin; the milk in the pan; the ballad in the 
street; the news ot the boat, the glance of the e7e 
••• ; show me the ultimate reason of these matters; 
show me the sublime presence of the highest spiritual 
cause lyrking ••• in these suburbs and extremities ot 
nature.? 
Character, genius, virtue, gracefulness, beauty, all bear 
in a striking way on the extent to which man is tree to exercise 
power of selt-determ.ination. Oonsequently they are especially 
provocative instances ot natural e-venta. As a case in point, 
6Ibid., pp. 129-1301 Rusk, Letters, Vol. I, pp. 1?4-175; 
McGitfert, ~' PP• 120-126 (January, 1831). 
?:&Berson, Works, Vol. I, p. 111. 
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.mnerson tells us that what we admire most in a man of character 
is his freedom, his self-determination, his consequent wisdom and 
power. Similarly the power of genius comes to man only upon 
self-abandonment to nature. Virtue, too, arises only when man 
gives himself over to spontaneity.8 Indeed gracefulness and 
beauty are the necessary results of natural actions since what-
ever tends unimpeded to its end must be graceful and beautiful. 
Meaning of 'Present Yet Inaccessible' 
All such natural events share two important features which 
~eveal what 'God' means. First they awaken a feeling of rever-
ence or of religious commitment. Second this feeling is toward 
something felt to be both present yet inaccessible in the event. 
Somehow presence and inaccessibility specify the object of reli-
gious feeling. But how? We could easily understand that stars 
and the horizon suggest presence and inaccessibility since they 
may be visually present yet be7ond reach. But !aerson had some-
thing more in mind than sensible presence and insurmountable 
physical distance. !he woods, beautiful flowers, are present and 
also quite accessible. Still they too occasion the revelation ot 
the divine--the present yet inaecessible.9 It is important to 
learn how 'presence and inaccessibility• designate the object of 
~he religious sentiment. 
128. 
8 ~·• Vol. II, PP• ?-11; Vol. III, p. 26; Vol. I, pp. 120-
9Ibid •• Vol. I. nn. 8-11. 
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Emerson believes that something invariably happens in the 
natural event which elevates it beyond what any calculation from 
given forces on hand could explain. For instance, he states: 
"!his is that which we call Character--a reserved force, which 
acts directly by presence and without means." Genius and virtue 
aove forward in qualitative leaps, rending time and space, con-
tradicting by their evolution the laws of sensuous experience. 
There is always more to an event than we can solidif)' into ever-
lasting concepts. Beauty too always ultimately eludes our quest. 
Indeed a man might come to resent this were it not that this tan-
talizing characteristic ot beauty converts all nature into a vast 
promise. 10 Han is turned by constitution toward the inaccessible 
Whatever he does he will outstrip by further and rurther stages 
ot development. .Each natural event promises another and a better 
one. 
Emerson maintains that confronted with the novelty in these 
natural events man feels spontaneously that some source of erea-
ti vity is present which brings the evolution to pass. fhis 
source is boundless in its capacity for further novel stages. 
Its possibilities can never be lastingly circumscribed either by 
~um.an intelligence or in reality. Like a horizon it forever out-
strips full possesaion.11 It is to this boundless source ot 
10 Ibid., Vol. III, P• 89; Vol. 
P• 393;~, Vol. V, P• 129 (1836) • II, pp. 2?2-2?6; Vol. III, 
........... 
11Emerson, Yorks, 
Emerson calls God "ine 
~hich the hands of man 
Vol. I, PP• lOt 16; Vol. III, P• l?l. 
Unattainable, the !lying Perteet, around 
can never meet." Ibid., Vol. II, p. 301 • 
............. 
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~reativity in a natural event that the religious sentiment at-
taches itself. Since it is the source ot an actual ascension, it 
is present; since it is boundless in its perpetually creative 
drive toward higher stages or asceunion, it is also inaccessible. 
Human Soul Suggesting this Notion ot God 
Texts which expressly discuss the meaning of the term 'God' 
confirm this conclusion. I wish to cent~r on two or them. In 
the first, the departure is tha human soul. 
What is God? !he most elevated 
that can be formed in the mind. 
own soul carried to perfection. 
he conceive. He is infinite as 
less as I am sintul ••• 12 
conception or character 
It is the individual's 
Jor no other deity can 
I am finite; He is sin-
Several typically !:mersonian beliefs are suggested in this pas-
sage. To say that God is the soul of the individual carried to 
perfection implies that God is soul stripped of limits. '!he 
~oul in the classical philosophical tradition is understood as 
the principle of lite. !hie see.ms to fit Emerson's perspective. 
The Over-Soul, another term for the divine, Vivifies all reality. 
Pressing this thought, it is apparent that 'being• and 'life' are 
~ynonymous with 'ascension' or •creativity.• Hence we may say 
that God is infinite life, infinite being, infinite creativity. 
Further, the line "He is infinite as I am finite. He is 
~inlesB as I am. sinful," conveys the contrast between the bound-
less creativity of God and the limited stagnated state of man by 
12Jl'1Jf, Vol. III, P• 182 (1830). 
rr--------~ 
~ elf. .&aerson linked human limitation with sinfulness. He 
that the only way we can establish that we are not simply 
of divinity is through our free will. "Your reason is 
your virtue is God, and nothing but your liberty, can you 
all securely and absolutely your own." Our liberty is our prin-
iple limitation. Just how this limits us he makes plain when 
e insists that to live a aan must act spontaneously rather than 
interfere with the directions ot nature. In-
erterence limits living. For this reason Em.erson could exclaim 
hat "the only sin is limitation."13 Self-will is limiting and 
Lillitation is sintul because it implies the individual's 
of will over and against natural process. This thwarts 
scension, the action ot the divine force of lite. To act 
ainst nature's directionality is to counter God's will. 
God, however, is limitless. He is spontaneity itself, the 
creativity. 
fhe magnetism which all original action exerts is ex-
plained when we inquire the reason o? self-trust. 'Who 
is the Trustee? Vb.at is the aboriginal Self, on which 
a universal reliance may be grounded? What is the 
nature and power of that science-battling star, without 
paralax, without calculable elements , which shoots a 
ray of beauty even into triT1al and impure actions, it 
the least mark of independence appear? The inquiry 
leads us to that source, at once the essence of genius, 
ot virtue1 and or life, which we call Spontanirty or 1iist!iict. 4- - -
l3McGittert, YES, p. 4; Ellerson, Works, Vol. II, p. 308. 
14Eaeraont Works, Vol. II, p. 64. Italics mine. 
133 
Bature in General Sugsestipg this Notion of God 
The second passage takes as its departure observations of 
natural events surrounding man which suggest the presence of God 
within all nature. 
The sovereignty of this nature whereof we speak [God] 
is made known by its independency of those limitations 
which circumscribe us on every hand. The soul [God] 
circumscribes all things. As I have said, it contra-
dicts all exper11nce. In like manner it abolishes 
space and time. ' 
Once again in describing what he means by God, he alludes to an 
unlimited principle--1.e., one which abolishes the limitations 
0£ existing under the conditions of time and space. 
Be is not suggesting that the meaning of the word 'God' in-
volves transcending reality, that it requires us to abolish 'tille 
and space' in every use or the term. That would make the word 
'God' patently meaningless. He has in mind instead to distin-
guish his view from the standard philosophical notion of 'time 
and space• shared by Locke, Huae, Kant. !'his standard usage im-
plied first, that all objects in time and space change, and 
second, that each change is entirely explicable by its sensibly 
observable causal antecedents. To conceive of being this W&.'¥ 
under the conditions of time and space suggested a world in which 
given the knowledge or all causal antecedents or all events, 
every event would be determined and entirely predictable. 
15 nli•t Vol. II, P• 272. 
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Emerson refused to accept this view. 
How easily, if fate would suffer it, we might keep for-
ever these beautiful limits, and adjust ourselves, once 
tor all, to the perfect calculation or the kingdom of 
cause and effect. In the street and newspapers, life 
looks so plain a business that manly resolution and ad-
herence to the multiplication table through all weather 
will ensure success.16 
"Perfect calculation" and "adherence to the multiplication table" 
connote the level of operation directed by Understanding, in 
which experience is subjected to mathematical generalizations. 
He here re~eets what he regards as the approach typical ot the 
scientist of his day, and insists reality includes far more than 
sense-observations reveai.17 
Only Reason or Spirit, not Understanding, contacts reality 
directly. "But ah! presentl7 comes a day, or is it only a half-
hour, ••• whieh discomforts the conclusions ot nations and of 
7ears." These rare moments transport a person to another way ot 
seeing the world, through the eye of Reason. 'l'he usefulness or 
Understanding depends on Reason, which is to Understanding as 
power is to torm. Understanding abstracts torm from concrete 
exercises of power. When power assumes a new function new torms 
16 Ibid., Vol. III, P• 6?. 
17In remarking that the sensist operates on a "journalist-
leve1 • of experience, :&Berson is not unlike Kierkegaard, who 
stormed mightily against the journalist-e7e description ot real-
ity. But Emerson ditfere from Kierkegaard in that Emerson still 
finds a somewhat kindly place tor that level. "Calculation of 
the kingdom of known cause and etfeot" gu.ages the level of Under-
standing, which !llerson accepts as an important though derivative 
grasp of the world. 
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arise. Hence Understanding, to retain proximate contact with 
reality must draw oft new form.a, since man now faces a whole new 
situation. Old forms cannot be successfully imposed. ~o immor-
talize old schemes dooms one to sheer formalism, to living in the 
past. 
Power keeps quite another road than the turnpikes of 
choice and will; na.mely the subterranean and invisible 
tunnels and channels of life •••• Life is a series of 
surprises, and would not be worth taking and keeping 
if it were not. God delights to isolate us eyery day, 
and to hide us from the past and the future.18 
Instead we are commanded to !!!!. !!2!• Living involves trulJ 
new lines of behavior, new in the sense that they are not entire-
ly predictable from their causal antecedents. Soae further 
source accounts tor the novel aspects of the action. 
!he ardors of piet,' agree at last with the coldest 
soeptioism--that nothing is ot us or our works--that 
all is ot God •••• I would gladly be moral and keep due 
metes and bounds which I dsarly love, and allow the 
most to the will of man; but I have set my heart on 
honesty in this chapter and I can see nothing at last, 
in success or failure, than9more or less of vital force supplied from the Eterna1.l 
Man plans, works long and hard to make tor himself a better da7, 
and indeed does achieve improvements. But still "the results of 
life are uncalculated and uncalculable •••• !he individual is al-
ways mistaken. It turns out somewhat new and very unlike what 
he promised himself."20 
18Ibid., Vol. III, P• 67. 
l9Ibid., p. 69. 
20Ibid., PP• 69-70. 
136 
When, therefore, Emerson declares that God is known as what 
abolishes the limitations of time and space, he does not intend 
to reserve the use of the word 'God' to what is entirely removed 
from the world. Of the two ways of looking at the world, Under-
standing grasps it as though all events were entirely explicable 
in terms or their causal antecedents; Reason, however, recognizes 
that events point to a source other than those open to "the per-
fect calculation ot the kingdom of known cause and effect." 
After its own law and not by that of arithmetic is the 
rate of its progression to be computed. !he soul's 
advances are not made by gradation, such as can be 
represented by motion in a straight line, but rather 
by ascension o~1state such as can be represented by metamorphosis. 
Abolition of space and time means that the traditional philoso-
phical conception of space and time must be set aside in order tc 
speak meaningtull7 about God. God is what reason discovers to 
account for what Understanding cannot in the Rresent, viz., 
novelty, lite, being. 
The feeling of the presence of God does not imply removal 
trom lived experience. Quite the contrary: 
The sense or being which in calm hourse arises, we 
know not how, in the soul, is not diverse from things, 
from space, trom light, from time, from man, but one 
with them and proceeds obviously from the2~ame source whence their lite and being also proceed. 
Indeed man's substitution of what he devises in Understanding by 
abstraction for what he first found to be real by liVitJ:g explain.a: 
21~ •• Vol. II, p. 274. 
22Ibid., P• 64 • 
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bOW he originally tell into a confusion about his unity with the 
of reality. "Ye f'irst share the 11!13 by which things exist 
d afterwards see them as appearances, and forget that we have 
eause.*' 
Emerson considers God to be the primal source or creativity. 
is said and done, since reality constantly ascends 
it is impossible to reach any lasting comprehension of 
appropriate name tor God. Natural events around us, 
ur own feelings, attirm God's presence in concrete activities. 
t this aouree ot creativity outstrips every formulation ot it 
grants us. It forever outstrips what it has 
it has revealed to us ot itself in transforming 
daily acts ot living. Yor this reason Eaerson also calls 
power "the Unattainable, the flying Pertect."23 
!his primal source takes many other names too. In tour 
ges of "Ex:perience"24 alone he lists 'Chance,• 'First Oause,• 
•rortune,• 'Minerva,• 'Kuse,• 'Holy Ghost,• 'unbounded substance.• 
t because the source is boundlessly creative every term falls 
of designating only some facet, some particu-
divine. 
!'he over-Soul 
'What of the term •over-Soul'? Popular memory ot Emrson 
23Ibid., p. 301. 
-24Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 70-?4. 
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•ight suggest this as his chiet designation tor the divine. Cur-
iously he almost never used the term though he did so entitle an 
i,aportant essa7. Ye ma,- inter that •over-Soul' was considered 
just one ot man,. terms applicable to the divine. 25 Regardless 
o! its intrequent usage, however, it is a singularly appropriate 
term for the divine within his over-all ontological tramework. 
It underscores what is primary in nature--namel7, vitality or 
creativity. 
All the terms used in the essay "Experience" to designate 
<Jod serve as feeble attempts to verbalize the unbounded source 
ot creativity. This source is also the source or living, evolv-
ing, being. Indeed, •1n our more correct writing we give to this 
generalization (vast tlowing TigorJ the name Being, and thereby 
confess that we have arrived as tar as we can go.•26 Since the 
source of being or ot living is the soul, the supreme source ot 
both may be called the Over-Soul. It supplies growth. But to 
grow is to ascend, to ~· Be~ond the entirely determinate series 
ot events which Understanding supposes and which grounds the 
aoral beliet in compensation {that every loss is a gain and vice 
rt"ersa) runs a deeper .tact, Tis., !h!. soul itself. 
~e soul is not a compensation, but a lite. !J!he soul 
is ••••• Essence, or God, is not a relation or a part, 
lnit the whole. Being is the vast attiraation, exclud-
ing negation, sell-balanced, and swallowing up all 
25aobert Detweiler, "!he Over-Rated •over-Soul'•" American 
Literature, XllVI (March, 1964), PP• 65, .!i .!li• 
26Eraerson, Work§• Vol. III, P• ?3. 
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relations, parts and times within itselr. 27 
Being is creative. Events in the dimensions ot time and space 
as Understanding takes them up are not. But insofar as they are 
swallowed up by Being they become alive and new and real. The 
term Over-Soul suggests the pervasive force ot creativity. 'God' 
is 'the pervasive primal source of creativity•' 
lllnerson's 'Divine Creative Source' 
ana the !radltlona! lotion ol G04 
Other properties ascribed to 'God' indicate that lmerson•s 
•eaning for the term. does not differ vastly from the common 
Judeo-Christian notion of God. 28 For instance he attaches intel-
ligence, will and uniqueness to 'God'. !hough l!merson found tra-
ditional Christianity deficient as a religion he continued work-
ing through its long established theological framework, particu-
larly along the Augustinian lines. According to Augustinian 
thinking, Christ is the divine Word, the repository of all divine 
ideals which serve as the patterns tor created beings. !he 
27Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 120-121. 
28By the comm.on Judeo-Ohristian notion ot God I have in mind 
a description approximating that formulated, e.g., by John Hick: 
"God is the unique infinite personal Spirit who has created out 
of nothing every-thing other than himself; he is eternal and un-
created; omnipotent and omniscient; and his attitude toward his 
human creatures, whom he has made for eventual fellowship with 
himself, is one of grace and love." The Eristence of God (New 
Yorki The Macmillan Company, 1964), PP: ~-~. Ve fiid correspond-
ing predicates affirmed ot 'God' throughout .Emerson's writings, 
with the possible exception of personal immortality implied in 
Hick's description. 7or Paerson 'God' is the unique personal 
Spirit, etc. 
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Jather's utterance of the Word issues into creation, the expres-
sion or the divine intelligence and will. :Emerson considered the 
world as the spiritual language or God. As created, the world 
implied divine will, as the language or God it implied divine 
intelligence. :Emerson points to the divine will in the attribu-
tion of such terms as "Beauty,• "Virtue," "Love" to 'God•. 29 
Divine intelligence is asserted in sueh terms as th9 "Omniscient." 
"Supreme Mind,• "Divine Mind," eto.30 Uniqueness is also a pro-
perty of the maersonian 'God.' On the negative side, divine 
uniqueness meant that 'God' is not identical with the sum total 
ot all the workings of persons and things in creation. Positive-
ly, it meant 'God' is the supreme maker of the world--which is 
finite whereas 'God' is not. "!hat central life is somewhat 
:something] superior to Creation, superior to knowledge and 
thought, and contains all its circles." !hus Ellerson predicates 
the rather traditional properties of uniqueness, intelligence and 
will to 'God.' "'!he world is not the product of manifold power, 
but of one will, of one mind; and that one mind is everywhere 
active."3l 
~e ascription of these three properties to 'God' makes it 
also possible to describe 'God' as a perso?, i.e., as that which 
29Jor example: "Love ••• is the essence of God." P.mereon, 
Yorks, Vol. II, p. 200. Ql• Vol. II, p. 64, ,08; McGittert, ~' 
p. 4. 
30!Derson, Works, Vol. II, pp. 276-r 280, 288. 
3lib1d., Vol. I, p. 123; Vol. II, P• 318 • .Q!• Vol II, pp. 
272-280. 
141 
has intelligence and will ot its own right. But this conclusion 
requires further comment since the way Emerson uses the term. 
•personal' would at least semantieall' render his notion of God 
impersonal. 
In Emerson's use of the term, 'person' signifies the parti-
cular man. Particular men can be regarded exclusively, or as 
related to a common divine source. nrn youth we are made tor 
persons. Childhood and youth see all the world in them. But the 
larger experience of man discovers the identical nature appearine 
through them all." The former way of looking at persons is an 
exaggeration, the latter is the truth. The analysis ot the reli-
gious importance ot Obrist brings this out. Jesus "•81'• that God 
incarnates himself in man and evermore goes torth anew to take 
possession of his world." !bis is the "doctrine of the soul." 
Historical Christianity instead offers "an exaggeration of the 
personal, the positive, the ritual. It had dwelt, in dwells, 
with noxious exaggeration about the person ot Jesus."'2 
Signiticantl7 the positive, the ritual, the personal are 
called exaggerations, in contrast to the "doctrine ot the soul." 
Elsewhere Paerson repeats the contrast, remarking that the spri-
tual principle should be allowed its tull expansion in man "with-
out the admission ot anything unspiritual; that is, an:,.thing pos-
itive, dogmatic, persona1.n33 He again is calling the distinc-
32Ibid., Vol. I, PP• 129-131; Vol. II, P• 277. 
33Ibid., Vol. I, PP• 335-336. 
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tion between Reason and Understanding into play. Understanding, 
the faculty which considers objects in isolation, creates cxag-
gerations--the positive, the ritual, the dogmatic. Evidently, 
"person," or at least the "exaggeration of the personal," is to 
be located within the sphere ot Understanding. Understanding, 
looking on individual me:n merely as individuals, takos each only 
as an end to himself; by contrast Reason, recognizing the relat-
edness ot all individual men to God, surrenders private aims to 
the spontaneous direction of the divine will. "!'h.e soul knows no 
persons. It invites every man to expand to the :f'ull circle of 
the universe and will have no preference but those ot spontaneous 
love."34 Viewed according to Reason persons are introductions to 
God. 
Persons themselves acquaint us with the impersonal. 
In all conversation between two persons tacit refer-
ence is made, as to a third part7, to a common na-
ture. !hat third party ••• is impersonal; is God.35 
What is meant b7 the "impersonal"? Ye learn this by negat-
ing the properties ot the personal. It is not something consi-
dered in isolation, that much is clear. Even more, the imper-
sonal involves a non-symmetrical relationship with individual 
men. It is their "common nature," "what invites ever7 man to 
expand to the full circle of the universe," rtthe identical nature 
appea:-ing through them all." .&:lerson tells us "the sovereignty 
of this nature ••• is made known by its independency or those 
34Ibid., Vol. I, p. 130. 
-
35Ibid., Vol. II, P• 277• 
-
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limitations which circumscribe us on every hand. The soul cir-
cumscribes all things."36 1'he relation according to this image 
is that of the container to the contained. But more precisely 
the soul is the cause of the world, taking possession ot the 
-orld by incarnating itself in particular forms. 
One mode or the divine teaching is the incarnating of 
the spirit in a form--in forms like my own. I live 
in society; with persons who answer to thoughts in 1IJ.'1' 
own mind •••• I see its presence in them. I am certi-
fied of a common nature.37 
!thus God is impersonal--he is the one spirit who gives being and 
life to ma~ particular huan forms. !he term person on the eon-
tra.?7 belongs to these dependent forms, not to the collllBon inform-
ing spirit which forever outstrips these torms.38 
'!he statement that God is impersonal must be considered in 
light ot what we have already noted, i.e., that God is unique, 
intelligent, and possessed ot will. God is not iapersonal in the 
sense that a falling rock would be. He is conscious ot and in-
volved in the evolution of the universe. God is not impersonal 
in that the divine is simply identical with the sum total ot pro-
cesses, things and relations in the universe. He is not. He is 
impersonal in that he is the maker ot the world. He is the com-
mon omni-related source ot being, goodness, 11.te, in the world. 
DiVine aims and acts are not private (personal) aims and acts. 
36Ibid., Vol. II, p. 2?2. 
-
37Ibid., Vol. II, p. 276. 
-
38!!?.!2:•t 'fol. II, P• 314. 
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To be the divine creative source is to be impersonal. Nonethe-
less, m&erson's description ot God includes properties--intelli-
gence, will, uniqueness-which together correspond to the what is 
commonly meant by the term 'person' in the usual Judeo-Oll.ristian 
notion of God. 
Suamarz 
Any natural situation in which a simple man surrenders to 
the promptings or nature arouses in him a feeling of religious-
ness toward something regarded as present yet inaeeessible--pre-
sent in the sense that it etfeots ascension, inaccessible in tha 
it is boundlessly creative. '?b.us the divine or God means the 
boundless source or creativity. Many names are applied to this 
source in order to express some tacet of it. 'Orer-soul' is an 
especially appropriate term but because this source is boundless 
all terms fall short ot describing it. Moreover Ellerson attaches 
a number of predicates to the term 'God' which indicate that he 
did not intend his notion of God to differ greatly from the usual 
Judeo-Ohristian notion. Some of these predicates are intelli-
gence, will, uniqueness, love, lite, Creator, Spirit, etc • 
.&lerson believed that the notion of the divine arose in 
natural situations and that God's reality could be established 
the verification procedure which showed God to be the source of 
all creative advances which took place in nature. The final 
chapter studies the reasons for these beliefs. 
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-CH.APTER VI 
THE ARGUMEBT J'OR GOD'S .EXISTENCE 
»aerson appeals to the moral sentiment to establish God's 
existence. Since the moral sentiment affirms the claim that the 
boundless source of creativity exists, that source must actually. 
This affirmation of the moral sentiment must be accepted because 
the opposite position would imply the moral sentiment as such was 
. 
unreliable,, nature untrustworthy and life absurd. The argument 
nas two major stages. !he first shows that the moral sentiment 
actually claims God exists. J'ollowing the general lines of the 
verification procedure, the claim is established in part by the 
orima facie case that the claim arises spontaneously, and in part 
by testing the purported claim. for its fruitfulness. The second 
~ajor stage mounts support for the credibility of the claim. In 
short, all genuine claims of the moral sentiment are to be be-
lieved on the general thesis that nature is reliable and that 
nature reveals the moral sentiment as the means tor ascertaining 
true beliefs. 
Before dealing with these stages two preliminary remarks are 
in order. Jlirst, the force of his argument from the aoral senti-
•ent is not demonstrative but 'probable( in a sense to be ex-
plained. Seoond, the term. 'aoral sentiment' broadly taken is 
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another term tor 'verification procedure.• 
Logical Force of the Argy!ent 
Emerson's argument is not strictly demonstrative. He did 
ot intend to construct a logically ineluctable proof in which 
God's existence is established by strict logical entailment, by 
causal inference. or course he would insist that logic is impor-
tant to the argument. Every good argument must have implicit in 
it a firm. logic. He would also agree that the notion or cause-
etfect is present in the argument, since it concludes that God, 
the causal source or creativity, exists. 
But the argument does not turn directly on the logical en-
tailment from given effect to the necessary inference ot its 
cause. Instead !aerson maintained that man finds a strong rela-
tion between his ability to do good and his concrete adherence to 
the belief that God exists. Upon making an option for the real-
ity or God as causal source (and most tully only then) man dis-
covers himself doing things previously beyond his power. One 
ight suggest almost a ratio between man's ability to do good and 
the degree or explicitness with which he recognizes God as the 
source or this new ability. Since the moral sentiment declares 
to man that God is the source or this power and since man exper-
iences little or no evidence to encourage him to think he himself 
is its source, man accepts the testimOIQ" ot the moral sentiment, 
or ordinary experience, that God is the source ot this creative 
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the credibility ot the moral sentiment. 
If Emerson did not intend his argument to follow by logical 
or mathematical necessity it is equally clear that he did not 
think of its force in terms of logical or mathematical-type pro-
babilities. He strongly opposed casting intuition regarding 
reality into the forms of logic or empirical science, tor that 
~ould falsify the intuition. Yet he was unshakably firm in his 
conviction that God exists. The kind or likelihood--perhaps even 
necessity--he had in mind differed basically from the sort which 
gained currency through logic and mathematics. 
'!'he standard of likelihood grounding his argument was not 
merely the extent to which his position could admit aspects ot 
reality lost from speculative sight by other approaches; nor the 
degree or success with which his theory rescued a certain dimen-
sion or experience from its paradoxical status in other theories. 
The standard was what best engendered a healthJ" lite-st7le, where 
best was decided by living according to a belief with two conse-
quenees--tull extension ot power of self-realization and reeling 
ot full self-satisfaction. 
Thus his argument is not demonstrative. Its merit does not 
rest solely on necessary logical entailment, nor on logical or 
mathematical probabilities. Logical and mathematical conceptions 
of necessity and probability are foreign to his approach. !he 
force of likelihood and necessity is guaged non-mathematically 
by the fullness o! self-realization resulting from commitment to 
a given belief. 
Moral Sentiment a Broad Term 
tor Vefitlcat!on Procedure 
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Before considering the argument we must also specify that 
the term moral or religious sentiment--just as Reason and intui-
ti on--i s used broadly to designate his verification procedure. 
The test of truth is moral fulfilment. If acting according to 
belief in x results in moral fulfilment x is good and hence real. 
Recall the word 'feeling• is used to mean 'sentiment.• Unlike 
Hume's conception of sentiment as something radicated in imagina-
tion rather than intellect, Emerson's theory of sentiment unifies 
the activity of reason with affective states, so that sentiment 
means a direct affective-cognitive relation of a man in a cone 
present situation calling tor active response. If under a speci 
fie set of conditions a person feels morally attracted to attain 
x, and if acting for attaimaent of x in tact begets the moral 
satisfaction anticipated, x must be real. 
Bow man reaches this level of insight--that the best satis-
faction is a key to deciding what is real and that moral satis-
faction is the best--eomes about by means or a trial-and-error 
procedure directed by insight or intuition at more primitive 
levels of development. '!he procedure is governed by a series of 
conditions. Since intuition and moral sentiment are at bottom 
the same, the conditions proper to intuiton are proper also to 
moral sentiment, the difference being that at the latter stage 
the standard of satisfaction has been established to be moral 
rather than biolo ical or utilitarian. 
{. 
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fhe conditions governing the claims of the moral sentiment 
are three. Yirst, truth comes through intuition only on condi-
tion ot simplicity, total dedication to making the lived experi-
ence alone the source tor all attirm.ations or denials about 
reality. This is roughly similar to phenomenological reduction 
whereby an individual as he enters into the search tor truth, in-
tends to exclude all preoccupations, preconceptions, and partial-
ities toward one or another view about self or the object of con-
sciousness. Emerson regards this an absolute precondition tor 
moral sentiment. Secondly x or y arises as that which claims to 
be most fulfilling of man's real selt-illage. X or y arise spon-
taneously but only a.t'ter much struggle tor simplicity. !hey 
arise spontaneously but not always without prior ettort. JinallJ 
beyond becoming aware of the claims of the ob~ect a man must tesi 
its claims in practice in order to distinguish whether the objec1 
truly issues from intuition or whether it is bred from self-delu-
sion. Emerson's dealings with the Transcendentalists with regarCl 
to their conflicting intuitions seems to have impressed upon him 
that insights required .further justification than simply their 
arising in the mind of an honest man. Their practical claims 
must be tested practically. He holds that when all conditions 
are present, the moral sentiment indeed reveals God as the su-
preme object tor moral commitment. 
That the Moral Sentiment Claims Q§d as !ts Supreme Objec! 
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The nucleus of the argument is that since the moral senti-
ment claims God as the supreme object of moral fulfilment, God 
exists. The first task is to show the moral sentiment genuinely 
claims God as its supreme object. Establishing its genuineness 
has two steps. 'fhe first studies the various objects which the 
moral sentiment claims as proper objects. Materialities, frifllds 
love, are examples ot these objects. The purpose is to show tha 
all such objects while proper tor moral commitment are not su-
preme objects, and that commitment to them eventually leads to 
the spontaneous belief in God as the supreme object. The other 
step fortifies the pri:ma tacie credibility of the spontaneous 
belief by testing the belief for its fruitfulness. 
The argument begins with a study of four sorts of objects 
which offer fulfilment--materialities, timeless laws ot the mind 
persons, virtues. Emerson was particularly interested to know 
why they called forth a total religious and moral commitment whe 
in every case they eventually failed to give full satisfaction. 
He also wondered wh3" upon disenchantment, pursuit began anew. 
He examined the various aspects of this phenomenon to learn whe-
ther the sentiment attached to the various concrete objects indi 
cated a pattern revealing any fundamental inclinations in the 
sentiment itself. As we shall see, Emerson decided that these 
objects draw our religious commitment because they dimly suggest 
i 
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friends, honors, etc. breed eventual discontent with them and a 
renewed search because they are not themselves the highest objec 
tor bum.an happiness. 
Stud.z ot Objects and the Feeling ot Religiousness 
All sorts ot objects propose themselves to man as the su-
preme object tor moral striving. Because they promise the high-
est fulfilment man totally dedicates himself to their pursuit. 
Peculiarly, regardless ot the object selected, he feels in his 
dedication a sense or religious submission. 
Focusing on this feeling ot religiousness, Emerson notes 
that certain insights, those that discover central principles 
governing reality, are attended by the emotion or the sublime. 
By the emotion ot the sublime he meant the feeling of delight an 
satisfaction which arises in those moments when we stand in awe 
before the principles we have discovered. At such moments we 
are impelled to regard our discovery with obedience engendered 
by the awe, and with a certain enthusiasm begotten by the del:Sgb.t. 
Quietist rapture, Oalvinist reTival, ftethodist e:xperiene~, are 
instances ot this enthusiasm. It can range in intensity from 
"the taint glow of virtuous emotions, to its rarest appearance, 
prophetic inspiration." !he direct result or this religious en-
thusiasm is to place the person in an order or activity far su-
perior in quality and effectiveness to what he could rightly ex-
pect on the basis of his own given capabilities. It is impor-
tant to bear this in mind. Insi hts or "Revelations" as he 
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calls them, do not issue forth so much into words but into acti-
yities. Revelation is not fortunetelling but a force inclining 
11an to truly!!.!! in the present.
1 
Emerson calls this feeling of awe and delight "religious" 
because its features are the same claimed for religion b7 sincere 
worshippers, !1!.•t reverence and submission. The word 'awe' in 
contemporary usage most often signifies having reverence for some 
thing other than and superior to the one having the feeling. !he 
object of awe is usually taken to be endowed with great authoritJ 
and power over the one feeling it. !he implication of reverence 
and submission is not lost in Emerson's use of 'awe•. One clear 
textual basis for this conclusion rests on a passage in the 
•Divinity School Address," where in describing the religious sen-
timent he substitutes "reverence and delight" tor "awe and de-
light." !he element of submission is shown in that upon coming 
into the religious sentiment man feels a desire to obey. 2 
])aerson feels quite free to identify the religious sentiment 
with the moral sentiment. The principles discovered which cause 
the religious feelings carry with them moral commands; conversel3 
the commands which give rise to the moral sentiment excite reli-
gious feelings. !he moral sentiment is an insight into princi-
ples which turn out to be divine laws. The sentiment these laws 
«rouse is one ot reverence and delight. Olose study shows that 
1JWerson, Yorks, Vol. II, pp. 281-285, 290-293. 
2Ibid., Vol. I, P• 121; Vol. II, PP• 281, ,!1 !9.S•; PP• 290, 
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these laws express the "sublime creed that the world is not the 
product of manifold powers but of' one will, of one mind; and that 
one mind is everywhere active;" that all evil is so much non-en-
tity, whereas benevolence, or the good, is alone absolute and 
real; that so much benevolence a man has so much lite has he. 
!fhe perfection of the la.ws or the soul tell us that man is real 
or living insofar as he partakes or this power to do good; and 
that the results of this power far outstrip man's personal capa-
bilities. "The perception of this law of laws awakens in the 
mind a sentiment which we call the religious sentiment, and which 
•akes our highest happiness. Wonderful is its power to charm and 
icommand."3 
The various objects to which man reels religious commitment 
eventually fail him. Study of these objects and their failures 
~eveals that they serve to direct man to the eventual recognition 
of the primal source or creativity as the supreme moral object. 
!he Material and the Mental as Objects 
Materialities--man•s physical surroundings in whole or part-~ 
•re the most evident sort of things which promise self-fulfilment 
on condition or total dedication to their pursuit. In time, how-
ever, man comes to realize that in tact materiality exists to 
serve him, not the other way around. Materialities then will 
tall short as moral objects. As Emerson says of our enchantment 
3 ng., Vol. I, P• 125; PP• 122-125. 
J.7'f" 
1 1th scenes of nature, of the rainbow, stars, shadows in the 
1 till waters, if we hunt them out too eagerly their unreality 
10eks us. Once we realize that all our rapture turns upon no-
•hing more significant than an accumulation of globes or water, 
pecks of dust, light and our given physical perspective we react 
,,ith embarrassment and disappointment. We then seek elsewhere 
"or the true object or our craving, an object worthy ot our dedi-
~ ation. 4 
Man may teel he has found it in the recognition that envir-
~nment serves him, or more precisely that it obeys his mind 
~ccording to timeless laws. Even the most primitive level or 
,his revelation, when man first merely suspects he is different 
~rom what he observes, stimulates the moral or religious senti-
lent. (ThereJ arises a pleasure mixed with awe; I may say a low 
egree of the sublime is telt."5 Insight into this principle in-
eed renews the moral sentiment. But the tendency to tix upon 
,he mind as the object tor moral commitment runs off too easily 
nto adulation tor some changeless, absolute ideal wherein both 
~he process and materiality of our given existence get lost. 
l:merson believes that formal institutional Christianity and phil-
>sophieal realism exeapli.ty this extreme. He rejects the appeal 
~o this dedication to the intellect basically because the enthu-
~iasm following upon it is sterile--it does not incite and demand 
4 ~., Vol. I, PP• 19, 49; .£!., Vol. III, PP• 192-193. 
5Ibid., Vol. I, P• 51. 
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a better quality of human behavior in daily living. 
other Persons and Virtues as Objects 
Short of carrying to the extreme of idealism the realiza-
tion that matter serTes man 9 an individual may as readily settle 
upon the belief that the object of the moral sentiment is anothe 
mind, another person with whom he must relate, •8.7• in love, or 
friendship and loyalty, or by honoring that person. Emerson 
takes each of these possibilities under consideration. 
Love, and the admiring loyalty we call friendship, address 
themselves to a person on whom we wish to bestow all our affec-
tion and attention. We are interested at first in some specific 
individual. But not only do lovers and friends pass away leav-
ing us with a void, continued acquaintance with them when they 
are with us eventually conveys to us that their power to grow, 
to do the better thing, has limits. What we desired in them was 
the goodness we saw in them. !he discovery that they can only 
do so much good before they get trapped in the circles or their 
own routine instigates the return of uneasiness. Ye conclude 
that the true object of our desire was not the person but the 
ideal of goodness or creativity we at !irst thought resided 
unbounded in the person. It is a common enough experience that 
sooner or later we move on to higher objects--some ideals we saw 
in the person--in hopes to find there the !ulf ilment we sought 
in our attachment to the person. Ye now set as our goal certain 
limited ideals some virtues tor instance • But the same 
r 
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easiness carries man even beyond commitment to these limited 
ideals. 
A pattern begins to emerge. Whether the object or the love 
is concrete or ideal the passion is the same--a teeling tor tota 
devotion and selt-saeritice tor the ob~ect and a desire tor a 
sort of goodness that seems invariably to escape man's grasp. 
Priendship discloses that "man wants to feel himselt backed by a 
superior nature," and that "the mind was made with this intent--
to go outside itself and apply its attections to some other 
eing."6 !his "other being" will turn out to be a superior bei 
eserving ot man's obedience. No finite ob~ects ot love or 
friendship satisfy. !bey do not measure up to what we thought 
the moral sentiment claimed they would achieve tor us upon our 
otal commitment to them--the happiness ot full self-possession. 
Honor has an advantage over love and friendship as a means 
o leading us to the true moral object. In honoring a person, 
he sentiment is never prof tered to the person as such but to a 
quality in that person. We pay honor to a "delicate sense ot 
ight which, when sealed in a noble breast, quick and correct in 
judgments," is trul7 a rit representative of those central 
d divine principles that evoke the religious sentiment. As we 
aw earlier divine principles are creative principles. Hence 
reative judgment is meant here. Yet just as love and triend-
hip, which have limited objects before them, honor too fails. 
6iaicGiftert, !!§, pp. 153-154. 
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l man may be honorable only in some respects. He may have total 
aedication to certain ideals yet with regard to other ideals he 
•aY be quite immoral. In short a hero's ability to make creative 
judgments turns out to be limited. But that, the ideal of bound-
less creative judgment, is what we intended to honor.? 
Whether the object is material or ideal the result is always 
disappointment--invariably for the same reason. The object tails 
to give man sufficient measure ot freedom and creative power. 
The destiny ot material things depends on man's mind, not vice 
~ersa. Dedication to the products of intelligence, timeless 
laws, also inhibit creative development. Love, pursuit of vir-
tues in general, also disappoint because they too fail to deli-
~er those endless possibilities of .further creativity which first 
~ttachment to them suggested. Yet throughout, the religious 
sentiment directed commitment to them for their promise ot bound-
less creative dominion. 
Analysis ot the Religious Sentiment Itself 
At this point Emerson•s focus shifts. He proposes that tor 
~is analysis, the sentiment which these objects roused is more 
ieserving of attention than the objects themselves.8 Perhaps 
~he sentiment itself indicates the highest moral object. 
Turning attention directly upon this "impulse to believe," 
7 Ibid., p. 155· 
8 Ibid., PP• 157-158; l!merson, Yorks, Vol. II, pp. 45, 171 • 
............ 
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tbiS "strong instinct to worship," he remarks that man has an 
overwhelming inclination to magnify certain things to the point 
of idolizing them. We glorify natural spectacles; we exaggerate 
the qualities of a good friend beyond fact; a great man we claim 
ia very great, even literally the very best sort ot man. The 
reason for this exaggerating is not adulation or vanity. Ve 
really wish to oonvinoe ourselves that the object or our regard 
is truly the highest and most perfect. Ot course such overstate-
ments are faults; yet beyond what we apprehend in the qualities 
we praise, lurks something true which, if explored, will bare the 
true object of the moral sentiment.9 The tendency to magnify 
the superlatives s~ggests that the object proper to the moral 
sentiment is something other than man, superior to hill, the 
highest good, the most graceful, becoming or beautiful. That is 
what man believes he is attaching himself to in friendship or in 
honoring a hero. I 
1. 
It would seem as if the soul had been made to go outside 
of itself, to apply itself in all its length and breadth 
to something else--that is, to God. Therefore we approve ' 1 
when it goes out or itself and does thus devote itself 
to true friendship or to Science--we approve for we com-
pare this action with selfishness. But when the idea 
of God is suggested we feel these are but halt, that the 
act is true but the object is untrue.10 
Two points stand out in this passage. First, selfless dedica-
tion implies that the soul was made for something other than it-
self. Secondly, upon placing the idea of God before the soul, 
9JMN, Vol. III, P• 166. 
-lOibid. 
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it realizes that the true object for its self-sacrifice is God, 
the boundless source of craativity. In other words, the soul 
moves away f'rom dependent ..:>bjects with whose possession it feels 
restless; it moves toward that source upon which earlier objects 
depend--the source with which, upon discovery, the soul both 
reels satisfied and which it concludes was the truly intended 
object for• its dedication all along. 
The human soul has a propensity to refer all its higher 
feelings, all its veneration for virtue and ~eatness 
to something wherein this attribute (or power) is sup-
posed to reside. Cause and effect is another name for 
this sentiment. T.t is felt by all.11 
The object for moral commitment, therefore, is God, which we 
have seen means the botmdless source of creativit7. 
Ris belief that the nature ot the primal source is bound-
less, grows out of his reflection on the human tendency to mag-
nify the worth or the object of dedication, X!.!•• that what we 
are doing in effect is attempting to create objects adequate to 
our desires. The moral aen.timent prevents the man from settling 
into a final belief that objects which do not promote ever .tur-
ther ascension can really serve this purpose. It refuses to 
r~lax its Ae~roh tor an object matching what we believed were in 
such objects to discover, i.e., boundless creative power. The 
reason man decides the boundless or infinite is the proper ob-
ject or the moral sentiment does not rest on analysis but aimpl7 
upon the tact that when he coaes to the awareness of the 
11 JMlf, Vol. I, p. ?6; .!!• Emerson, Yorks, Vol. II, p. 169; 
Vol. IIl";"""'pp. 228-229. 
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infinite, he feels that is the supreme object of moral satisfac-
tion. !o keep the logic ot the argument clear it is worth 
stressing that though the moral sentiment points to God as the 
boundless source of creativity, the argument is not intended as 
causal. !he belie! in the boundless source of creativity arises 
as a spontaneous claim. fhe weight of the logic is what arises 
in such a way is to be believed, not the analytic inference trom 
effect to cause. 
Retormulation ot the Analysis 
To restate the first phase of :Emerson's study, we have 
round that man feels he must do what is best for him, i.e., he 
ought to do what is good. The moral sentiment, the developed 
form of intuition, discloses that the good means the creative, 
that which improves the quality of lite. Other equivalents tor 
the good are the natural, the gracetul, the beautiful, the real. 
Han may believe he has found the good in love or friendship, for 
example. But invariably there arises a feeling ot dissatisfac-
tion with the object of love and friendship. Discontent grows 
out ot the eventual Blld gradual recognition ot the limits ot the 
object. Goodness is creative; the creative does not involve 
repetition ot the same kinds ot act. Inti.mate acquaintance with 
one's beloved discloses that what seemed genuine goodness or 
creativity in the person was not. The acts ot the beloved may 
follow each other in an ascending plane. (Hence some semblance 
ot creativity). But sooner or later we find that the acts are 
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~eally parts of a wide circle ot acts which repeats itself, ever 
the same, over and over again. Repetition is not creativit7. 
Pathoaing the limits ot the object ia disillusioning. I1an 
recognizes that be has mistakenly committed himself to a partial 
reflection ot the good rather than to the source or the good. 
!'be moral sentiment suggests that it is with the source that man 
must concern himselt. While as a matter ot tact a person in 
turn places his homage at the teet or many objects that are 
sources ot the creative--nature teaches ua slowly, each step ot 
the revelation preparing us tor the next--none ot these relieve 
the iapulse to resume the search tor too long a time. At this 
point man ma7 come to recognize the unlimited source of good as 
the true object ot the moral sentiment.12 
A person needs a span of tiae to arrive at this conclusion-· 
not so much to s7stematicall7 eliminate finite goods class by 
class, since tJ'picall7 men do not operate that wa7. but more to 
note and study the ~ facto pecul1ar1t7 of the natural operation 
ot the moral sentiment. !hat peculiarity is the refusal of the 
moral sentiment to rest secure with finite objects ot any number 
ot various kinds. An individual wonders why he feels restless 
with finite sources. Stuqing the span or his experience, he ob-
serves a pattern. When man moves froa object to object in hia 
quest tor the good, in all cases he seeks a pul"er form ot creati-
'9'1.t7. Perhaps then he is destined for creativi.117 in itself--the 
12 Jmf, Vol. I, P• 76. 
-
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absolute good. Even when a person commits himself to very limi-
ted concrete objects, such as a friend or beloved, the exaggera-
tion of the good in the object or commitment reflects his inten-
tion to commit himself to the infinite good or creativity in it-
self. ~e human heart impatient with finite things, "loves to 
lose itself in the contemplation of the vast and unbounded," 
source for all the good in human action.13 Upon coming to the 
suggestion that the absolute good, the absolute source of crea-
tivity, should be sought in all things the sentiment of moral 
approbation stirs again. Now, as &Berson says, man feels God is 
the proper object for moral dedication; that in all previous 
searches the activity was appropriate but the objects sought 
were not sufficient. 
fhe previous levels of the struggle !or lasting fulfilment 
suggest that beatitude comes to man when he exercises fully his 
illimitable creative "realizing" power. At this point man feels 
that only belief in God as the boundless source of creativity 
opens him to the fullness of this power. !his source is the 
supreme object of the moral sentiment becauBe upon coming to tha1 
suggestion the moral sentiment !eels that such is so. 
!est of the Claim tor its !Pruition 
Yet the credibility of the assertion has not been finalized, 
A !rranscendentalist might urge that whatever the upright simple 
l3PlcGif!ert, I!§, PP• 152, 151 (1831). 
.! 
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man feels (intuits) as true, is true. Jor Emerson this sort of 
reliance on feeling was too facile. Simplicity demanded trust 
be li~ited to those cases in which the worth of an ideal had bee~ 
tested in practice. Only when he lived according to the ideal 
which indeed simplicit7 and integrity placed before him and, in 
so living, came to feel that the ideal achieved what it promised, 
could a man claim thP; object was true. The pragmatic test was 
an important hedge against self-deception. Th.us belief in God 
has yet to be tested in practice. !hat is thP, final condition. 
When the moral sentiment presents x object for moral commit-
ment it does so with the claim that acting to attain x will make 
man most happy. ~erson considers human self-fulfilment to be 
that happiness. !hus the claims of the moral senti.llent are such 
that x will be most self-fulfilling. The standard for selt-
fulfilment is some self-image of man. !hat image the process of 
intuition determines and clarities by the following procedure. 
First the self-image reveals itself as a given desire or feeling 
for the attaining of x object. Second, the validity of the 
image is tested to discover if indeed acting to attain x gives 
man the feeling that x or objects or x-sort satisf7 the selt-
image. Limited satisfaction with achieving x indicates some-
thing in the initial feeling which demands further clarification. 
Next, y spontaneously offers itself. Activity prepares for more 
thought. This procedure is repeated again and again until ideal-
ly full satisfaction and full insight are reached. 
J 
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Ettects Rf Belief' in God 
Emerson is cle.a.r about the self'-tul.filling etf'eets commit-
ment to God will have. Reliance on God frees man to be himself--
he will be most natural, uninhibited, most capable of being good 
and therefore of' effecting good in his environment. He will have 
the power to effect ascension, evolution, in the processes of 
his surroundings. Possessod of belief in God man will experi-
ence power :for. good on levels of activity previously quite be-
yond his reach. He will feel self-determined and satisfied. 
Descriptions of the effects following commitment to belief 
in God abound in Emerscn's works. 'l.'hey often run on in tones ot 
rapture for pages. Thus, in 1832, he writes this response to 
the sceptical charge that we have no certain grounds tor belief 
in virtue or reality: 
!his is a true account of our instinctive taitb. Why 
do I believe in a perfect system or compensations, that 
exact justice is done? Certainly not upon a narrow 
experience or a score or a hundred instances. ~or I 
boldly affirm and believe the universality or the law. 
But simply that it is better in the view or the mind 
than any other way, therefore must be the14ruer W8.1'• Whatever is better must be the truer wa:r. 
!en years later, when he had matured and modified his thought 
he remarks, " ••• the general impression which a doctrine makes on 
us, I think is the test of its truth. It it frees and enlarges-· 
if it helps me, then 1 t is true; and not otherwise. " But perhap1 j! 
the shortest is the most poignant statement: "This CreligiousJ 
14JMN, Vol. III, p. 317. 
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sentiment is divine and deifying. It is the beatitude of man. 
It makes him illimitable.•15 Belief in God places man in the 
condition of his highest happiness; superior results prove the 
reality ot the object o! this belief. And in the "Over-Soul" 
he relates that the divine presence affirms itself in us as 
"the doubling of the heart itself, nay, the infinite enlargement 
of the heart with a power of growth to a new infinity on every 
side.•16 Two implications of this quotation should be under-
scored. Jirst, the choice of the word "heart" directs our atten· 
tion to the figurative locus tor the religious sentiment. The 
sentiment, not the logic of argument, establishes the reality of 
God. Secondly the expression "doubling ot the heart" and its 
intensified form "infinite enlargement of the heart with a power 
ot growth" points out the unique effect which follows belief in 
God. By himself man must remain in the chains ot cosmic neces-
sity ot time and space. Believing in God liberates him. He be-
comes a creator, he can make new things happen. He actively 
participates in the evolution or nature.17 !hat is what "a poweJ 
of growth to a new infinity on every side" is intended to convey. 
By evolution Ellerson means growth, qualitative ascent. 
15itusk, Letters, Vol. III, p. ??; Emerson, Yorks, Vol. I, 
p. 125. 
16Eaerson, Works, Vol. II, pp. 292-293. 
l?Ibid., Vol. I, p. 125. "Who can set bounds to the possi-
b1litie"S01 man? Once inhale the upper air, being admitted to 
the absolute natures ot justice and truth, and we learn that man 
h~s access to the entire mind of the Oreator, is himself the 
creator in the finite." Ibid., p. 64. 
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!bus, belief in God gives man the power to do good, free 
trom outside interf erencfls which would tie him to the level of 
entirely determined series of causes and effects. To do good 
means to achieve creative novelty, ascension, being. Hence the 
sort of good act which results from belief in God is creative 
novelty. Acts of ascension, as he refers to them, are those not 
entirely determined by their given causal antecedents in sensuou 
time and space. !heir source ultimately is God, who is most 
free, i.e., completely self-determined. Man by abandoning him-
self to nature opens himself to the working of God's creative 
will. Insofar as he surrenders to God's will in nature and acts 
spontaneously, according to the directions of the divine will in 
nature, man also becomes tree, self-determined. He finds himsel 
performing acts which run contrary to the laws which men ot 
Understanding had concluded were ultimate, changless and inv1ola 
ble. He is tree; he is creative. And because ot this man feels 
lastingly self-fulfilled. Placed in the context ot the argument 
tor God's existence the tact of man's self-determination establi 
.............. 
shes that God exists. 
That the Moral Sentiment Claims God Exists 
But does the moral sentiment actually claim. that God existe? 
Having established that the moral sentiment claims God as its 
supreme ob~ect, it is essential to the argument to link that 
with the further claim that this supreme object exists. 
The belief in God as the su reme ob eot of the moral 
I 
'I 
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sentiment includes the claim that God is real. That such is 
Emerson's view is clear, but his reasoning remains rather iapli-
cit. Yet his thinking is not too difficult to piece together. 
All objects which claim to be proper to the moral sentiment in-
clude the claim. ot reality. !hey arise in natural beliefs which 
purport tactual content. As we have seen, it is basic to his 
outlook that the claims of natural beliefs deserve credence. 
Since nature is trustworthy it is appropriate to rely on it and 
the deliverances of natural beliefs resulting from this reliance. 
Be rejects Hume's notion that natural beliefs are merely practi-
cal postulates ot no objective import. Instead for him. a belief 
claiming factuality is either true or false. It is true as it 
promotes human living, false as it does not. 
Por instance beliefs in the external world or in the pre-
sence of order in it arise not just as regulative postulates but 
as tactual. !l.'h.eir claims to reality are credible because the7 
are natural beliefs; the7 are falsifiable according to their 
failure to promote human living. Similarly belief in whatever 
object, say x, as proper to the moral sentiment includes the 
claim ot reality tor x. This belief too is credible it it is 
a natural belief. A natural belier satisfies the conditions of 
simplicity and spontaneity. Spontaneity requires the beliet be 
tested for its claim--as in this case that x is proper to the 
moral sentiment. Propriety is decided by the extent of selt-
tultilling creative power which results trom acting according to 
belief in x. It x is proper to the moral sentiment, beliet in x 
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must be a natural belief. Hence the concomitant claim that x 
is real stands since the claims of natural belief a are to be 
trusted. 
Various objects propose themselves in natural beliefs as the 
supreme object of moral fulfilment, yet they are later set aside. 
This, however, does not militate against trust in natural belief. 
What man sets aside is their claim. to supremacy not their pro-
priety. »nerson reasons that with the exception of God as the 
explicit object all other objects of the moral sentiment preserve 
their claim to reality solely on the grounds that they are propel 
to objects for moral fulfilment. Though they originally appear 
as supreme--proper in that sense--the sense of their 'propriety' 
undergoes continuous modification, the most significant of which 
is that they are not supreme. What is discarded is the exagger-
ation in the wa:y they were originally taken. It turns out that 
to believe only x or y and not God is fulfilling has too narrow 
a scope. 
Their disposal as supreme does not necessitate their nulli-
fication as proper and hence as real objects. Only if they 
failed to contribute to fulfilment would their propriety and 
claim to reality be falsified. But they contribute to fulfil-
ment in that they lead to the eventual recognition of God as the 
supreme object, and in that they continue to be required for the 
promotion of highest fulfilment. Indeed their pursuit is best 
advanced only through commitment to belief in the primal source 
ot creativity. Their retained connection with the supreme object 
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upholds their propriety. Hypothetically, were belie! in God 
somehow to bring about the recognition that concern for matter 
in no way promoted moral fulfilment, then matter would have lost 
its claim to reality. But in tact belief in God only turns man 
away from exclusive concern with matter; it actually promotes a 
fuller appreciation of its functions. 
Belief in God is a natural belief. As it arises in sponta-
neity it too includes the claim ot supremacy and reality for its 
object. But in order to establish that this claim of reality is 
true it is not enough to show that God is a proper object of the 
moral sentiment. It is necessary to establish that God is its 
supreme object. For while the other objects maintain their 
propriety and their claim to reality by subsumed connection with 
the supreme object, some object--God, as Emerson decides--must 
be shown as truly supreme. Emerson apparently establishes this 
by following the general rule that the test of any object is the 
power of self-fulfilment resulting from commitment to belief in 
the object. Since man finds commitment to belief in God most 
ful!ill.ing--no desire to rejoin the search tollowing--God is the 
supreme proper object and hence is real. 
!he Oredibilit1 ot the Twin Clail'lls 
of €ne Horal Sent!ient 
To this point the argument has established that the moral 
sentiment asserts that God is its supreme object and concomi-
tantly that God exists. But the second major stage ot the 
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argument now presents itself, because a further question remains. 
What gives these deliverances of the moral sentiment their cred1· 
bility? ~e answer rests with the earlier study ot the reliabil· 
ity of nature and the procedure or verification which nature pro-
vides. !'he moral sentiment is another designation for the veri-
fication procedure. The claim that God exists must be accepted 
as true because whatever the moral sentiment claims, is true. 
In turn the general reliability of the moral sentiment rests on 
the reliability or nature which gives rise to the verification 
procedure. Belief in the reliability of nature is grounded on 
the success with which oomndtment to this belief promotes human 
living. 
We have seen that Emerson holds that whatever the verifica-
tion procedure (moral sentiment) declares as true is true. His 
thinking rests on the premise stated early in Nature that "we 
must trust the perfection of the creation so rar as to believe 
that whatever curiosity the order of things has awakened in us, 
the order of things can satisty."18 As we have established ear-
lier, this belief in the reliability of. nature rests on the 
further belief that any other view would make the world chaotic, 
which if adhered to practically would make continued human exis-
tence impossible. The assumption that nature is reliable is 
supported by the fact man can live. Since his life and his 
world are not chaotic, nature is reliable. 
18 Ibid., Vol. I, PP• 3-4. 
-
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But as nature impels man to wonder whether he has on hand a 
trustworthy means to know what is really true or good tor him, 
so nature supplies him wit~1 the moral sentiment as that means--
the only means. Were a person able to impugn the reliability 
ot the moral sentiment, he at the same time would have shaken 
bel1et in the reliability of nature. At this point the limits oj 
the reliability or the moral sentiment are no longer considered 
objections against its reliability but rather explicable ditti-
cul ties about its reliability. 
Linking his reasoning to the atfirmation by the moral sen-
timent that God exists, we discover that the argument is shaped 
much like a pyramid of playing cards--if one card falls, the 
pyramid collapses. It we could show that the moral sentiJnent 
lacked reliability when it asserted God's existence, we would 
also show that the moral sentiment is unreliable in any and all 
of its revelations. The apparatus for verifying its assertions--
the condition of simplicity, the spontaneous arousal of purpor-
ted intuition, the final pragmatic testing of the alleged intui-
tion--is the same whether in the case of God's existence or any 
other instance. If after using this apparatus in the former 
case, the issue were still questionable, then all other cases 
should remain open tor doubt, since the procedure tor verifying 
them is the same tor both. Thus disproving the attirmation that 
God exists, disproves the reliability ot the moral sentiment 
generally. But to disprove that would also be to undo belief 
in the reliability of nature. And that would be tantamount to 
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declaring that the world is chaotic, orderless. ~orieasons we 
have already given :&uerson could not accept this last conclusion, 
for that would mean that human living is absurd, which continued 
living shows is not the case. As he says: "Men are all secret 
believers in it [the goodness of nature~ •• : they believe that thE 
best is true ••• or chaos would come."19 
For the same reason, he insists we must accept the testi-
mony of the moral sentiment that God exists. Ir its testimony 
were false we would live in a world of chaos. Tb.at, however, 
would make life an insupportablo curse. Ye find this view ex-
pressed as early as 1823. 20 It remained corner-stone of his 
philosophy his entire life. In 1824, he comments at length on 
the implications of denying God•s existence. 
It is casting man back into a cold and comfortless soli-
tude. You leave him alone in a Universe exposed to the 
convulsions or disorder and the wrecks of systems where 
man is an atom unable to avert his peril or provide for 
hia escape ••• Yhy should he live in this infinite wilder-
ness of suns and stars; he has no securit~1 no interest, no love, in this dire dominion of Chanee?2 
Worth stressing in this passage is that he relates the denial ot 
God's existence to the consequent denial of order in nature, and 
also loss of order to the loss or man•s desire to live. Here it 
is not obvious that the reason why the denial of God's existence 
imperils :Emerson's belief in the reliability of nature is that 
19 ~·, Vol. III, p. 283. 
20JMN, Vol. II, P• 136. 
-21Ibid., P• 252. 
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the denial or God's existence places the reliability of the 
moral sentiment in doubt; nor is it clear that the crucial test 
for the acceptance of the orderliness of nature is whether man 
can actualll live better by the one or the other view. These 
implications emerge later as subsequent texts bear out. We 
shall cite two. 
nal: 
In 1836, the year he published Nature, he wrote in his jour· 
(G'lroant us the Ideal ~heory, and the universe is 
soTved. Otherwise, the moment a man discovers that 
he has aims which his faculties cannot answer, the 
world becomes a riddle. Yet Piety restores him to 
Health.22 
Here belief in the orderliness of nature is said to be threa-
tened precisely when the validity of the moral sentiment is sha-
ken. The world becomes a riddle, chaotic, if the moral senti-
ment sets before man aims which his faculties cannot accept as 
real, let alone reach. !he ttideal Theory" is that description 
and account of nature which the moral sentiment sets before us, 
.!!!•• that nature, and man as part of it, evolves because of the 
effective presence of the creative spirit, God. 
"Yet Piety restores him to Health" cryptically expresses 
the doctrine that because the moral sentiment is reliable, (in 
........ 
all its revelations, the foreJ1ost of which is that God exists) 
the world is orderl7 and hence the man who adheres to the promp-
tings of the moral sentiment CP1etyJ can aetuall7 live. !o make 
22JMI', Vol. V, P• 125. 
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this clear we must remember that the words "to live" mean to 
develop in self-fulfilment. Emerson associates living with grow-
ing and both ot these with being. The opposite associations are 
d.Ying, decaying, non-being. Yollowing these standard analogies 
in J!D.erson, haith would belong to the tirst group. ~us "Piety 
restores him to Health" means that on the one hand, he who does 
not live according to the moral sentiment but instead by Under-
standing would make living impossible; on the other hand he who 
opts tor the moral sentiment, lives. 
!he man ot Understanding might be either a sensist or an 
idealist, as Emerson's critique of these two philosophical pos-
tures reveals. Either tradition if adhered to in practice makes 
selt-tultilment impossible. !he empiricist camp is particularly 
open to the ·charge of denY'ing the objectivity ot the moral aenti· 
ment, and hence of rendering practical living absurd. Both, how-
ever, separate man or some aspect of him trom nature by declarin@ 
unreal some one or another aspect or reality which living affirms 
as real. Consequently both paralyze man's ability to live and 
deprive him ot "Health." "Piety," i.e., acceptance ot the moral 
sentiment especially in its declaration ot God's existence, re-
stores man to "Health." 
That is best which gives me to myselt •••• That which 
shows God in me, fortifies me. !hat which shows God 
out of me, makes me a wart and a wen. There is no 
longer a necessary reason tor my being. Already the 
long shadows of untimely oblivion creep over me and 
I shall decrease forever.23 
23 Emerson, Works, Tol. I, p. 132. "Tb.at which shows God 
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Bis argument, therefore, is that since the moral sentiment 
claims God tor its supreme object, God exists. The reality ot 
the boundless source ot creativity is part ot the claim. This 
claim must be believed because all genuine claims ot the moral 
sentiment a.re true. The general reliability ot the moral senti-
ment is based on the reliability ot nature. Nature provides the 
moral sentiment as a way ot ascertaining true beliefs. Nature 
is reliable because commitment to that belief successfully pro-
motes the quality ot human living. 
Conclusion 
Once he has established God's existence his search has 
ended. He could now rest his moral theory on the will ot God, 
since God has been shown to exist. Be has also discovered how 
to solve his original puzzlement regarding the command: ~Be 7e 
perfect, as your heavenly :father is perfect."· God is most tree, 
self-determined. !he supreme exercise ot God's self-determina-
tion is in his creativity. Man becomes most like God by becom-
ing tree, by self-determination. The supreme exercise ot man's 
self-determination is in his creativity. Man grows by develop-
ing nature. Yet the search cannot end. for while it may be 
settled that man must be self-determined and creative, the paths 
creativity will take to perfect him, man cannot know beforehand. 
That depends on his day to day experience. 
out of me."--a.D7 approach to God's existence not grounded in the 
moral sentiment. 
·1111.! 
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The strength and limits of Emerson's approach to God's exis· 
tence stem mostly from his stern refusal to pursue technical ana-
lysis any further than the problems in daily experience seemed 
to require. !be merit of his repose is his thorough-going reli-
ance on the evidence of ordinary experience. Few philosophers 
have been so tenacious in attempting to respect everything they 
!ind in experience, and only what they find there. The limits 
arise mainly because while he saw the need for technical criti-
cism of the beliefs widely held by the religious, political and 
business leaders or the new Republic he could have taken more 
seriousl7 a close technical scrutiny ot his own approach. As-
sured as he was that in each situation nature provides its own 
appropriate though implicit structures, he was confident that hiE 
own approach was therefore validly (though implicitly) structurec 
throughout. "Whatever any mind doth or saith is after a law, 
and this native law remains over it after it has come to reflec-
tion or conscious thought." !he spontaneous principle contains 
the logical, "but virtual and latent."24 
Emerson's approach to God•s existence requires closer tech-
nical analysis than he was willing to make--but not because he 
was remiss tor refusing to explicate the logical structure of 
his approach. It is not an argument or proof in the demonstra-
24"Ve want in every man a long logic; we cannot pardon the 
absence of it, but it must not be spoken. Logic is the proces-
sion or proportionate unfolding ot the intuition; but its virtue 
is as silent method; the moment it would appear as propositions 
and have a separate value, it is worthless." ~·• Vol. II, 
pp. 327-329. 
I, 
'I 
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tive sense. Its rorce is not demonstrative logical entailment. 
He cannot be criticized technically tor not guaranteeing the 
links of his approach by a mathematical-type certitude. Indeed 
the language of mathematical-type necessity and probability is 
contrary to his view of ordinary experience. 
!he genuine technical ditficulty is that, though he main-
tained his philosophical beliefs were not merel7 cultural assump-
tions but were grounded in lived experience, he did not articu-
late very clearl7 why bis particular views should not be regar-
ded also as merely cultural assumptions. He believed. that to 
impose cultural assumptions on reality was to prescribe rather 
than describe, but in places he leaves hillSelf open to that 
charge. 25 
A case in point--his meaning for the term 'God.' Emerson 
claims that the true meaning ot the term 'God'--as intelligent, 
unique, possessed of will, etc.--comes to us from the experience 
ot liTing, within •natural situations" to be precise. 26 B7 what 
assurance was that notion of God anything more than a broadl7 
based cultural assumption and not prescriptive? He also sug-
gests that his conception ot God would bold true tor all future 
times. Flnerson's observation has it that once man relies on 
this "divine" he is no longer restless. But irretormable 
25Prescr1ption would, of course, run counter to Emerson's 
intention. 0 I.f I speak, I define, I confine, and am less •••• !he 
moment we cease to report and attempt to correct and contrive, 
it is not truth." ~., PP• 329, 342. 
26Hopkins, Spires £!_ Form, P• 124. 
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descriptions would appear to be inconsistent with his basic 
stance. !his "finalized" conception of the divine only seems to 
turther the charge or prescription. Although ha recognized the 
impact of cultural assumptions on lived experience, he never 
remarks on the possibility that his conception of the term 'God' 
might be such an assumption, and hence might be retormulable at 
a later day. 
~e magnitude of the difficulty comes to light when we con-
sider how hard it is to know whether his pragmatic test estab-
lishes, is as it seems to be. This problem attends ~hing 
the pragmatic test confirms, but especially God's existence. 
~e conclusion that God exists, rests on the supposition that if 
the moral sentillent--ordinary experience--were to mislead in thi• 
special instance, ordinary experience would have to be judged 
unreliable in 8:tJ:3 instance. It it were that unreliable then na-
ture itself would not be trustworthy. But then living would be 
impossible, which is contrary to tact. 
Still, on the basis of his own perspective, I believe it is 
possible--without impugning the reliability of ordinary experi-
ence--to project that at some later moment ot development some 
other natural source of creativity might be substituted tor what 
he understood by •God." !he issue here is not whether or not 
ordina17 experience misleads, but to what extent it might mis-
lead before it must be re~ected as unreliable. Ellerson clearly 
acknowledges the limitations in ordinary experience, 8l1d that 
these limits tend to distortions. But the measure of the 
r,, 
1?9 
reliability of the moral sentiment is the extent to which commit· 
ment to a given thing actually fulfills its promise of a full anc 
satisfying ability to live. 
On the one hand, ordinary experience, the moral sentiment, 
would be unreliable if it convinced the simple man that x-reli-
ance supplied him with his fullest measure ot freedom and power 
when indeed it did not. But on the other hand, if Emerson were 
mistaken that the moral sentiment had made such a declaration, 
and if further some other natural source were to supply man with 
a still larger degree of freedom and power, then the moral aenti· 
ment procedure would not have been unreliable, but Enerson's 
estimate of its actual claims. 
Bis conception or God was intended to rest both on the pre-
vious experiential and experimental setting aside of all aspects 
of lived experience except the spiritual as the source of crea-
tivity, and also on the wide-spread belie~ in God within the 
community of "7oung Americans." 
Both these bases are open to challenge. The first supposes 
unidirectional upward movement toward the spiritual in man's 
awareness and indeed in all nature. Logically, however, and 
quite in keeping with his evolutionary view, it is possible to 
project a more nearl7 circular progression. Thus just as at 
each previous stage man eventuall7 recognized his dedication to 
some object was only partially worthy ot his commitment, so too 
man may discover that dedication to the spiritual divinity is a 
partially correct but passing phase in man's evolution. Matter 
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(induced chemical stimuli, or embryo reformation, for instance) 
~ight agai~ be asserted in place or God as giving man a still 
fuller measure of creative power consistent with his nature--but 
matter now that man has gained a heightened appreciation of its 
capacities. 
It is possible to suggest this because he has not provided 
an account f.or the necessity of the unidirectional progression 
of objects of the moral sentiment--from the material to the spir· 
itual. It is also possible because his way of deciding "lasting 
and full satisfaction," the standard tor determining the supre-
macy ot an object, invites it. Since lasting satisfaction is 
decided factually and since J!merson includes no discussion ever 
of a timeless norm for what is lasting, there is no way to con-
clude that commitment to x or y or God will provide lasting sat-
isfaction at some later time. !hus it is possible to claim that 
what was earlier thought to be spiritual, personal, or whatever, 
was an exaggeration, that instead the source ot creativity is 
matter, regarded in a way not previously comprehended. 
The second base is also open to challenge, largely because 
Emerson's devoted little study of the concept o~ community. He 
holds that community assent (among the-Young .Americana") has 
ontological significance but he does not clearly specify the 
limits of community reliability. It would beg the question to 
say the community is reliable because those who live naturally 
are sustained by God. !he approach to God's existence is the 
question at issue. His reliance on the "young Americans" was 
I 1 
181 
rooted in his faith in lived experience, not vice versa. But 
even the culture or the idealized "young American" would be lia-
ble to distortion. He would be the last to de117 that. Nonethe-
less, he never quite specifies the means by which to distinguish 
what the community mistakenly objectifies in its culture and 
what he supposes community-experience trul7 establishes. 
One might want to insist, as the later Allerican pragmatists 
would, that the method emplo7ed by the scientific community has 
the sort of weight Ellerson vaguely hoped to tind in the com.munit~ 
of "7oung Americans." Reliance on the scientific procedure for 
truth might seem in basic opposition to :&aerson•s approach, how-
ever~ According to his critique, science restricts itself by 
method to generalizations based on measurement. !his represents 
two problems for a healthy lite-style. First, the scientific 
procedure excludes a priori any feature ot lived experience 
which cannot be guaged mathematically. Secondl7, the scientific 
procedure considers only those particulars ot value which can be 
tit into laws. Those particulars which are not measurable or 
which may be unique to a concrete situation are regarded as 
irrelevant. 
Indeed the poet or the poet-philosopher27 rather than the 
scientist personified what Emerson held to be the approach propel 
to life. But this poet was his idealization ot what a poet 
27Plato is the prime example of the poet-philosopher: "Pla-
to affirms the coincidence of science and virtue." Ellerson, 
Works, Vol. IV, p. 83. 
'I, 
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should be; the scientist, his typification ot the scientist ot 
his day. file poet kept his "inward and outward senses" in be.l-
a.nee, i.e., he recognized the richness or actual experience, 
spirit and matter, unity and diversity, stability and change, 
the emotive and the intellectual, etc. The creative man, the 
poet realized that the norms tor judging and transforming fea-
tures in lived experience must come from the experience, and that 
these norms would require retoraulation because experience con-
tinually reforms itself. On the other hand, the scientist, 
still under the SW&.7 of the Enlightenment, drew his norms from 
a mathematical model. He did not yet acknowledge the need to 
recast his generalizations in light of future cases. Nor was he 
ereative--repetition was the only pattern in a series he could 
recognize. In short the dimensions ot experience tended to be 
drastically narrowed to what his mathematical ideal for inquiry 
restricted him--to measurable sense qualities, nothing more. 
i'he scientist had lost the delicate balance needed tor full humar.i 
living. Compare the following judgements ot "scientific" and 
poetic experience. 
I see not, if one be once caught in this trap ot so-
called sciences, 8.l17 escape tor the man trom the links 
or the chain or physical necessity. Given such an 
embryo, such a history must follow. On this platform, 
one lives iD8a sty or sensualism, and would soon come to suicide.2' 
~t of poetic experience, " ••• now 11.7 chains a.re b:: ... ~ken; ••• and I 
shall see and comprehend J8.'1' relations. That will reconcile me 
28 Ibid., Vol. III, P• 54. 
-
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~o life, and renovate nature.•29 !'he poet, not the scientist ot 
~he day, was best suited to husband the New Dien. 
Emerson inte.nded neither to reject nor even to diminish the 
~ortb or a genuinely scientific attitude. His quarrel was with 
the scientific attitude of his d8.7 which drew its norms trom a 
mathematical model rather than from lived experience. In his 
mind, were the scientific approach to draw its norms from lived 
experience it would be bal~ced, vital, human, creative. In 
fact, he worked and hoped tor the time when the scientist and the 
poet would both rely on the same basic procedure, the procedure 
he attempted to articulate in his "science ot the real."30 
I look tor the new Teacher that ••• shall see the iden-
tity ot the law of gravitation with purity ot heart; 
and shall show that the Ought, the Deity41is one thing with Science, with Beauty, and with Joy.7 
Properly understood it might be consistent with J!lnerson•s 
thought to accept the suggestion that the ideal coJ111unity for 
support o! belief would be that or science, though not the scien• 
titic colllDlunity or his day. He thought the natural way or think-
ing was the genuinely scientific way or thinking. His community 
ot like-minded believers would in this sense be a scientific 
comm.unity--though, of course, not necessarily a community ot sci-
entists. It would be proper to say that for him the conclusion 
29 Ibid., p. 12. 
-30 Ct. Ibid., pp. 12, 20-21. 
--
3libid., Vol. I, P• 151; Vol. III, PP• 12, 20-21. "Por the 
experieiie'e""or each new age requires a new confession, and the 
world seems always waiting tor its poet." ~·• Vol. III, p. 1(. 
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"God exists," rests on the scientific approach to human living, 
and that he sought support tor this conclusion from among men 
~ho also shared his scientific approach. 
Regardless of the 11.Jllits of his argument for God's existence 
his work as a whole anticipated the efforts of later pragmatists 
to develop fully a procedure in harmony with both humanism and 
science. Vhether or not his conception of God was entirely 
rooted in experience, Emerson himself did not regard his over-all 
efforts as finai.32 In fact, he was not certain what the final 
~esolution would be. In his old age, nearly twenty years after 
the first impact or Darwin's Origin 91. Specie!• Ellerson commented 
on the rise in attention to science and the decline or interest 
in poetry, with the remark that our heightened interest in the 
sciences will either beget a new and better poetry, or extinguish 
it completely.33 Between the lines runs his completed thought: 
The future Eden would be either one of greater lite--ot more 
bum.anly meaningful freedom and creativity--or one of mass sui-
~ide. 
32 Ibid., Vol. II, P• 369; Vol. III, PP• 14-15, 21 • 
............... 
33v1111ams, "Unpublished Letters of Enerson," PP• 477-478. 
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